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Part I: Introduction, Hobbes & Descartes

Historical & Conceptual Background of the Modern Era (1500-1900)

I Renaissance Humanism
   A. Renaissance
      1. Began in 14th century Italy.
      2. Rapidly spread through Europe.
   B. Humanism
      1. Not the secular humanism of the 20th century.
   2. Celebration of the:
      a. Richness of the human spirit.
      b. Fruits of culture.
      c. Beauty of creation as means to bring God and spiritual things down to earth.
   3. Reveling in the goodness of creation that was made wonderful by God.
   4. The work of human culture was revered because humanity reflects the divine spirit.
   C. Rebirth of interest in Greek and Roman Literature
      1. The fall of Constantinople in 1453 to the Turks resulted in Greek refugees bringing Greek manuscripts to Europe.
      2. Latin translations of the works of Plato spawned an anti-Aristotelian reaction.
a. Aristotle had dominated the Scholastic thought of the Middle Ages.
b. A fresh examination of the original texts helped free thinkers from medieval thought.
c. Thinkers could read the texts directly without having to trust their predecessor’s commentary.
   3. Philosophy became more of an intellectual adventure rather than a mere defense of orthodox views.
D. Technology
   1. The printing press in 1447 enabled mass production of books.
   2. Intellectual works could be widely circulated.
   3. Learning was no longer confined to the clergy.
E. Other Trends
   1. Common tongues, such as English and French, begin to replace Latin in the scholarly literature.
   2. The rejection of Scholasticism as sterile, abstract intellectualism, many turned to classical literature.
   3. The classical view of autonomy and independence lead to freedom of thought.
4. Art became less symbolic and religious and more focused on classical and contemporary themes and subjects.
   a. The human figure became more important.

II Protestant Reformation
A. the Church
   1. 13th century was the high water mark of the church.
   2. The Great Schism 1378-1417
      a. Two opposing factions each with its own Pope and College of Cardinals.
      b. Scandals rocked the church as some clergy used their positions to satisfy their lust and greed.
      c. Attempts at reform were ignored or prevented.
B. Martin Luther (1483-1546)
   1. Provoked by the sale of papal indulgences by the Dominican friar Tetzel.
   2. Nailed his Ninety Five Theses to the door of the Wittenberg castle church in 1517.
   3. 1520: Pope Leo X excommunicated Luther, setting off the protestant revolution.
   4. A large part of northern Europe joined the revolution.
   5. 1530: Henry VIII’s dispute resulted in the Church of England breaking with Rome.
   7. Luther was influenced by Ockham’s skepticism towards Aquinas’ rationalism.
   8. The view that individuals had direct access to God and could follow their own interpretation of the Bible gave individuals new importance and encouraged freedom and individualism.

III Social & Political Changes
A. Religion
   1. The Protestant Reformation destroyed the religious unity of Europe.
   2. Kings broke with Rome.
   3. Religious wars occurred that, because of the strife and confusion of theological fanaticism, ironically gave rise to skepticism and tolerance.
B. Commerce
   1. A money economy replaced the barter system.
   2. Banking and capitalism created a need for stable governments.
   3. The middle class arose and became dominant.
   4. This caused an increased interest in life on earth.
   5. From the Medieval dualism of Heaven and Earth arose a culture uniting flesh and spirit.
   6. The protestant Ethic arose-economic activities are good and can serve a spiritual purpose.

IV The Rise of Modern Science
A. Background
   1. The renaissance began with a return to ancient thought.
   2. Astrology, Witchcraft, Alchemy and such abounded.
   3. Ptolemy of Alexandria (2nd century AD) and Aristotle
      a. Geocentric view.
      b. Planets revolved around the earth and had epicycles (sporadic, small loops) in their orbits.
      c. All known data fit within this theory.
      d. It fit the theological view from Palms 93:1 that the earth “will not be moved.”
B. Copernican Revolution
   1. Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543)
   2. The Revolutions of Heavenly Bodies 1543
   3. Heliocentric theory.
4. Based in Neo-Platonism.
   a. The perfect motion is a uniform circular motion around a center.
   b. Putting the sun at the center reduced by 50%+ the amount of epicycles needed.
   c. This was scientifically correct in that is placed a simpler more elegant solution over a complicated, awkward one.
5. This work stirred up both scientific and religious controversy.
6. The book wasn’t published until shortly before his death and wasn’t officially condemned by the church until Galileo’s time.

C. Galileo
1. Galileo Galilei (1564-1642)
2. He developed a telescope capable of 1000X magnification.
3. His observation of Jupiter’s moons gave plausibility to the Copernican theory.
4. His observations also refuted the Aristotelian view of an imperfect changing earth and a unchanging and perfect heaven.
5. Galileo, being a devout Catholic, sought to reconcile science and religion.
6. Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief Systems of the World 1632
   a. He claimed the Copernican view was correct.
7. His book was condemned, he was forced to deny his theory and he remained under house arrest until his death.

V. Implications of the New Science
A. Galileo
1. Combined Democritus’ materialism with the mathematical ideals of Plato and Pythagoreans to create a mathematical, mechanical conception of the world.
2. Primary Qualities
   a. Those that can be quantified.
   b. Size, shape, motion, mass, number.
3. Secondary Qualities
   a. Subjective qualities.
   b. Color, odor, sound.
4. Nature is made of only mathematical primary qualities.
5. The secondary qualities present nature as subjectively experienced.
6. This distinction became philosophically important.
B. The Replacement of Teleology with Mechanical Explanations.
1. Teleological Explanations-explain events in terms of their purposes.
   a. Aristotelian: Why do stones fall? In order to achieve their natural state.
   b. Medieval: Why does it rain? God makes it rain in order to nourish the crops.
2. Causes are given in terms of final causes.
3. Galileo didn’t ask why, but how-this lead to a science that asked new questions.
4. What was sought was an outward, observable behavior of things and not their inner meaning or divine purpose.
C. Elimination of Final Causes and God
1. God was no longer seen as the Supreme Good drawing all things to their final end.
2. As mathematical, physical laws provided sufficient explanations for natural events, the need to postulate God’s active intervention was reduced.
3. God became the First Cause that set things in motion after which things ran autonomously in accord with casual laws.
4. Thus began the compartmentalization of religion and science.

VI A New Approach to Philosophy
A. Agenda of the Early Modern Philosophers #1
1. To sweep away the past.
2. Aristotelian science had dominated thought for over a thousand years.
3. However, it was mistaken in its most fundamental conceptions.
4. As the science declined, so did the philosophy.
5. As the scientific, theological and philosophical beliefs had been sustained by tradition and authority, these were challenged.
6. Modern philosophers would not accept any belief unless they could convince themselves of its merit.
B. Agenda of the Early Modern Philosophers #2
1. The Search for a perfect philosophical method.
2. It does no good to reject past theories without a better replacement.
3. The problem is how to know what is better (how to guarantee its truth).
4. The early modern era begins with an obsessive search for this method.
   a. Strong focus on epistemology and philosophy of mind.
5. No method seemed to yield indubitable truths and consensus, so the search for a method continued.
C. Rationalism
1. The view that at least some knowledge is a priori.
2. A priori knowledge is knowledge that is obtained through reason, prior to or independently of experience.
   a. Logical and mathematical truths are said to be a priori.
   b. Some rationalists take truths about God, metaphysics or ethics to be a priori as well.
3. The mind contains innate ideas or a rational structure complete with logical categories.

D. Empiricism
1. The view that all knowledge of the world is empirical or a posteriori.
2. A posteriori knowledge is knowledge derived from experience.
3. The mind does not contain any innate ideas—it is a blank slate.

**Argument Basics**

I Argument Concepts
A. Defined
1. An argument is a set of claims, one of which is supposed to be supported by the others.
2. Conclusion: The claim that is supposed to be supported by the premises.
   a. An argument has one and only one conclusion.
3. Premise: A claim given as evidence or a reason for accepting the conclusion.
   a. An argument can have many premises.
4. Inductive Argument: An argument in which the premises are intended to provide some degree of support but less than complete support for the conclusion.
5. Deductive argument: An argument in which the premises are intended to provide complete support for the conclusion.
6. Fallacy: An argument in which the premises fail to provide adequate support for the conclusion.

B. General Assessment of Arguments: Reasoning
1. Do the premises logically support the conclusion?
2. If the argument is deductive, is it valid or invalid?
   a. A valid argument is such that if the premises were true then the conclusion must be true.
   b. An invalid argument is such that all the premises could be true and the conclusion false at the same time.
   c. Validity is tested by formal means, such as truth tables, Venn diagrams and proofs.
   d. A full discussion of deductive arguments is beyond the scope of this class.
3. If the argument is inductive, is it strong or weak?
   a. A strong argument is such that if the premises were true, then the conclusion is likely to be true.
   b. A weak argument is such that if the premises were true, then the conclusion is not likely to be true.
   c. Inductive arguments are assessed primarily in terms of standards specific to the argument in question.

C. General Assessment of Arguments Are the premises true?
1. Are the premises true or at least plausible?
2. Testing premises for plausibility:
   a. The premise is consistent with your own observations.
   b. The premise is consistent with your background knowledge and experience.
   c. The premise is consistent with credible sources, such as experts, standard references and textbooks.

**Some Useful Valid Deductive Arguments**

I Introduction to Deductive Arguments
A. Defined
1. An argument in which the premises are intended to provide complete support for the conclusion.
2. The premises are offered as evidence that the conclusion must be true.
3. The conclusion is not supposed to go beyond the premises.
B. Use
1. Deductive arguments are often used as a “logical frame” to present points established in other (typically inductive) arguments.
2. Example: After arguing that sexist art is harmful, one might build an argument using that claim and the claim “if sexist art is harmful, it should be censored” as premises.
C. Assessment
1. Analogy method—any argument with the same form as a valid argument is valid.
   a. This method requires that you know the form already.
2. Informal method: assume the premises are all true and ask whether the conclusion could still be false.
   a. This method is not completely reliable.
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a. These are definite and objective methods of testing validity.

D. Valid/Invalid, Sound/Unsound
1. Valid: an argument such that if all the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true.
2. Invalid: an argument such that even if all the premises are true, then the conclusion can still be false.
3. Sound: the argument is valid and has all true premises.
4. Unsound: the argument is invalid or has one or more false premises or both.

II Some common Valid Deductive Arguments

A. Modus Ponens (Affirming the Antecedent)
1. Form
   a. If P, then Q.
   b. P
   c. Q
2. Example:
   a. If killing in war is like murder, it is immoral.
   b. Killing in war is like murder.
   c. It is immoral.

B. Modus Tollens (Denying the Consequent)
1. Form
   a. If P, then Q.
   b. Not Q.
   c. Not P.
2. Example:
   a. If reality is just a dream, it should seem fairly incoherent.
   b. Reality does not seem fairly incoherent.
   c. Reality is not just a dream.

C. Hypothetical Syllogism
1. Form
   a. If P, then Q.
   b. If Q, then R.
   c. If P, then R.
2. Example
   a. If cheating is wrong, then cheating in a class is wrong.
   b. If cheating in a class is wrong, cheating on this test is wrong.
   c. If cheating is wrong, then cheating on this test is wrong.

D. Disjunctive Syllogism
1. Form
   a. P V Q
   b. Not P (or not Q)
   c. Q (or P)
2. Example
   a. Bill can lose weight through surgery or diet and exercise.
   b. Bill decided not to diet or exercise.
   c. Bill has decided to lose weight through surgery.
3. Note: this assumes that P and Q are the only two options.

E. Dilemma
1. Form 1
   a. If P, then Q
   b. If R, then S
   c. P or R
   d. Q or S
2. Form 2
   a. If P, then Q
   b. If R, then S
   c. Not Q or not S
   d. Not P or not R.
3. Form 3
   a. If P, then Q.
   b. If not P, then not Q.
   c. P or not P.
d. Q or not Q.

4. Example
   a. If lying is wrong, then people should not lie.
   b. If lying is not wrong, then it is okay for people to lie.
   c. Lying is either wrong or it is not.
   d. So people should not lie or it is acceptable.

III Reductio Ad Absurdum (Reducing to Absurdity)
   A. Defined
      1. An argument in which one proves that a claim is false by drawing an absurdity from the assumption that it is true.
      2. A claim can also be proven to be true by assuming it is false and deriving an absurdity from this.
   B. Form #1
      1. Assume that a claim, P, is true.
      2. Prove that this assumption leads to something false, absurd, or contradictory.
      3. Conclude that the claim that P is true is itself false.
      4. Conclude that P is false.
   C. Form #2
      1. Assume that a claim, P, is false.
      2. Prove that this assumption leads to something false, absurd, or contradictory.
      3. Conclude that the claim that P is false is itself false.
      4. Conclude that P is true.
   D. Example
      1. Oppression is to best defined as the mistreatment of a minority by a majority.
      2. In the case of sexism, a majority (women) is mistreated by a minority (men).
      3. Therefore, sexism is not oppression.
      4. This is absurd, so the definition is flawed.

Some Useful General Inductive Arguments

I Introduction to Inductive Arguments
   A. Defined
      1. An inductive argument is an argument in which the premises are intended to provide some degree of support, but less than complete support, for the conclusion.
      2. The premises are offered as evidence that the conclusion is likely to be true.
      3. The conclusion goes beyond the evidence presented in the premises—this is the inductive leap.
   B. Assessment
      1. They are assessed in terms of how strongly the premises support the conclusion.
      2. They are also assessed by standards specific to the type of argument.
      3. The standards are also used in assessing your own arguments when creating them.
      4. Unlike deductive arguments, there are no perfectly objective and definite ways of assessing inductive arguments.
   C. Strong and Weak Arguments
      1. Strong argument: An argument such that if the premises are true, then the conclusion is likely to be true.
      2. Weak argument: an argument such that even if the premises are true, the conclusion is not likely to be true.
      3. Unlike validity, strength is relative and not absolute.

Analogical Argument

I Introduction
   A. Definition
      1. An argument in which one concludes that two things are alike in a certain respect because they are alike in other respects.
   B. Uses
      1. Analogies are often used in cases in which X is understood and Y is not, to conclude something about Y.
         a. These are typically called explanatory comparisons/analogies.
      2. Example:
         a. Email is like mail sent to a post office box.
         b. Just as mail is delivered to the PO box and you go to pick it up, email is delivered to your email in box and your software “goes” and picks it up.
3. Analogical arguments are often used in cases in which X is accepted/seen as plausible and Y is not, to get the audience to accept Y or see it as plausible.

4. Analogical arguments are commonly used in both law and medicine.

II Form

A. Informal
   1. Most analogies are presented in an informal manner.

B. Strict Form
   1. Premise 1: X has properties P, Q, and R.
   2. Premise 2: Y has properties P, Q, and R.
   3. Premise 3: X has property Z as well.
   4. Conclusion: Y has property Z.

III Assessment

A. The strength of the analogy depends on
   1. The number of properties X and Y have in common.
      a. The more the better.
   2. The relevance of the shared properties to property Z.
      a. The more relevant, the stronger the argument.
      b. Property P is relevant to property Z if the presence or absence of P affects the likelihood that Z will be present.
   3. Whether X and Y have relevant dissimilarities as well as similarities.
      a. The more dissimilarities and the more relevant they are, the weaker the argument.

Argument from/by Example

I Introduction

A. Definition
   1. Defined: An argument in which a claim is supported by providing examples.
   2. Arguments from/by example are common in law.

II Form

A. Informal
   1. Arguments from/by example are typically presented in an informal manner.

2. Example: A person might prove that someone else is a pizza mooch by presenting all the times they had pizza without contributing.

B. Form
   1. Premise 1: Example 1 is an example that supports claim P.
   2. Premise 2: Example 2 is an example that supports claim P.
   3. Premise x: Example x is an example that supports claim P.
   4. Conclusion: Claim P is true.

III Standards of Assessment

A. Standards
   1. The more examples, the stronger the argument.
   2. The examples must be relevant.
      a. The more relevant the examples, the stronger the argument.
   3. The examples must be specific and clearly identified.
   4. Counter-examples must be considered.
      a. Counter-example: an example that counts against the claim.
      b. The more counter-examples and the more relevant they are, the weaker the argument.

Argument from Authority

I Introduction

A. Defined
   1. Defined: An argument in which the conclusion is supported by citing an authority.
   2. The strength of the support depends on the quality of the authority.
   3. It is a relatively weak form of argument.

B. Use
1. They are used when a person lacks the knowledge or expertise and needs to rely on an outside source.
2. They are also used to add extra weight to the author’s position.
3. Arguments from authority are often used as part of a larger argument.

II Form
A. Informal
   1. Most arguments from authority are presented in an informal manner.
B. Form
   1. Premise 1: Person A is an authority on subject S.
   2. Premise 2: Person A makes claim C about subject S.
   3. Premise 3: Therefore, C is true.

III Assessment
A. Standards
   1. The person has sufficient expertise in the subject.
   2. The claim is within the expert’s area of expertise.
   3. There is an adequate degree of agreement among experts.
   4. The expert is not significantly biased.
   5. The area of expertise is a legitimate area or discipline.
   6. The authority must be properly identified.
      a. This typically requires citing a source.

Appeal to Intuition

I Method
A. Intuitions & Arguments
   1. An intuition is typically a blend of how one thinks and feels about a matter prior to reflection.
      a. Crudely put, it is sort of a “gut” reaction.
   2. The goal of the argument is to “motivate” the reader’s intuitions so s/he accepts your position on the issue.
   3. The argument is something of a blend between persuasion and argumentation.
      a. The goal is to support a position through reason.
      b. The goal is also to get the audience accept your view because you have presented something that appeals to their intuitions.
B. Basic Method
   1. Show that X violates (or coincide with) our intuitions.
   2. Conclude that X is incorrect/implausible/wrong (or correct/plausible/right).
D. Story Method (General)
   1. Present a plausible and appealing story or scenario that aims at motivating the target’s intuitions towards your position on the issue.
   2. Present a developed argument that shows the reader why the story or scenario rationally supports your position.
   3. Conclude that your position is correct.

Thomas Hobbes

Background
I Background
A. Personal Information
   1. English
   2. 1588-1679
   3. Educated in scholasticism at Oxford, but was critical of it and the universities.
   4. Worked as a tutor for the wealthy Cavendish family.
   5. Knew Francis Bacon, Galileo and perhaps even Descartes.
   6. Wrote a series of objections to Descartes’ Meditations which were published by Descartes along with his replies.
B. Influence: Galileo’s Works
   1. Hobbes was influenced by Galileo’s works.
   2. Galileo’s physics served as a model for Hobbes’s philosophy.
C. Influence: Euclidean Geometry.
   1. Hobbes learned about Euclidean geometry at the age of 40.
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2. He found the axiomatic method of proof and emulated Euclid’s rigorous method in some of his works.

D. Influence: English Civil War
1. Began in 1642.
2. The main dispute was over the divine right of kings.
3. The war was fought between the monarchy and parliament.
5. In 1649 Charles I was executed and Cromwell’s government ruled England.
6. Hobbes was the tutor of the exiled Prince of Wales, who would be crowned Charles II in the restoration (1660).

E. Published *The Leviathan* in 1651.
1. This lead him to be dubbed “the father of atheists.”
2. He was deemed unsuitable as a tutor for the Prince of Wales.
3. The French Catholics were hostile to his attacks on religion.
4. He returned to England and made a deal with Cromwell.

F. A Happy Ending
1. His former student was crowned Charles II in 1660.
2. Charles II had fond memories of his former tutor and treated him well.

Hobbes: Physics & Philosophy

I Physics

A. Goal & Method
1. He set out to revamp the study of the physical world, human nature and society.
2. He utilized one scientific method in his approach because he regarded economy as critical to science.
3. His goal was to reduce complex phenomena to the simplest laws and most basic components.
4. He adopted Galileo’s reduction of nature to matter in motion as his model.

B. Empiricism
1. He held that all knowledge comes via the senses.
2. This served as his epistemology.

C. Metaphysical Materialism
1. The world can be fully explained in terms of matter in motion.
2. The sole science is physics.

D. God
1. Nature suggests the existence of an ultimate cause.
2. Since the notion of a nonphysical substance is meaningless, a spirit would have to be a fine and transparent physical substance.
3. While we may be able to claim that God exists, his empiricism entails that we cannot know what God is—he is not accessible via the sense.
4. Hence, God is not a subject for philosophy or science and can be left to the theologians.

E. Ontology
1. There are natural bodies such as rocks, water and living things.
2. There are political bodies which are artificial bodies.
3. The goal of philosophy is to find the causal laws for natural and artificial bodies.

II Types of Philosophy

A. First Philosophy
1. This replaces metaphysics.
2. It is an examination of properties common to all bodies.
3. It studies “motion and magnitude in the abstract.”
4. He holds to determinism: all events, including those of the future, are necessarily determined by previous causes.

B. Special Sciences
1. Sciences that study the motions of specific bodies moving at determinate velocities.
2. Includes astronomy and physics.

C. Science of Human Bodies
1. Living beings are complex bodies because they have a variety of internal motions.
2. A person can only study the motion of another body because it is creating motions within the person’s body.
3. Thus, a scientific account, given in terms of matter and motion, is needed for the human body.
4. He describes living organisms in such terms.
   a. The heart is a spring.
   b. The nerves are strings.
   c. The joints are wheels.
5. This view generated significant controversy because most other contemporary thinkers regarded humans as the pinnacle of the created world who possessed both dignity and a spiritual nature.

6. Hobbes reasoned that there is no reason to take human nature to be different from the rest of nature-hence the tools of the physical sciences are suitable for studying humans.

D. Political Science
1. Hobbes believed he could generalize from the science of human bodies to a science of society.
2. If humans are bodies in motion, then the laws that govern these motions can be discovered.
3. An understanding of the laws can be used to bring about peace, order and stability by adjusting society as a doctor adjusts a human body to make it healthy.

III Epistemology & Psychology
A. Thoughts
1. His epistemology is based on a mechanistic psychology.
2. Since all events are the movements of matter, mental events are motions within the body.
3. Thoughts are motions that represent objects outside the body.
4. Thoughts arise from the senses.
   a. “The original of them all is that which we call sense, for there is no conception in a man’s mind which hath not first, totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense.”
   b. “The rest are derived from that original.”

B. Sensations
1. Physical motions from external objects affect the sense organs and produce sensations-images, phantasms, or fancy.
2. The phenomenal qualities (color, flavor, odor, etc.) are not in the external objects or the motions of the body.
3. The qualitative terms do not describe quantitative motion.
4. They describe the appearances, phantasms, etc.
5. Hobbes reasons that the object and what we experience are two different things.
   a. For example, the moon seems to be a small, glowing disk yet it is very large.

C. Imagination and Memory
1. The original motion of perception causes the other motions of the brain.
2. Imagination and memory are merely “decaying sense.”
3. He explains afterimages using the notion of inertia.
4. The imagination can add or subtract its images to create fictional ideas.
5. The components of what is imagined were first present in sensations.

D. Association
1. Images that succeed one another in experience tend to be associated in the imagination.
   a. Such as fire and smoke.
2. Some associations are more subjective than others.
3. Thinking is explained in terms of how ideas tend to follow one another in thought when they followed one another in sensation.
4. His work in formulating the laws of motion for human cognition provided the foundation for associationist psychology.

IV Language
A. Humans
1. Humans differ from animals in regards to language.
2. Hobbes rejects the view that humans have a soul or other non-physical quality that distinguishes them from other animals.
3. Humans can give names or “other voluntary signs” to sensations.

B. Nominalism & Reasoning
1. He denies the existence of metaphysical universals.
2. There are universal names that stand for groups of similar particulars.
3. Words are signs that stand for sensations and are such that relations between words correspond to relations between external events.
   a. Such as fire and smoke.
4. Reasoning is “nothing but reckoning, that is adding and subtracting, of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the marking and signifying of our thoughts.”
5. Knowledge arising from reasoning is science.
6. Reason does not provide knowledge of the world-it only gives us the consequences of definitions, thus yielding conditional knowledge.
   a. “And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have said before is called science, it is not absolute but conditional.”
   b. “No man can know by discourse that this or that is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely:”
   c. “But only, that if this be, that is; if this has been, that has been; if this shall be, that shall be;”
V Metaphysics

A. Determinism
1. If the physics of his day provides the last word on nature, this entails that the world is deterministic.
2. Future events are determined of necessity by past events.
3. Uncertainty and unpredictability are features of our knowledge but not of the world.
   a. If we think an event results from chance, this is due to our ignorance of the causes.

B. Human Behavior
1. Since humans are also governed by the physical law, it follows that human behavior is also determined.
2. The more these laws are understood, the more predictable human behavior will be.
3. Hobbes accounts for our apparently intentional actions by making a distinction between vital and voluntary motions.
4. Vital motions: these are automatic activities such as digestion and circulation of the blood.
   a. Since they are not consciously chosen, it seems reasonable that they are determined by bodily states.

C. Voluntary Motions
1. In the case of voluntary motions, some think people have free will.
2. All voluntary motions begin with endeavor.
3. Endeavor manifests as either desire (motion towards something) or aversion (motion away from something).
4. These correlate with what an individual finds pleasurable or painful.

D. Hobbes account of Deliberation
1. Hobbes needs to provide an account that reconciles our deliberation and determinism.
   a. For example, a person might feel inclined to make a commitment, yet feel some reservations.
2. Hobbes explains this is terms of either experiencing alternating feelings of desire and aversion or motion between competing desires or two conflicting aversions.
3. Deliberation is determinate, but is explained in terms of a competition between forces in which the strongest wins.
4. The final motion in the competition is regarded as an act of will, though it is no more free than any other physical motion.

VI Ethics

A. Morality and Materialism
1. He explains morality in the same matter as the Epicureans-in terms of human psychology.
2. “Good” refers to objects of desire-pleasure.
3. “Evil” refers to objects of aversion-pain.
4. Since good and evil rest on pleasure and pain and people vary in what they regard as pleasurable and painful, then good and evil are subjective.
5. People are egoistic hedonists-they are guided by their pursuit of pleasure.
6. Hobbes is a psychological hedonist-he claims that people always seek to gain pleasure and avoid pain.
7. On his view, good is what yields pleasure and evil is what yields pain-to the individual.
8. Given his view, there is no sense in asking whether people ought to act this way or not.

Hobbes: Physics & Politics

I View of Politics
A. Experience
1. Hobbes lived during the English civil war.
2. He switched allegiances several times between the royalists and anti-royalists.
3. He always timed his switches badly, often ending up in danger.

B. Conclusions drawn from experience
1. If there is not a stable government, then there is chaos.
2. Chaos is to be avoided at all costs.
3. Chaos can only be prevented by a strong government.

C. Method
1. He attempts to present an analysis that explains society.
2. Using a method derived from geometry, he starts with a set of indubitable axioms about human nature and then deduces theorems from them.
3. His goal is not to present an historical account as to how government arose.
4. His goal is to show how government is justified in terms of the laws of human nature and the required form of a rational government.

II The State of Nature
A. State of Nature

1. A thought experiment.
2. In this state all are equal and everyone has a right to all things.
   a. Equal in terms of a lack of distinctions based on society such as ranks or privileges.
3. Given his materialism and psychological hedonism, there is no objective moral order that humans are subject to.
4. In the state of nature, “right” means “freedom based on power.”
5. “Every man has a right to everything; even to one another’s body.”

B. Egoism

1. Hobbes takes humans to be egoists, with each looking out for himself.
2. He rejects Aristotle’s view that people are social by nature.
3. He claims that people have no natural love or sympathy for other humans.
4. Bodies are driven by their desire to survive and there is nothing to create harmony in the motions.
5. The state of nature is a terrible state in which there is no
   a. Industry.
   b. Culture of the earth.
   d. Commodities that may be imported via the sea.
   e. Large buildings.
   f. Instruments of moving/removing things that require extensive force.
   g. Knowledge of geography.
   h. Account of time.
   i. Arts, letters, society.

6. The state of nature is a state “of continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”

III Natural Laws

A. Natural Laws

1. Hobbes does not follow the ancient & medieval view that natural laws are part of an objective moral order.
2. These laws are general rules that are discovered by understanding the nature of the physical world.

B. The Laws

1. The first law is the law of survival, which gives everyone the right to all things.
2. Seek peace, but be prepared to preserve your life by any and all means.
3. We should give up our right to all things, provided that everyone does so, in order to keep the peace.

C. The Sovereign

1. We agree to give up our right to all things out of selfishness.
2. Given that humans are egoists, there must be a coercive power to compel people to abide by their agreements.
3. This is done by having all “confer all their power and strength upon one man or assembly of men, that may reduce their all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will.”
4. He calls the sovereign “an artificial man”, the “great leviathan” and “that mortal god.”
5. This is the origin of social contract theory—the theory that governments are created by humans via agreement.

IV Social Contract

A. The Contract

1. In the contract each gives up his rights to a sovereign.
2. It is as if each person signs the following agreement: “I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man or assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him and authorize all his actions in a like manner.”
3. The contract is between individuals and not between the citizens and the state.
4. Once people agree to create the sovereign, they give up all rights over it—except the right of self-preservation which is still retained.
5. His theory does not require any particular form of government, although he expressed preference for a single ruler.
6. He does not present any notion of a division of power, most likely because he saw the English civil war as arising from a division of power between the king, lords and House of Commons.

B. The Sovereign

1. He considered the worst tyrant to be preferable to no government or a weak government.
2. His sovereign has absolute power.

C. Rights & Morality

1. The only rights citizens possess are those granted by the sovereign.
2. The sovereign cannot act unjustly because all law and justice stem from governmental authority.
3. Hobbes is a legal positivist—what the state defines what is legal and illegal and this determines what is “right” and “wrong.”
4. If people were permitted to decide which laws were just and which unjust, the result would be chaos.

D. Reaction
1. The royalists did not like his rejection of the divine right of kings and wanted a more substantial and dignified foundation to government than a sovereign created out of fear and desperation.
2. Those with democratic leanings did not like the absolute power the sovereign was imbued with.

Impact & Problems

I Impact
A. Impact
1. His theory of perception and psychology provided a model of scientific, empirical epistemology.
2. He made the first systematic attempt to develop a complete materialistic monism in the modern era.
3. His use of the natural sciences as a model for psychology, sociology and political theory became the standard approach.
4. He is considered by many to be the founder of modern political science.
5. He contributed the innovation that the state is a human construct rather than being based on eternal principles (such as the Platonic Justice) or the result of human nature (such as Aristotle's view that humans are social by nature).
6. His view of the state as a collection of individuals helped bolster individualism.
7. His concepts of the state of nature and social contract theory became standard components in political thought.
8. He helped foster the modern movement away from a theological state to a secular state.
   a. This provided grounds for regarding politics and government as matters of rational inquiry.

II Problems
A. Perception
1. The world is divided into two realms.
   a. The external world of bodies in motion.
   b. The inner world of the mind in which perception occurs.
2. We cannot be sure of an external world since we cannot “get outside” of our internal experiences and compare them to the external objects that are supposed to cause these experiences.
B. Consciousness
1. If their appearances, it would seem to follow that there is what appears and what it appears to.
2. Hobbes takes consciousness to be motion, but it seems quite different from other motions in that it is capable of being appeared to by other motions.
3. Hobbes did not address this problem.
C. Freedom, Purpose and Values
1. Hobbes theory seems to do away with freedom, purpose and values.

Rene Descartes

Background

I Life & Works
A. Life
1. Born March 31, 1596 in La Haye France (now named “Descartes”).
2. Received a scholastic education at the Jesuit college of La Fleche.
3. Earned a degree in law.
4. Joined armies to see the world.
5. On November 10, 1619, shut in for the winter, he had three vivid dreams.
   a. The dreams lead to his mission—to solve the mysteries of nature via a philosophy based on mathematical reasoning.
   b. In gratitude he vowed to make a pilgrimage to the Italian shrine of Our Lady of Lorretto.
6. In 1649 he became the tutor of Queen Christina of Sweden.
7. The cold and his 5:00 am meetings with her eventually lead to his death by pneumonia on February 11, 1650.
B. Published Works
1. 1620-Wrote the Rules for the Direction of the Mind.
   a. Published after his death.
2. 1633-Wrote Le Monde (The World).
a. A work on physics—the world as matter in motion.
b. Galileo has been condemned by Rome for a similar view so it was not published until 1664.
3. 1637- *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One’s Reason and Seeking the Truth in the Sciences.*
   a. Written in French rather than Latin.
4. 1641- *Meditations on First Philosophy.*
5. 1644 *Principles of Philosophy*
   a. Intended to replace the textbooks based on Aristotle that were used in universities.
6. 1649- *Passions of the Soul*

II Agenda
A. Motivation
   1. He was dissatisfied with the philosophy and science of his time.
   2. He says that philosophy “has been cultivated for many centuries by the most excellent minds yet there is still no point in it which is not disputed and hence doubtful.”
   3. He held that the sciences are on shaky foundations because they rest on philosophical assumptions.
B. Travel
   1. He was tired of the fact that the teachers repeated the old ideas or Aristotle and Scholastic dogma.
   2. He set out on an intellectual journey.
   3. His exposure to the vast diversity in opinion leading him to more confusion and doubt.
C. Inward Focus
   1. He decided to “undertake studies within myself too and one day to undertake studies within myself too and to use all the powers of my mind in choosing the paths I should follow.”
   2. His goal was to locate a solid foundation for the sciences.
   3. He is considered the father of modern philosophy because of his autobiographical and individualistic approach to philosophy.
   4. Unlike Medieval philosophers, Descartes rarely used quotes and generally did not rely on arguments from authority.
   5. Descartes operated as a solitary thinker working towards truth.
   6. He was one of the first philosophers to make extensive use of personal pronouns.
   7. He believed that individuals have the intellectual capabilities to discover truth on their own.
   8. Descartes held that these individual journeys would lead to the same truths.
D. Goals
   1. To find certainty.
      a. Doubts and conflicting opinions were disturbing and weakened the foundations of the science.
   2. To create a universal science: this involved finding a unified set of principles from which can be deduced all answers to Scientific questions.
   3. To reconcile the scientific, mechanistic conception of the universe with human freedom and religion.

Method
I Methodology
A. Mathematics
   1. He used mathematics as a model in his quest for certainty and a universal science.
   2. He found the certainty and self-evidence of mathematics to be very appealing and believed it could be applied to all questions.
   3. He expressed this view in the *Discourse.*
   4. He held that the method of mathematics consists in two mental operations: intuition and deduction.
B. Intuition
   1. This is the recognition of self-evident truths.
      a. Such as truths of math and the principles of logic.
   2. If one is thinking with clarity when examining a self-evident truth, then one will simply see its truth.
   3. Such truths are not derived from other truths.
   4. He took such ideas to be innate-implanted by God.
   5. We are not always aware of the ideas.
   6. These ideas cannot be derived from sense experience.
   7. These ideas are discovered by an intellectual “vision.”
      a. This notion of nonsensory intellectual vision is found in Plato and Augustine.
      b. It is a standard component of rationalism.
C. Deduction
   1. This is a necessary inference from other propositions that are known with certainty.
   2. He held that one could proceed, via deduction, from a self-evident truth to a conclusion that would thus be known with certainty.
3. He held that all truths could be reached by applying this method of deduction.
4. He was the first to publish the principles of analytical geometry in 1637.
   a. Spatial figures could be analyzed in terms of numbers and variables.
5. The physical world can be translated, via geometry, into mathematical forms.
6. He contended that this method could be applied to bring order and measure to all knowledge.

D. The *Meditations on First Philosophy*
1. The six meditations is written as if he wrote them over the course of six days.
2. The meditations were actually the result of about a decade’s worth of effort.
3. It seems to be based on the fact that Jesuits would spend six days of Holy Week studying the spiritual meditations of Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the order.

**First Meditation: The Method of Doubt**

I First Part

A. Start and Goal
1. Many beliefs he took to be true were false.
2. Everything constructed on these beliefs was doubtful.
3. Goals:
   a. Rid himself of all opinions he had accepted.
   b. Build anew from the foundation to establish a firm and permanent structure in the sciences.

B. Method
1. It is not necessary to show all of his beliefs are false.
2. Assent will be withheld from:
   a. Matters which are not entirely certain and indubitable.
   b. Those appearing manifestly false.
3. Finding a reason to doubt in each justifies rejecting the whole.
4. No need to examine each in particular.
   a. An endless undertaking.
   b. The destruction of the foundations brings down the rest.

II Doubting the Senses

A. Senses
1. All that was accepted as most true and certain was learned from or through the senses.
2. But at times these senses are deceptive.
3. It is wiser not to entirely trust anything which has deceived us once.

B. Dream Problem
1. Skeptical Pause: While the senses sometimes deceive us about barely perceptible or far away things, others cannot reasonably be doubted.
   a. Example: "I am here, seated by the fire…and other similar matters."
   b. To deny these would be comparable to madness.
2. In dreams, things less probable than those claimed by the insane occur.
3. He has often thought he was awake when asleep.
4. Skeptical Pause: What happens in sleep does not appear as clear or distinct as current experience.
5. In sleep he has been deceived by illusions.
6. There are no certain indications to clearly distinguish being awake from dreaming
7. He assumes he is asleep and all these particulars are false delusions.
   a. Possibly neither our hands nor body are as they appear to be.

C. Painter Analogy
1. Things represented in sleep are like painted representations which must have been formed as the counterparts of something real and true.
2. In this way those general things at least (eyes, head, hands, body), are not imaginary, but real.
3. Painters, even when representing sirens and satyrs, cannot give them entirely new natures, but combine the members of different animals.
   a. If a painting represents a thing fictitious and false, the colors are necessarily real.
4. For the same reason, though general things (body, eyes, head, hands) may be imaginary, there are simpler and more universal objects which are real and true.
   a. Just as certain real colors, these images of things, whether true and real or false and fantastic, are formed.
5. To this class of things pertains
   a. Corporeal nature.
   b. Extension.
c. Figure of extended things.
d. Quantity/magnitude and number.
e. Location.
f. Time
8. Physics, Astronomy, Medicine and sciences that consider composite things are very dubious and uncertain.

D. Math-Skeptical Pause
1. Arithmetic, Geometry and other such sciences.
a. Deal with very simple and very general things.
b. Do not determine whether they exist or not.
c. Might be taken contain some certainty and indubitability.
2. Whether one is awake or asleep,
a. Two and three together always form five,
b. The square can never have more than four sides.
3. It seems impossible that truths so clear and apparent can be suspected of any falsity or uncertainty.

III God and the Demon
A. God
1. Descartes believed that an all-powerful God existed who created him.
2. How does he know that God has not made it so that there is
   a. No earth.
   b. No heaven.
   c. No extended body.
   d. No magnitude.
   e. No place.
3. Yet he has perceptions of all these things and they seem to exist exactly as he sees them?
4. Others deceive themselves in what they think they know best, so how does he know he is not deceived when he
   a. Adds two and three.
   b. Counts the sides of a square.
   c. Judges simpler things.
5. Possibly God has not desired that he should be deceived, for He is said to be supremely good.
6. If it is contrary to His goodness to have made Descartes so he constantly deceives himself
   a. It would be contrary to His goodness to permit Descartes to be sometimes deceived
   b. He cannot doubt that God permits this.
7. There is nothing in all he formerly believed which he cannot doubt for powerful and considered reasons.
   a. So he ought to refrain from giving credence to these opinions as he would to the manifestly false.
   b. If he desires to arrive at any certainty in the sciences.

C. The Demon
1. He supposes not that God, but some evil genius as powerful as deceitful has employed his whole energies in deceiving him.
2. All external things are illusions and dreams which this genius presents as traps for his credulity.
3. He considers himself as having no hands, eyes, flesh, blood, nor senses, yet falsely believing himself to possess them.
4. If it is not in his power to arrive at the knowledge of any truth, he will do what is in his power
   a. Suspend judgment.
   b. Avoid giving credence to any false thing.
   c. Avoid being imposed upon by this arch deceiver, however powerful and deceptive he may be.

Meditation II
Of the Nature of the Human Mind; and that It Is More Easily Known Than the Body

I Skepticism and Certainty
A. Method
1. Anything that can be doubted in the least will be treated as false.
2. He will continue until he finds something certain or until he is certain there is nothing certain.
3. Archimedes, to move the earth, demanded only one fixed and immovable point.
   a. Similarly, Descartes hopes to discover one thing which is certain and indubitable.
B. Skepticism: He decides to suppose that
1. All things seen are false.
2. Nothing his memory represents existed.
3. He has no senses.
4. Body, figure, extension, movement and place are fictions of his mind.
5. Nothing is true.

C. The Foundation of Certainty: I am, I Exist
1. He denied he had senses and body and accepted there was nothing in the world.
2. He is sure he exists since he thought of something.
3. If the deceiver deceives him, he cannot doubt that he exists.
4. The deceiver can deceive Descartes but can never cause him to be nothing if he thinks he is something.
5. “I am, I exist”, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or I mentally conceive it.”

II The Self
A. Goal
1. To determine the nature of the self.
B. Rejected: Rational Animal.
1. Perhaps he is a rational animal.
2. He would have to inquire what an animal is, and what is reasonable.
3. This would lead to an infinite number of questions, and he doesn’t want to waste time on this.
C. Rejected: A body.
1. Body is a thing that
   a. Has a certain shape and location.
   b. Fills a space thus excluding other bodies.
   c. Is perceivable by the senses.
2. A body must be moved by something else because self-movement, feeling and thinking are not part of the nature of body.
3. Assuming the evil demon is deceiving him, he can doubt he has a body.
4. His experiences with dreams also undercut the belief that he has a body.
5. So he rejects the claim that he is a body.
D. A Thing that Thinks
1. Only the attribute of thought cannot be separated from him.
2. “I am, I exist” is certain.
3. It might be possible that if he ceased entirely to think, he would cease to exist.
4. Not accepting anything which is not necessarily true, he claims he is not more than a thing which thinks.
5. The thinking thing is a mind or soul.
6. So, he is a thing that thinks.
E. Rejected
1. He is not a human body.
2. He is not a subtle air distributed throughout the body.
3. He is not a wind, a fire, a vapor, a breath, nor anything he can imagine or conceive.
4. This is because he has assumed that all these were nothing.
F. Knowledge of His Existence is not Via the Imagination.
1. To imagine: to contemplate the figure or image of a corporeal thing.
2. It is certain the knowledge of his existence does not depend on things whose existence is not yet known to him.
3. His knowledge does not depend on what he can feign in imagination: ‘feign’ shows the error.
4. He considers that all images and things relating to the body are dreams.
5. Thus, he sees as little reason to use his imagination to know more distinctly what he is than to go to sleep so his dreams may represent a perception he had when awake with greater truth and evidence.
6. So he knows for certain that his knowledge of himself does not come via the imagination.
G. Certainty
1. It is certain he exists; even if he is always sleep or his creator is deceiving him.
2. Though nothing he imagines is true, the power of imagining is in use and forms part of his thought.
3. Even if what he seems to sense is false and he is dreaming, it is still true that he is feeling and thinking.

III The Wax Example
A. The Wax
1. The wax has color, taste, and smell and is also cold, hard, has a certain shape and produces a sound when struck.
2. After being heated, the color changes, the taste and smell vanish; it is hot, liquid and does not make a sound when struck.
3. The same wax remains after all sensed things changed, so what was known distinctly in the wax cannot be anything sensed.
4. The wax was not the taste, odor, color, figure, and sound.
5. The wax was a body once perceived under those qualities and is now perceptible under others.
B. How the wax is known
1. Abstracting from all that does not belong to the wax all that remains is an extended thing that is flexible and movable.
2. The wax can take on an infinite number of shapes and this is beyond his imagination.
   a. So this conception of the wax is not brought about by the imagination.
3. The wax can receive more variations in extension than he ever imagined.
   a. So he could not understand via the imagination what this piece of wax is.
4. Its perception is neither an act of vision, nor touch, nor imagination.
5. The wax is known by his mind.

C. Language and Errors
1. Words often impede and the terms of ordinary language almost deceive him.
2. We say we see the same wax, if it is present.
3. We don’t say we judge it is the same from its having the same color and figure.
4. From this he would mistakenly conclude he knew the wax by vision and not by the intuition of the mind.

D. Perception and Inference
1. When he says he sees men, he really does not see them.
2. He infers he sees men, just as he says he sees wax.
3. He just sees hats and coats which may cover automatic machines.
4. He judges them to be men.
5. Similarly only by the faculty of judgment in his mind, he comprehends that which he believed he saw.

E. The Wax proves he exists.
1. If he judges the wax exists because he touches it, it follows that he is.
2. If he judges his imagination, or another cause persuades him the wax exists, he will conclude he is.
3. What he has said of wax may be applied to all other external things.
4. All contributions to the knowledge of any body, are better proofs of the nature of his mind.

F. Conclusion
1. Even bodies are not known by the senses or imagination but only the understanding.
2. They are known because they are understood, not because they are sensed.
3. He claims there is nothing easier for him to know than his mind.

Meditation III

Of God: That He Exists
Revised 12/14/2004

I Truth & God
A. Standard of Truth: Clear & Distinct
1. He is certain he is a thing which thinks because he perceives this clearly and distinctly.
2. His standard: all things which he perceives very clearly and very distinctly are true.

B. External Things
1. He accepted that he had ideas caused by and similar to external objects.
2. The only thing clear and distinct about such ideas is that they were presented to his mind.
3. Thus he is in error or if he is correct about their existence, this is not due to any knowledge from his perception.

D. God and Deception
1. He could be deceived by as mathematics, geometry, etc. if God made him so he is deceived even about what seems most manifest.
2. Since he has no reason to believe in a deceptive God and is not yet convinced there is a God, the basis for his doubt is both sleight and metaphysical.
3. To be certain of anything, he must answer two questions:
   a. Does God exist?
   b. If God exists, is He a deceiver?

II Ideas
A. Division of Thoughts
1. He divides his thoughts into certain kinds to determine in which there is truth or error.
2. Ideas: thoughts that are images of things.
3. Volitions, affections and judgments

B. Ideas & Truth
1. Ideas in themselves and not related to anything else beyond cannot be false.
2. Falsity cannot enter into will or affections: though one may desire evil or nonexistent things, it is no less true they are desired.
3. The principal and common error is judging the ideas in him are similar to things outside.

C. Source of Ideas
1. Types of ideas: innate, adventitious, others formed by himself.
2. He originally held that his sense experiences were produced by external objects.
3. He holds that such things as sirens and hippogriffs are formed out of his mind.
4. He does not, as yet, know the true origin of these ideas.
D. Ideas of External Objects
1. He sets out to determine what causes him to think the ideas that appear to be from external objects are similar to them.
2. First reason: He seems to have been taught this lesson by nature.
3. Second Reason: These ideas do not depend on his will and so don’t depend on him.
4. Third Reason: He considers that his ideas resemble the objects.

E. External Objects: Instructed by Nature
1. By “instructed by nature” he means
   a. A certain spontaneous inclination impels him to believe in a connection between his ideas and external objects.
   b. Not a natural light making him recognize it is true.
2. He cannot doubt what the natural light causes him to believe to be true.
3. The natural light is his sole faculty to distinguish truth from falsehood.
4. He rejects the natural impulses as a reliable means to distinguish between truth and falsehood because when choosing between virtue and vice they often lead to vice.

F. External Objects: Ideas do not depend on his will.
1. These ideas must proceed from external objects because they do not depend on his will.
2. He rejects this: perhaps he has an unknown faculty to produce these ideas without external things, as happens during sleep.

G. External Objects: Resemblance
1. Though the ideas are from external objects, it is not necessary they should resemble each other.
2. There is often a great difference between the object and its idea.
3. The idea of the sun that is derived from the senses, an adventitious idea, is the sun seems extremely small.
4. The idea of the sun derived from astronomical reasoning is elicited from certain innate notions or formed by him in another manner and in this idea the sun appears much greater than the earth.
5. These two ideas cannot both resemble the same sun and reason shows that the one which seems to have originated directly from the sun is the most dissimilar to it.

III Ideas, Reality and Causes
A. Ideas and Reality
1. He considers another method of determining if anything he has internal ideas of exist as external objects.
2. Taking ideas as modes of thought, they are the same in that all appear to proceed from him in the same manner.
3. Taking ideas as images, one representing one thing and the other another, they are very different.
4. Objective reality
   a. Having the quality in a representational rather than actual manner.
   b. Known now as “intentionality” or “aboutness.”
   c. Example: the idea of a square is “about” the square, but the idea is not itself square.
   d. Is the reality of ideas.
5. Ideas representing substances contain more objective reality than those representing modes or accident.
6. The idea of God has more objective reality than ideas of finite substances.

B. Principle: The cause must contain at least as much reality as the effect.
1. The natural light informs him there must at least be as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect.
2. An effect must derive its reality from its cause.
3. A cause cannot communicate this reality to the effect unless it possesses it in itself, hence
   a. Something cannot proceed from nothing.
   b. That what is more perfect, which has more reality within itself, cannot proceed from the less perfect.
4. This is true of effects possessing formal reality and those having objective reality.
5. Formal Reality
   a. Actually having a quality.
   b. For example, actually being square or weighing ten kilograms.
   c. Possessed by what causes ideas
6. To exist a thing must be produced by something possessing formally or eminently all that enters into its composition.
7. Eminent Containment: Having the capacity to produce the effect of a quality without actually having that quality.

C. Causes of Ideas
1. The idea of something must be caused by something with at least as much reality as conceived to exist in it.
2. The cause of an idea does not transmit any of its formal reality to the idea.
3. An idea is a mode of thought and requires only the formal reality it borrows from thought.
4. The cause of an idea must contain at least as much formal reality as the idea contains objective reality.
5. If something is in an idea which is not in the cause, it must have derived from nothing.
6. But this is not possible since an idea cannot come from nothing.

D. Regress Argument for Archetypes
1. Though one idea causes another idea, this cannot continue indefinitely.
2. An idea must be reached whose cause is an archetype, which formally contains the whole objective reality in the ideas.
3. Thus the light of nature causes him to know the ideas in him are like images
   a. Which can be less perfect than their causes.
   b. Which can never contain anything greater or more perfect than their causes.

E. Method: Trying to find an idea he cannot be the cause of.
1. If the objective reality of an idea shows it is not in him formally or eminently, so he cannot be the cause, it necessarily follows
   another being exists that caused it.
2. Without this idea, he would lack a sufficient argument to prove the existence of any being beyond himself since his
   investigation has found no other proof.
3. Ideas: Some ideas represent him to himself, so they are caused by him.
4. Idea: He has an idea which represents a God.
3. Ideas: Other ideas represent corporeal and inanimate things.

F. He could be the cause of his ideas of secondary qualities.
1. There is nothing in the ideas of corporeal objects that prevent him from being the cause.
2. There is little in them he perceives clearly and distinctly.
3. It is only in judgments that formal falsity occurs.
4. A certain material falsity may be found in ideas: when these ideas represent what is nothing as though it were something.
5. Ideas of cold and heat are so unclear and indistinct that they do not show if one is the privation of the other or if they are real
   qualities.
6. Since ideas resemble images there cannot be any ideas that do not appear to represent some things.
7. If cold is a privation of heat, the idea representing it as real and positive is false, and the same for other similar ideas.
9. If true, as they show so little reality he cannot clearly distinguish the thing represented from non-being, he could be the cause.
10. Thus, it is not necessary to posit a cause for these ideas other than Descartes.

G. He could be the cause of his ideas of primary qualities.
1. Some clear and distinct idea of corporeal things might be from ideas of himself: substance, duration, number, etc.
2. When he thinks a stone is a substance and he is a substance, both represent substances.
3. When he perceives he now exists and remembers thoughts he can count, he acquires ideas of duration and number which can
   be transferred to any object.
4. The other qualities composing ideas of corporeal things (extension, figure, situation and motion) are not formally in him, since
   he is only a thinking thing.
5. But because they are modes of substance and he is a substance, they might be contained in him eminently.

IV God
A. God
1. He sets out to determine if he could be the cause of his idea of God.
2. God: a substance that is infinite eternal, immutable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and which created everything.
3. He believes the ideas of these characteristics cannot proceed from him alone.
4. He concludes God necessarily exists.

B. Substance and Infinity Argument
1. Since he is a substance, the idea of substance is within him.
2. Being finite he would not have the idea of the infinite unless it came from an infinite substance.
3. He could not perceive the infinite by the negation of the finite.
4. There is more reality in infinite substance than in finite, so he has the notion of the infinite earlier than the finite: the notion of
   God before that of himself.
5. He could not know he is imperfect without an idea of a more perfect being with which to compare himself.
6. So, the idea of God cannot be materially false and cannot be derived from nothing (existing in him because he is imperfect).
7. The idea is clear and distinct and contains more objective reality than any other, so it must be true.
8. We can imagine such a Being does not exist, but not that His idea represents nothing real.

D. Infinity, God and Comprehension
1. That he does not comprehend the infinite and that God contains an infinitude of things he cannot comprehend does not affect
   matters.
2. It is the nature of the infinite that his finite and limited nature should not comprehend it.
3. It is sufficient he understands this and judges all he clearly perceives in which there is some perfection, and possibly an
   infinitude of unknown properties, are in God formally or eminently.

E. Descartes considers he might be the cause.
1. He considers all perfections attributed to God are potentially in him, though he is unaware of them.
2. Since his knowledge increases and he sees nothing which can prevent it from increasing into infinitude, there is nothing to
   prevent him using it to acquire the other perfections of the Divine nature.
3. There is no reason why the power of acquiring these perfections should not suffice to produce ideas of them.

f. Why Descartes Cannot be the Cause
Modern Notes

1. Suppose his knowledge acquired more perfection, and his nature held many things potentially, but not actually.
2. These do not pertain to the idea of God: In Him everything is actual and not potential.
3. Since his knowledge increases little by little, it is imperfect.
4. His knowledge can never be infinite since it cannot reach a point where it cannot increase.
5. God is actually infinite, so that He can add nothing to His supreme perfection.
6. The objective being of an idea cannot be produced by a being existing merely potentially but only by a formal or actual being.
7. So, Descartes cannot be the cause of his idea of God.

V More on God

A. Goal
1. He wants to determine if he can exist if God does not exist.
2. Perhaps he derived his existence from himself, his parents, or something less perfect than God (since nothing equal or greater in perfection can be imagined).

B. He is lacking, so he cannot be the author of his own being.
1. If he were independent of every other and the author of his being he would have given himself every perfection of which he had an idea and would thus be God.
2. It was much more difficult to bring about his existence from nothing, than to attain knowledge of things he is ignorant of.
3. So he is not the author of his own being.

C. Infinite Parts Argument
1. His life may be divided into an infinite number of parts, none of which is dependent on the other.
2. Because he existed before it does not follow he must exist now, unless some cause at this instant produces him anew-conserves him.
3. Conserving a substance in each moment requires the same power and action necessary to create it anew.
4. The light of nature shows there is only a distinction of reason between creation and conservation.
5. Being nothing but a thinking thing he would know he had such a power.
6. Since he lacks the power, he knows he depends on some being different from himself.

D. Regress Argument
1. Perhaps he depends on his parents or another cause less perfect than God.
2. This cannot be, because there must be at least as much reality in the cause as in the effect.
3. As a thinking thing with an idea of God, the cause of his existence must be a thinking thing having the idea of all perfections attributed to God.
4. This cause must derive its origin from itself or from some other thing.
5. If from itself, it follows this cause must be God.
   a. Having self-existence, it must have the power of possessing all perfections conceived as existing in God.
7. If it derives its existence from another cause, the second cause either exists by itself or by another.
8. There can be no regression into infinity, thus the ultimate cause, God, is reached.

E. Several Causes
1. There cannot be several causes for his existence from each he received an idea of a perfection attributed to God.
   a. So all these perfections exist in the universe, but not complete in one unity, God.
2. The unity, simplicity or inseparability of all things in God is His principle perfection.
3. So, the cause must be singular-God.

F. Parents
1. Though all he believed of them were true, it does not follow they conserve him or created him as a thinking being.
2. They merely implanted certain dispositions in the matter in which the self exists.

G. Idea of God
1. Must come from the senses or be a fiction or be innate.
2. Not received via the senses—it is never presented to him unexpectedly, as ideas of sensible things usually are.
3. Not a fiction of his mind since he lacks the power to take from or add anything to it.
4. Hence it is innate, just as the idea of himself is innate in him.

H. God is not a Deceiver
1. Descartes knows he is something incomplete and dependent, which incessantly aspires after something better and greater.
2. Descartes knows that God actually and infinitely possesses the things he aspires to, so He is God.
3. His argument rests on his recognition that it is not possible that his nature should be what it is, and that he should have the idea of a God, if God did not exist.
4. A God who possesses all supreme perfections of which our mind may have some idea without understanding them and who is liable to no errors or defect.
5. From this it is manifest He cannot be a deceiver, since the light of nature teaches that fraud and deception necessarily proceed from some defect.
Meditation IV

I God & Reason

A. God is not a deceiver.
   1. Descartes is satisfied he has proved that God exists and is perfect.
   2. He is also convinced that God would not deceive, since being a deceiver would make him imperfect.

B. Reason
   1. God created his cognitive faculties.
   2. God is not malicious or deceptive.
   3. So when he uses his reason correctly, it must lead him to the truth.
   4. Thus, anything that is clear and distinct must be true.
   5. He asserts that when he is reasoning properly “it is quite impossible for me to go wrong.”

C. The Cartesian Circle
   1. This problem was first noted by his contemporary, Antoine Arnauld.
   2. Descartes claims that he is sure what is clearly and distinctly perceived is true only because God exists.
   3. But, Descartes also claims that we can only be sure that God exists because we clearly and distinctly perceive this.
   4. The problem is that to know God exists, ensuring the truth of what is clearly and distinctly perceived, he must know that what he clearly and distinctly perceives is true.
   5. Hence, his

D. The Possibility of error.
   1. Descartes needs to provide an account of error.
   2. He claims the scope of the will is wider than that of the intellect.
   3. Rather than limiting the will to the limits of the intellect, he extends it to matters which he does not understand.
   4. Since the will is indifferent in such cases, it easily turns from the good and the true, thus leading to error and sin.
   5. Thus he supports:
      a. The theological view that human error arises from human finiteness, fallibility and sin.
      b. His view that when the correct philosophical method is applied (his) human reason cannot fail.

E. Points of Certainty
   1. He exists as a thinking thing.
   2. God exists.
   3. What remains is the problem of the external world: how does he know there is a physical world?

Meditation V

I Third Proof of God (Lawhead’s reconstruction)

A. The Proof
   1. I have the idea of a God that possess all perfections.
   2. Existence is a kind of perfection.
   3. If the God I am thinking of lacked existence, then He would not be perfect.
   4. Hence, if I can have the idea of a perfect God, I must conclude that existence is one of His essential properties.
   5. If existence is one of God’s essential properties, He must exist.
   6. Therefore, God exists.

B. Unique to God
   1. No other being has existence as part of its essence.
   2. Aside from God, we can have an idea of a being without that being actually existing.
   3. Since existence is part of God’s perfection, it is a contradiction to deny his existence.
   4. This argument is a variation of St. Anselm’s ontological argument.
   5. This argument was criticized by Kant on the grounds that existence is not a property.

Meditation VI

I The External World

A. The Problem
   1. He begins with his ideas of physical objects.
   2. He again raises the question of whether any external objects correspond to these ideas.
   3. As with God, he sets out to determine their possible causes and considers the cause could be him, God or actual objects.

B. Descartes as the cause.
   1. He considers that he is the cause of the ideas he has that seem to be of an external world.
   2. He rejects this on the grounds that he seems to be passive in reception.
   3. For example, the cold of winter is not something he chooses-he simply experiences it.
C. God as the cause.
1. He considers that God could be causing the ideas of the external world, even though there is no such world.
2. But, this would make God a deceiver.
3. Descartes has argued that God is perfect and hence not a deceiver.
4. Hence, God is not the cause of these ideas.
D. External objects cause the ideas.
1. He regards this as the only remaining possibility.
2. Thus, by process of elimination it must be correct.
E. Illusions
1. He admits that physical objects are not always as they appear to the senses.
2. He counters this by arguing that such sensory illusions can be pierced by reason.
3. Mistakes are made by jumping to conclusions about what is perceived rather than using reason.
F. Nature of Objects
1. He claims that physical objects “possess all the properties which I clearly and distinctly understand, that is, all those which viewed in general terms, are comprised within the subject of mathematics.”
2. Objective (primary) qualities consist of size, shape, number, etc.
3. Subjective (secondary) qualities consists of colors, tastes and sounds, etc.
4. The sensory experiences yield only the world of appearance.
5. Scientific reason yields the mathematical formulas that accurately characterize the world.

Cartesian Dualism

I Dualism
A. Substance
1. Descartes revives the ancient and Medieval concept of substance.
2. Substance: “a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence.”
3. Technically, only God meets this definition.
4. In a limited and metaphorical sense, created beings can be regarded as substances.
B. Two substances.
1. Mental and physical.
2. The mind and body are distinct substances.
C. Meditations: Doubt
1. Based on his reasoning in the Meditations, he takes mind and body to be distinct.
2. He was sure of the existence of the mind but in doubt about the existence of his body.
3. Since the mind does not need the body to exist or to be understood, the mind is distinct from the body.
D. Meditations: Different
1. The mind and body are distinct substances because they each have different essential attributes.
2. Minds
   b. Are not extended.
   c. Are immaterial.
   d. Lack parts.
   e. Cannot be divided.
   f. Do not occupy space.
3. Bodies
   a. Are not conscious.
   b. Move as the result of mechanical forces.
   c. Extended.
   d. Composed of parts.
   e. Are divisible.
   f. Occupy space.
E. Humans and Animals
1. Humans consist of a mechanistic, material body and an immaterial mind.
2. The mind is the person.
3. Animals lack minds—they are merely bodies.
   a. Animals are, for Descartes, natural automatons.
   b. He does not deny that they are alive and does not deny that they feel—provided that feeling is limited to bodily motions.
   c. He takes the most telling argument against animals having minds to be one based on the fact that they do not use language.
F. Dualism
1. Dualism: the view that there are two irreducible kinds of principles or elements.
2. Metaphysical dualism: there are two basic ontological kinds.
3. Mind-Body Dualism/Psychophysical Dualism: the view that mind and body are distinct metaphysical entities or types.

II The “Cartesian Compromise”

A. Reconciliation
1. Descartes endorsed the “new science” that provided a mechanistic account of the universe.
2. He was also a devout Catholic.
3. He set out to reconcile science and theology.

B. The Dualist Solution: The Body
1. One part of the world consists of physical substances.
2. This part is studied by the science and explained in mechanistic terms.
3. This part is a clockwork mechanism whose operations are determined by physical laws.
4. These physical laws are discovered by scientists via observations and enable predictions.
5. The human body is governed by these physical laws.
6. This realm “belongs” to science and not to theology.

C. The Dualist Solution: The Mind.
1. The other part of the world consists of immaterial substances.
2. The mind is free because it is not governed by physical laws.
3. Matters of the soul “belong” to theology and religion.

III Interactionism

A. Mind-Body Problem
1. Descartes claims that the human mind controls the human body.
2. The problem is: how do two fundamentally different substances interact?

B. Ship & Pilot Analogy
1. One possibility is that the mind directs the body like the pilot controls the ship.
2. Descartes argues that this cannot be correct because if it were true, then we would not feel pain when our bodies are injured.
3. Descartes notes that the mind and body interact.

C. The Pineal Gland
1. Near the end of Descartes’ life, the pineal gland (located at the base of the brain) was discovered.
2. The purpose of the gland was not known in his time (it is an endocrine gland that is now believed to play a role in blood pressure regulation, suppressing sexual development in children, possibly dreaming).
3. Descartes took this gland to be affected by “vital spirits” and to serve as an intermediary by which the mind interacted with the brain.
4. The obvious problem is that the pineal gland is still a material object.

Problems & Impact

I Problems

A. Natural Light
1. The natural light was taken to be a natural mental faculty that enabled people to immediately grasp self-evident truths.
2. Descartes distinguished between the infallible natural light and the unreliable natural impulses.
3. Both can lead us to believe.
4. Unfortunately, Descartes fails to provide a clear way of discerning between the natural light and natural impulses.

B. Principle & Doubt
1. It strikes many critics as odd that Descartes can doubt 2+3=5, yet cannot doubt his metaphysical principle that “there must be at least as much reality in the total efficient cause as in its effect.”
2. In one of his replies he lists the principle as an “axiom or common notion” such that it can be accepted as evident.
3. His acceptance of this principle seems to contradict his stated method of attempting to doubt common notions.

C. Infinity
1. In his time some theologians questioned his claim that infinity and perfection must come before thoughts of finitude and imperfection.
2. They argued, contrary to Descartes, that one could begin with the degree of being found in themselves and add to this, thus constructing the idea of a perfect being.
3. If a finite being can construct the ideas of infinity and perfection in this manner, then there is no need to postulate an external cause (such as God) for the idea.

D. Contamination Problem
1. If the mind interacts with the physical world via the human body, then some of what occurs in the physical world cannot be explained by the mechanistic sciences.

2. If the physical world interacts with the mind via the human body, then mental events are the result of events in the mechanistic physical world.

3. Thus Descartes’ attempt to keep the two realms distinct seems to fail.

4. Science seems to be undercut because of the difficulty in handling the mental causes.

5. Freedom seems to be undercut because of the influence of the mechanistic world on the mind.

E. Interactionism: Arnold Geulincx (1624-1669)

1. A Cartesian who thought that interactionism created insurmountable problems.

2. He claimed that mental and physical events are causally independent and only seem to affect one another.

3. He claims that God sets it so that mental and physical events run in parallel, like two different clocks that have been synchronized.

4. This is known as parallelism and was later developed in pre-established harmony by Leibniz.

F. Interactionism: Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715)

1. Regarded interactionism as very problematic.

2. Asserted that there is no causal interaction between mental and physical events.

3. He claims that each type of event is an occasion on which God creates matched events in the mental and physical realms.

4. This view is known as occasionalism.

G. Blaise Pascal (1623-1662)

1. A French philosophy & mathematician.

2. Best known for Pascal’s Wager.

3. Could not forgive Descartes since he regards Descartes as being “quite willing to dispense with God.”

4. He says Descartes “could not help granting him a flick of the forefinger to start the world in motion” and that he had no further need of God beyond this.

II Impact

A. Certainty

1. Descartes set certainty as his goal, thus fueling an epistemic debate over the possibility of certainty and related issues, such as what to do if certainty is not possible.

2. Continental rationalists and others continued in the quest for certainty.

3. Some skeptics, such as David Hume, accepted the Cartesian view that knowledge requires certainty but argued that such certainty is not possible.

4. Others, such as John Locke, were willing to accept probability in place of certainty because it seemed adequate for making it through life.

B. Universal Science

1. Descartes hoped to achieve a universal science.

2. This project was taken up by both rationalists and empiricists.

3. This project persists to this day.

C. Reconciling Science and Religion

1. Descartes hoped to reconcile science and religion by giving each its own distinct realm.

2. By his time science had become so established that turning back to the Middle Ages was probably not possible.

3. Religion was a very strong factor in his time and many scientists were also very devout.

4. Many thinkers of his time attempted to mix the new science into the stew of traditional religion.

5. Some thinkers decided that science should expand into all areas of human experience.

6. Other thinkers decided that aspects of humanity should be kept distinct from the mechanistic sciences.

D. Artificial Intelligence

1. Descartes claimed that machines could be built that mimicked human behavior but he argued that they could never think.

   a. This was because thinking was the essential quality of an immaterial substance.

2. Others have claimed that an immaterial mind is not required for thought.

3. Descartes also proposed the language test for detecting a mind.

   a. This was later repacked by Turing and is more famously known as the Turing test.

   b. In Turing’s test, if one cannot tell a human from a computer via a text interaction then the computer should be taken as thinking.
Benedict (Baruch) Spinoza

Background

I Background
   A. Early Years
      1. Born Baruch Spinoza (or Espinosa) in Amsterdam in 1632.
      2. His parents were Portuguese Jews who were among the Jews who had fled Spain and Portugal because those states required their citizens to be Christians.
      3. Holland was tolerant.
      4. He was regarded as a person of potential and was trained to be a rabbi.
      5. He learned Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, Hebrew and Latin.
   B. The Road to Excommunication
      1. In 1652 he began studying with a philosopher familiar with Scholasticism and Descartes.
      2. He went beyond the orthodox Jewish teachings.
      3. In 1654 he changed his name to its Latin version: Benedictus (“Blessed.”)
      4. He began to question the immortality of the soul and the existence of the Angels.
      5. His community feared he would offend the Dutch and that he was threatening the Jewish faith.
      6. When bribery and persuasion failed, the leaders of the Ecclesiastical Council excommunicated him in 1656.
         a. This was a sentence to damnation by the use of a curse.
      7. Someone attempted to kill him.
   C. Lenses & Philosophy
      1. He worked grinding and polishing lenses for telescopes and microscopes.
      2. His reputation as a philosopher grew and he corresponded with philosophers and scientists.
      3. He was offered the chair of philosophy at Heidelberg in 1673 but declined, thinking it would interfere with his desire for peace and the freedom to speak as he might on issues.
      4. He died in 1677 of tuberculosis.
      5. He was regarded with affection and seen as a thinker who lived his philosophy.
   D. Works
      1. 1663 Principles of Cartesian Philosophy
      2. 1670 Theologico-Political Treatise
         a. Published anonymously.
         b. Banned by the government after the 5th edition.
         c. Defended personal liberty.
      3. Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order
         a. Published by a friend after his death.
         b. He was worried theologians would not understand it and hence attack it.

Goals & Method

I Goal: Freedom
   A. Ethics
      1. His goal is to present a foundation for ethics.
      2. Ethics is a way of seeing the world which leads to a way of acting and this leads to freedom from human bondage.
      3. People are enslaved by their affections—they are in bondage to what they love and want.
      4. It is risky to base one’s happiness on concern for one’s life, health, riches, fame or friends because these things tend not to endure.
      5. Because of his experiences, the “surroundings of social life are vain and futile.”
      6. The objects of his fears contain nothing in themselves that is good or bad, “except insofar as the mind is affected by them.”
      7. He tried to find a real good that can “affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all else” and whose attainment would enable him to enjoy “continuous, supreme and unending happiness.”
      8. The way of emancipation is to have an intellectual love for what is eternal, infinite, changeless and complete.
      9. This is the entire logically necessary system of nature-God or substance.
     10. This love provides the only means of escaping bondage and achieving happiness.
II Method

A. Ethics
1. Mathematics is the key to the structure of the universe.
2. He agrees with Descartes that philosophic method should imitate the mathematical method.
3. Unlike Descartes who wrote in essay form, Spinoza followed the mathematical model—he attempted to demonstrate ethics in geometrical order.
4. Each of the 5 parts begins with definitions, axioms, and then propositions that are derived from the definitions and axioms following Euclid’s methods.
5. The work consists of 259 demonstrated propositions.
6. Each proof ends with Q.E.D.: quod erat demonstrandum (“which was to be demonstrated.”)
7. There is debate over how self-evident he thought his axioms were.

B. Foundation
1. He adopted the foundational model for philosophy.
2. The foundation is Part One which presents definitions and propositions about the nature of God.
3. The pinnacle is Proposition 42 in Part Five—the demonstration that supreme blessedness is achieved by the mind delighting in divine love.

B. Assumptions
1. To have a conception of X is to explain X.
2. To explain X requires an account of its cause.
3. The cause of X is what brings it into existence and makes it what it is.
4. “From a given determinate cause an effect necessarily follows.”
5. “The knowledge of an effect depends upon and involves the knowledge of the cause.”
6. He argues that “the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.”
7. These three principles collapse causal connections and logical connections.
   a. A causes B
   b. The concept of A contains the concept of B.
   c. B cannot be thought of apart from A.
8. Thus, nothing can be understood in isolation since everything is connected causally and logically.

Spinoza’s Epistemology

I Truth
A. Necessity
1. He is a rationalist—the real is rational and the rational is real.
2. “In Nature there is nothing contingent, but all things are determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and act in a certain manner.”
3. If one understands all the causes of an event, including the mathematical and physical laws and how it fits into the whole, its necessity would be understood.

B. Appearance of Contingency
1. Spinoza needs to explain why some events seem contingent.
2. “A thing cannot be called contingent unless with reference to a deficiency in our knowledge.”
3. People fail to see the necessity “because the order of causes is concealed from us.”
4. Humans can deduce some truths a priori, but not all—this would require complete knowledge of the divine.
5. All truths can be demonstrated, but not all can be demonstrated by humans.

C. Ideas
1. All human ideas fit in three categories.
2. These range from the most inadequate and confused to the highest possible level.
3. These categories are opinion, reason and intuition.

D. Opinion/Imagination
1. The source of inadequate ideas and false beliefs.
2. The most inadequate is secondhand opinion.
3. Includes perception coming from signs, such as those from reading.
4. The most common version is that acquired from vague experience.
   a. Repeated experiences of Xs yields a universal image of category X.

b. Since these ideas are based on the mechanical & physiological process of association, they fail to reflect the true, underlying logical connection between things.
5. Sense experience represents things “in a mutilated and confused manner and without order to the intellect.”

E. Reason
1. “It is the nature of reason to perceive things truly…as they are in themselves…not as contingent, but as necessary.”
2. “It is of the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity.”
F. Intuition

1. Spinoza is not as clear about this category as he is the others.
2. An integrated vision of the whole arising out of the level of reason.
3. Only god can have this full vision, but humans can grasp some aspects of it.
4. “The things which I have been able to know by this kind of knowledge are as yet very few.”

Spinoza’s Metaphysics

I Substance

A. Defining Substance
1. From Definition 3 in Part One
2. “That which is in itself and is conceived through itself.”
3. “That the conception of which does not need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed.”

B. Infinity
1. He argues that a substance must be infinite.
2. If a substance were finite, we must conceive of something external to it forming its limits.
3. If it had limits, then it would not be self-sufficient and logically independent.
4. As such, Spinoza rejects Aristotle’s and Descartes’ views of substance.
   a. Aristotle: A particular thing is a substance because it can exist on its own in a way that its properties cannot.
   b. Descartes begins with an initial definition like Spinoza’s, then proceeds to apply it to finite, created things such as bodies and minds.

C. Defining God
1. “By God I understand Being absolutely infinite.”
2. “Substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.
3. Using this definition in conjunction with his propositions, he argues that any substance, including God, must of necessity exist.

D. Ontological Argument for God’s Existence
1. A substance is “That which is in itself and is conceived through itself” and “That the conception of which does not need the conception of another thing from which it must be.”
2. If (a) a substance had a cause, then (b) to understand that substance we would have to have knowledge of its cause (axiom 4).
3. Part (b) of premise 2 contradicts Spinoza’s definition of substance.
4. Thus, a substance cannot have a cause.
5. According to Definition 6, God is a substance.
6. So, since God does not have a cause, God must necessarily exist.

E. God
1. As with any ontological argument, Spinoza assumes that the concepts of God and substance are conceivable.
2. He holds there is no contradiction in the definitions and they are coherent.
3. His initial argument appears consistent with traditional Judeo-Christian theology.
4. While Spinoza argues that anything that is a substance must exist, he further contends that there is only one substance: there is nothing but God.

F. Argument for One Substance
1. If there was a second substance, then it would have the same nature as God or a different nature.
2. It could not have the same nature as God for if it did, the two would be indistinguishable and hence one and not two.
3. If a second substance had a nature like God’s while still being numerically distinct, there would need to be a reason outside their nature as to why there are only two and not three or more such entities.
4. But, there cannot be any reason external to a substance as to why it exists.
5. So, there cannot be a substance like God but numerically distinct.
6. Since God is infinite in his attributes, if an other substance differs from God it must be different by lacking one of his infinite perfections.
7. Yet, if it is a substance, it must exist independently of God by definition.
8. But, this is absurd because this second substance would limit God’s nature.
9. So, it follows that God is the only substance and everything else that exists is but a mode of his being.
10. “Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can either be or be conceived without God.”

G. Pantheism
1. God is everything and is immanent rather than transcendent.
2. Thus, Spinoza is presenting a pantheist position.
3. Unlike theologians of the middle ages, Spinoza does not provide an account of the relationship between God and nature.
4. This is because he does not distinguish the two.
5. Reality is “that eternal and infinite Being whom we call God or Nature.”
6. Unlike medieval thinkers who claimed that everything depends on God, he claims that all individual things are merely modes or modifications of God’s attributes.
H. Is God a Person?
1. Traditional theology presents God as a person who thinks, wills, plans, chooses, etc.
2. Spinoza denies this: “neither intellect nor will pertains to the nature of God.”
3. In response to a critic, he said that seeing God as a person is merely acting on a psychological need to see God in one’s own image.
   a. He says that if a triangle or circle could speak, they would see God’s nature as eminently triangular or circular.
   b. He claims that each “ascribes to God its own attributes, assuming itself to be like God, and regarding all else as ill-formed.”

II Atheist or Mystic?
A. Labels
1. 19th century romantics called him “the God-intoxicated man.”
2. He was called an atheist in his time.
B. False Dilemma?
1. Prior to Spinoza, it was accepted that one either was a theist who accepted the traditional God or one was an atheist.
2. Spinoza is regarded as creating a conception of God that seems more consistent with the philosophical principles of his time.

III Freedom & Necessity
A. Apparent Contradiction
1. “God alone is a free cause” seems to contradict “God does not act from freedom of the will.”
2. God is a “free cause” in that His actions are neither compelled nor determined by anything external.
   a. There is nothing external to God.
3. God does not have “freedom of the will” because the laws of His nature determine His actions.
   a. God does not choose His nature-His nature is a matter of necessity.
4. Hence, God is free of external determination, but is determined internally by His nature.
B. Creation & Necessity
1. On the traditional view creation is a freely chosen act on God’s part.
2. For Spinoza “things could have been produced by God in no other manner and in no other order than that in which they have been produced.”
3. There is no contingency in nature because:
   a. The world follows by necessity from God’s nature.
   b. God’s nature is what it is by necessity.
C. Two Types of Events
1. Given Spinoza’s view, there are two types of events.
2. Some events are necessary-these are also the actual events.
3. Some events are impossible-these do not occur.
4. “All things follow from the eternal decree of God, according to that same necessity by which it follows from the essence of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles.”
5. God’s decree is not a decision on His part: everything happens by logical necessity.
6. There is no purpose since purpose implies seeking something that is lacking.
7. All that occurs is inevitable.
D. Free Will
1. Free will is an illusion.
2. People believe in free will because they do not know the divine nature and how everything proceeds by necessity from that nature.
3. He claims that if a stone thrown though the air were conscious it would think it was free to choose to move and land where it does.
4. People think they are free because they are “conscious of their own actions, and ignorant of the causes by which those actions are determined.”

IV Mind-Body Problem
A. God’s Attributes
1. Spinoza begins to address the problem by considering God’s attributes.
2. Attribute: “that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence.”
3. Thought is one of God’s attributes.
4. He makes the radical claim that “Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.”
5. While God has an infinite number of attributes, humans can only understand those of thought and extension.
B. Mind-Body
1. How do thought and extension relate?
2. He rejects Hobbes’s materialism and claims that thought cannot be understood in purely physical terms.
3. He rejects Descartes’ dualism and claims that “the mind and body are one and the same thing, conceived at one time under the attribute of thought and at another under that of extension.”

4. Physical events are mental events and vice versa; this is known as dual-aspect theory.

5. An object is a mode of God and as such is Nature in terms of the attribute of extension.

6. An object can also be seen in terms if the attribute of thought-the object as an idea in the mind of God.

7. Since God is omniscient, the idea contains all that is in the object-the idea and the object are identical.

8. But, thought and extension are both self-contained and can be understood independently.

9. The language of thought cannot be reduced to the language of extension and vice versa.

10. Unlike Descartes who divided reality, for Spinoza, either category can describe the whole reality:
   a. “When things are considered as modes of thought we must explain the order of the whole of Nature or the connection of causes by the attribute of thought alone.”
   b. “And when things are considered as modes of extension, the order of the whole of Nature must be explained through the attribute of extension alone.”

Spinoza’s Ethics

I Freedom

A. Overview
   1. Part Three of his Ethics addresses the nature of emotions.
   2. Part Four, “Of Human Bondage,” sets out to show that human problems arise because they are slaves to their passions.
   3. Part Five shows how the intellect can overcome this bondage.

B. Method
   1. He is critical of his predecessors who generally seem to assume that humans are outside of the laws of nature.
   2. For Spinoza, since everything occurs of necessity it follows that his geometrical method applies to humans as well as it applies to geometric shapes.
      a. Hence, he decides to “treat by geometrical method the vices and follies of men.”
      b. “I shall consider human actions and appetites just as if I were considering lines, planes, or bodies.”
   3. He provides a detailed classification of the emotions and deduces their various effects using his geometric model.
   4. He assumes that emotions follow the same logical necessity as everything else and hence holds that their effects should be fully predictable and that a suitable analysis will allow people to control them.

C. Self Preservation
   1. The desire to preserve oneself is the basic law of nature.
   2. Conatus: Means “striving” or “endeavor” and is the inner force that provides the drive for self-preservation.
   3. “Each thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persevere in its being.”
   4. The essence of a thing is a specific active force within it.
   5. Self-preservation goes beyond mere survival—it involves striving to fulfill one’s nature.
   6. Conatus is not limited to humans and is possessed by other living things as well as nonliving things.

D. Self-Awareness
   1. Humans are self-aware and can be self-determining.
   2. Fulfillment is based on realizing one’s inner nature.
   3. One will not be self-determined if one aims for illusory goals such as fame or fortune-achieving these goals depends on circumstances beyond one’s controls.
   4. The key to happiness is being inner directed, rationally understanding events and being not controlled by outside factors.

E. The Mind
   1. The mind both acts and is acted upon.
   2. As far as it is has adequate ideas it is initiating activity.
   3. As far as it has inadequate ideas it is acted upon,
   4. We are acted upon because we are victims of our emotions/passions.
      a. Passion is related to passive.
      b. The passions are something that happens to people.
   5. Reason provides adequate ideas that free one from the effects of the emotions.
      a. “A passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.”

F. Comprehensive Understanding
   1. A comprehensive understanding of the cause of emotions is needed.
   2. All emotions are responses to objects in the past, present or future.
   3. All emotions are based on the illusion that events of the past and present could have been otherwise and that the future is not determined.
   4. One is freed of the emotions when one realizes that all things happen of necessity.
   5. Once one is free, one will no longer feel completely dependent on one’s circumstances and will be in control of one’s life.
6. In so far as the mind understands all things are necessary, so far has it greater power over the emotions, or suffers less from
them.”
7. Thus, the path to liberation is to recognize the necessity of events and accept this with due resignation.
8. So, freedom from the bondage of the passions is not freedom from necessity but the recognition and acceptance of this
necessity.

II Good & Evil
A. Good & Evil
1. Since everything is determined by necessity, good and evil is not present in nature.
2. “Good” and “evil” refer to subjective evaluations of how something impacts one’s interests and concerns.
3. “We neither strive for, wish, seek, nor desire anything because we think it to be good, but, on the contrary, we judge a thing
to be good because we strive for, wish, seek, or desire it.”
4. He presents a form of moral subjectivism: “For one and the same thing may at the same time be both good and evil or
indifferent.”
B. Self-Preservation
1. Virtue leads to a power and independence consistent with the inner drive for self-preservation.
2. Since reason demands nothing opposed to nature, it demands that each person love himself, seek his own profit, and endeavor
to “preserve his own being.”
3. He avoids being an ethical egoist because the isolated, unique self with its own private interests is an illusion.
4. The way to serenity is to view things under the aspect of eternity (sub specie aesternitatis).
5. There is nothing more excellent for preservation than for all to agree that “the minds and bodies of all should form…one mind
and one body…and that all should seek the common good of all.”

III Love & Immortality
A. Intellectual Love of God
1. One achieves the highest form of knowledge by seeing things as part of an eternal, logically connected system caused by God.
2. From this comes the intellectual love of God that is “our salvation or blessedness or freedom.”
3. This is not traditional piety because “he who loves God cannot strive that God should love him in return.”
4. God has no personal qualities and being self-determined He is without passion and so without joy, sorrow, love or hate.
5. Since humans are modes of God’s being, “God, in so far as He loves Himself, loves men.”
6. The love of God is intellectual and provides an integrating vision of life.
   a. It is like the mental satisfaction of a mathematician.
B. Immortality
1. There is no conscious, individual immortality.
2. “The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal.”
3. Each human has a necessary place in the eternal order.
4. If a mind gets beyond the illusion of particularity and unites with the universal the flow of temporal events cannot deny it this
hold on eternity.

Conclusion
I Conclusion
A. The wise man
1. The ignorant man is driven by lust alone.
2. The wise man is “scarcely ever moved in his mind, but, being conscious of a certain eternal necessity of himself, of God, and
of things, never ceases to be and always enjoys true peace of soul.”
3. The way to peace is difficult, but can be found.
4. Salvation must be difficult—if it were easy, why would it be “neglected by almost everybody.”
5. “But all noble things are as difficult as they are rare.”

Criticisms & Impact
I Criticism
A. Desirable
1. Does Spinoza create a desirable picture about what human life should be about?
2. The recognition of serenity can lead to serenity, but this is based on passivity.
3. Such passivity can lead to detachment and apathy, thus hindering meaningful human relations.
4. Critics have said that his theory is adequate for a reclusive, celibate lens maker but not for most others.

5. Critics have also said that his theory undercut any motivation to oppose injustice and fight for change.

6. As a person, Spinoza had many close friends and was concerned about the political life of his nation.
   a. In 1672 the De Witt brothers were blamed for the country’s problems and killed by a mob.
   b. Enraged by this injustice, he attempted to run out into the street to denounce the murderers.
   c. His friends locked him in his room to save his life.

B. Coherent?
1. Is his theory coherent?
2. There is a tension between his claims about readjusting one’s attitude and the necessity of things.
3. He tells people to rise above inadequate ideas, yet says that they occur from necessity.
4. While criticizing those who claim humans are free of the necessity of nature, he asserts that the emotions can be controlled by reason.

II Impact
A. Impact
1. He attempted to create a rational, coherent view of reality and to apply this to the big questions of humanity.
2. His system was soon eclipsed by those of Leibniz and Locke.

B. 18th Century
1. The 18th century romantic poets rekindled his popularity.
2. Novalis called him “the God intoxicated philosopher.”
3. Goethe, Schelling, Coleridge, Wordsworth and the theologian Schleiermacher found him very appealing.

C. 19th Century
1. 19th century metaphysicians found him very appealing.
2. Hegel: “when one begins to philosophize one must be first a Spinozist.”
3. Marxists regarded his theory as a predecessor to their dialectical materialism and favorably compared his epistemology with their theory of ideology.”

D. 20th Century
1. Some find his solution to the mind-body problem appealing because it permits one to use traditional mental terms while using scientific language and, at the same time, avoiding dualism.
2. Einstein
   b. “The cosmic religious experience is the strongest and noblest driving force behind scientific research.”
   c. “God does not play dice with the universe”: The universe is a logically determined order best known through reason and not via empirical probabilities.

Gottfried Leibniz

Background

I German Culture
A. Stagnant
1. Prior to the 18th century German culture remained fairly stagnant.
2. Common people spoke German while the upper classes spoke French and scholars wrote in Latin.
3. The Reformation and the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) disrupted the German states.
4. Aside from Leibniz, the German states did not produce any significant philosophical thinkers during this time.

II Background for Leibniz
A. Early Years
2. Learned to read Greek and Latin.
   a. Bragged that at 13 he could read Scholastic texts as easily as people read romances.
3. Entered the University of Leipzig at 15 and graduated at 17.
4. Studied mathematics at Jena.
5. Returned to Leipzig to study law, but was blocked in his attempt to get his doctorate.
6. Received his doctorate in law at 21 from the University of Altdorf near Nuremberg.
7. Offered a professorship but decided to become a diplomat and administrator.
B. Professional Career
1. Traveled Europe as a diplomat.
2. Met many great thinkers:
   a. Nicolas Malebranche, a French Cartesian.
   b. Robert Boyle, an English chemist.
   c. Henry Oldenberg, Secretary of the Royal Society.
   d. Spinoza, in Holland.
3. Built a calculating machine that added, subtracted, extracted roots, multiplied and divided.
   a. This earned him membership in the Royal Society.
4. Most of his philosophic work was not systematic, but scattered about in letters, essays, pamphlets, and unpublished works.

C. Diplomacy
1. He hoped to reunite the Catholic and Protestant churches.
   a. Based on the view there would be theological propositions acceptable to both.
2. He hoped to unify the states of Europe.
3. He had an ongoing fight with Newton over who developed the infitesimal calculus.
   a. Leibniz’ system was accepted.
4. He died in 1716 with just his secretary at his funeral.

D. Works
1. *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*
2. *Theodicy*
3. *Monadology*

Goal & Method

I Goal
A. Unified
1. His goal is to use mathematics and theology to develop his concept of a universal harmony.
2. He wanted to reconcile science and religion, mechanism and teleology, modern and ancient philosophy.
3. He regarded the state of affairs of science as analogous to a well stocked shop “without any order or inventory.”

II Logical Method
A. Logic
1. Logic and mathematical methods can yield the method needed to find truth.
2. He had great faith in logic.
3. Like Galileo, he believes the universe is a harmonious system written in a mathematical language by God.
4. He disagrees with Descartes because he thinks Descartes’ view leads to Spinoza’s view and this leads to atheism.
5. He discovered that complex mathematical concepts can be reduced to combinations of simpler concepts.
6. He developed binary mathematics in which all numbers can be expressed as combinations of 0s and 1s.
7. He contended that this method could be extended beyond mathematics to all areas of knowledge, including physics, metaphysics and law.
B. Method
1. Step one: reduce all concepts into their elementary components.
   a. In geometry the simples are figures.
   b. In law the simples are actions, promises, sales, etc.
2. Step two: Representing concepts by mathematical symbols which form the language of thought.
   a. All thoughts can be represented by combinations of his mathematical symbols.
3. Step three: Formulating the correct rules for combining the symbols.
   a. The goal is to make the grammar of the symbolic language correspond to the world’s logical structure.
   b. True propositions would fit the structure.
   c. False propositions would be ungrammatical.
C. Application of the method
1. It would permit scientists and philosophers to communicate in a universal language.
2. It would permit the discovery of new truths by determining the various possible combinations within the rules.
3. It would provide an objective means of resolving philosophical controversies.
   a. In cases of philosophical dispute, philosophers would take up their pencils, say “let us calculate” and reach the answer.
D. Assumptions
1. He assumes that all human thought can be reduced to elementary concepts.
2. He assumes that the method would be completed in a modest amount of time.
   a. Five years for the whole project, provided that a “few select men” worked on it.
b. Two years to work out metaphysics and morality.

Leibniz's Epistemology

Innate Ideas

I Innate Ideas
A. Against Locke
1. Certain ideas cannot be derived from the senses.
2. The senses cannot yield necessary and certain truths, so if we have such ideas they must be innate.
3. He presents his view of innate ideas in New Essays on the Human Understanding, which is a reply to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689).
4. He contends that there is “nothing present in the intellect that was not first in the senses, except for the intellect itself.”
5. He claims that we could not have the knowledge we do if Locke’s “blank slate” view were correct.
B. The Mind
1. The mind must have a structure that enables it to discover universal and necessary truths.
2. Leibniz draws an analogy between the mind and a block of veined marble: the structure of the marble determines what sort of shape it can be sculpted into.
3. The shape of a statue is “innate” to the clock of marble, but must be freed by the sculptor.
4. By analogy, experience can reveal the necessary truths present in the mind.
C. Against the Empiricists
1. Locke and other empiricists argued that if people had innate ideas, then they would always be aware of them.
2. Leibniz replies that: “we must not imagine that these eternal laws of the reason can be read in the soul as in an open book…”
3. He claims that “…it is enough that they can be discovered in us by force of attention, for which occasions are furnished by the senses.”
4. Innate ideas are not present in the mind as explicit, fully developed knowledge but exist as “inclinations, dispositions, habits or natural capacities.”
5. Locke and Descartes regarded the mind as such that its contents were readily apparent upon introspection.
6. Leibniz claims that people can experience things without being consciously aware of it.
   a. He uses the example of people who have always lived by a waterfall-they experience its sound, but are not consciously aware of it.
   b. He takes the mind to have “levels” so its contents range from what is clearly perceived to what is experienced in a confused/indistinct manner to what is unconscious and latent.

Necessity & Contingency

I Truths of Reason and Truths of Fact
A. Truths of reason.
1. “Truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible.”
2. “Truths of fact are contingent and their opposite is possible.”
3. Truths of reason are based on the principle of contradiction and the principle of identity.
4. Principle of contradiction: If a proposition is self-contradictory, then its opposite/negation must be true.
5. Principle of identity: “P is P” or “each thing is what it is.”
6. Identical proposition: A truth of reason whose denial creates a contradiction.
   a. Example: “A square has four sides.”
   b. Known today as tautologies-it repeats the same thing without yielding new information.
B. Truths of fact
1. A truth of fact is any proposition that cannot be reduced to identical propositions-they can be denied without contradiction.
2. Truths of fact are based on the principle of sufficient reason: “no fact can be real or existent, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise.”
3. He claims “most often these reasons cannot be known to us.”
4. We can know that something is true without understanding all the sufficient reasons behind it.
5. God alone can understand all the sufficient reasons.
6. Leibniz also argues for God’s existence using the principle of sufficient reason.
C. Necessary & Contingent Truths
1. Truths of reason are based on logical laws and must be true.
2. Truths of fact are contingent-they are true because of how the world happens to be and, if things had been different, they could be false.
3. Truths of fact are about what exists and what does not exist.
4. Unlike Spinoza, Leibniz takes the details of the world to be contingent-thus God could have done otherwise.
5. However, Leibniz does make “Spinoza like” claims: “Always, in every true affirmative proposition, whether necessary or contingent, universal or particular, the notion of the predicate is in some way included in that of the subject.”
   a. Example “a triangle has three sides.”
   b. The subject, triangle, contains the predicate, three sides.
6. Given this view, he is an essentialist in the sense that an individual (subject) contains all its properties (predicates) in such a way that changing the properties changes the identity.
7. Thus, the necessity of such contingent truths is conditional: given the contingent fact that S exists, the predicates of S exist of necessity.
   a. Example: Given that Socrates existed, it was necessary he was a philosopher.
8. Such contingent truths are not necessary in that denying any truth of fact does not yield a contradiction.
   a. The claim “Socrates does not exist” does not entail a contradiction.

D. Deduction
1. The concept of subject S contains the properties/predicates of S.
2. But, in the case of a truth of fact, one cannot deduce the properties/predicates of S by analyzing the idea of S.
3. In such a case, “one never arrives at a demonstration of an identity, even though the resolution of each term is continued indefinitely.”
4. God, and God alone, can “comprehend the infinite all at once” and thus can “see how one is in the other and understand a priori the perfect reason for the truth.”
   a. Thus, God has a priori knowledge of truths of fact in that He knows the predicates of everything.
   b. For example, God had a priori knowledge of how Alexander the Great would die.
5. The identity of a thing consists of all its properties.
6. In the case of truths of reason created beings have a clear idea of the nature of the subject and can deduce the predicates.
7. In the case of truths of fact created beings do not have a clear idea of the nature of the subject and cannot deduce the predicates.

Leibniz’s Metaphysics

God

I God
A. Proofs for God’s Existence
   1. An ontological argument along the lines of St. Anselm and Descartes.
   2. An argument from eternal and necessary truths along the lines of St. Augustine.
   3. A design argument with the unique twist that it is based on the concept of pre-established harmony.
   4. A cosmological argument based on his principle of sufficient reason.

II Proof of God’s Existence by Possibility and Necessity
A. God
   1. God is the supreme substance
   2. God is unique, universal and necessary.
   3. Nothing else is independent of it.
   4. Being a pure consequence of possible being, it must be incapable of limits and must contain as much reality as possible.
B. Perfection
   1. God is absolutely perfect.
      a. In God, where there are no limits, perfection is absolutely infinite.
   2. Creatures’ perfections are from God, but their imperfections arise from their own necessarily limited nature.
      a. This distinguishes them from God.
C. Existence
   1. God is the source of existences and essences, as far as they are real, or what is real in the possible.
      a. Without God there would be nothing existing and nothing possible.
   2. If there is a reality in essences, possibilities or eternal truths, it must be founded in the existence of the necessary being.
      a. In whom essence involves existence.
      b. Or it is sufficient to be possible in order to be actual.
   3. God alone must exist if He is possible.
      a. Nothing can hinder the possibility of what is without limits, negation, and contradiction.
      b. This is sufficient to establish the existence of God a priori.

III The Cosmological Argument
A. Two principles upon which our reasons are founded.
1. Contradiction: in virtue of which we judge
   a. That to be false which involves contradiction.
   b. That true, which is opposed or contradictory to the false.
2. Sufficient reason:
   a. No fact can be real or existent, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise.
   b. Although most often these reasons cannot be known to us.

B. Two kinds of truth
   1. Those of reasoning:
      a. Are necessary and their opposite is impossible.
      b. Its reason can be found by analysis, resolving it into more simple ideas and truths until reaching those that are primitive.
   2. Those of fact: are contingent and their opposite is possible.

C. Sufficient Reason
   1. There must also be a sufficient reason for contingent truths, or those of fact.
      a. The series of things in the universe of created objects.
   2. The resolution into Particular reason might run into a detail without limits, because of the immense variety of objects and the division of bodies ad infinitum.
   3. Since this detail only involves other contingents, each of which needs analysis for its explanation, we make no advance.
   4. The sufficient/final reason must be outside of the series of this detail of contingencies, however infinite.

D. God
   1. Thus, the final reason of things must be found in a necessary Substance,
   2. In which the detail of changes exists only eminently, as in their source; this is what we call God.
   3. This substance, being the sufficient reason of all this detail, which is linked together throughout, is but one God, and this God suffices.

Possible Worlds & the Problem of Evil

I The Best of All Possible Worlds
   A. The Best World
      1. He claims that this world is “the best of all possible worlds.”
      2. He is not claiming that each single event or being taken in isolation is the best thing conceivable.
      3. He claims that the entirety of the world, from its creation to its end, is better than any other possible world.
      4. On his view, God had a myriad of worlds to choose from and chose one.
   B. God’s Choice (from Monadology)
      1. There is an infinity of possible universes in God’s ideas, but only one can exist, so there must be a sufficient reason for his choice of one rather than another.
      2. This reason is in the degrees of perfection of the worlds.
      3. This is the cause of the existence of the Best.
      4. His wisdom makes it known to Him.
      5. His goodness makes Him choose it.
      6. His power makes Him produce it.
   C. Diversity
      1. Given that only God is perfect, the created beings will be imperfect—thus even the best world is an imperfect world.
      2. So, God must pick the best world out of an infinite number of imperfect worlds.
      3. The best world contains “as great a variety as possible, but with the greatest possible order.”

II No Better World Possible (from Theodicy, #193-5)
   A. Intellectualist View
      1. The Will of God is not independent of the rules of Wisdom.
   B. The Problem and Reply
      1. Some claim God lacks goodness by saying He knows the best, can do it, but does not.
      2. Those who, from the alleged defects of the world, infer an evil or neutral God have seen very little of the world.
      3. If they waited until they knew more they will find there a contrivance and a beauty transcending all imagination.
      4. We find in the universe some things not pleasing to us, but it is not made for us alone—It is made for us if we are wise and we shall be happy in it if we wish to be.
   C. The Best
      1. Some say it is impossible to produce the best because
         a. There is no perfect creature.
         b. It is always possible to produce one more perfect.
      2. Reply: what can be said of a creature or particular substance, which can always be surpassed does not apply to the universe.
         a. Since it must extend through all future eternity, it is an infinity.
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D. Denial of Pantheism
1. There are an infinite number of creatures in the smallest particle of matter, because of the division of the continuum to infinity.
2. Infinity, the accumulation of an infinite number of substances, is not a whole any more than the infinite number itself, of which it cannot be said if it is even or uneven.
3. That serves to confute those who make of the world a God, or who think of God as the Soul of the world.
4. For the world or the universe cannot be regarded as an animal or a substance.

III Evil as privation (from Theodicy, #20)
A. The Question
1. Whence does evil come?
B. Origin of Evil-the Ancients
1. The cause of evil is attributed to matter.
2. Matter was believed uncreated and independent of God.
C. Origin of Evil- Intellectualist View
1. In the ideal nature of the creature as it is contained in the eternal verities in the understanding of God, independent of His will.
2. There is an original imperfection in the creature before sin, because the creature is limited in its essence.
3. Thus it cannot know all and can deceive itself and commit other errors.
D. Understanding & Necessity
1. Plato said in Timaeus that the world originated in Understanding united to Necessity.
2. Others have united God and Nature.
3. God is the Understanding.
4. The Necessity, the essential nature of things, is the object of the understanding, as far as it consists in the eternal verities.
5. His object is inward and abides in the divine understanding.
6. Therein is found the primitive form of good and the origin of evil:
   a. The Region of the Eternal Verities must be substituted for matter when seeking the source of things.
7. This region is the ideal cause of evil and good.
8. The formal character of evil has no efficient cause, for it consists in privation
   a. That which the efficient cause does not bring about.
9. Hence the Schoolmen call the cause of evil deficient.

IV The Analogy of the Boat (from Theodicy, #30-1)
A. Boats
1. The current of a river carries along boats, which differ only in cargo.
2. The boats most heavily laden go slower because of the matter which is inclined to slowness/privation of speed.
3. It does not lessen this speed, as that would be action, but moderates the effect by its receptivity.
4. Since more matter is moved by the same force of the current when the boat is more laden, it must go slower.
B. The Analogy
1. The current is like the action of God, who produces and conserves the positive in creatures, and gives them perfection, being and force.
2. The inertia of matter is like the natural imperfection of creatures.
3. The slowness of the laden boat is like the defects in the qualities and action of the creature.
4. The current is the cause of the boat's movement but not its retardation.
5. God is the cause of perfection in the nature and the actions of the creature.
6. The limitation of the receptivity of the creature is the cause of the defects in its action.
7. Thus the Platonists, St. Augustine and Schoolmen were right that God is the cause of the material element of evil in the positive, and not of the formal element, which lies in privation.
8. The current is the cause of the material element of the retardation, but not the formal-it causes the boat's speed but not the limits to this speed.
9. God is no more the cause of sin than the river's current is the cause of the retardation of the boat.
C. Defects
1. God gives ever to the creature and produces continually all that in it is positive, good and perfect.
2. The imperfections and defects are from the original limitation the creature had to receive with its beginning, through the ideal reasons restricting it.
3. God could not give the creature all without making of it a God.
4. Therefore there must be different degrees in the perfection of things, and limitations of every kind.

Metaphysical Points

I Problems & Solution
A. Introduction
Modern Notes

1. Leibniz set out to develop a metaphysics that would reconcile science and theology.
2. Descartes claimed that there are two types of substance: mind and matter.
3. Leibniz found problematic the notion that the substance physicists study are merely extended pieces of matter.

B. Problems with the Cartesian account of matter
1. The dynamic nature of matter indicates that such substances cannot be inert pieces of matter-they must be internally active centers of force.
2. Matter cannot be a fundamental substance because it is infinitely divisible-the fundamental entity must be indivisible.
3. Descartes did not provide a plausible account of mind-body interaction.

C. Problems with Spinoza’s account.
1. He rejects Spinoza’s monism on the grounds the plurality of the world seems evident.
2. He regards Spinoza’s division of the attributes of thought and extension to be as problematic as Cartesian dualism.

D. Rejection of Materialism
1. He rejects materialism.
2. He claims that a materialistic account of consciousness is not possible.
3. He argues that if he were shrunk down and examined the machinery of a person’s brain, he would never encounter that person’s thoughts, feelings or sensations.
4. Thus, he concludes that consciousness is distinct from matter.

E. Phenomenology
1. He claims that reality is mental in nature.
2. Matter “is a phenomenon like a rainbow.”
3. Matter is not a fundamental substance but is the result of something more fundamental.

F. Metaphysical Points
1. Leibniz’s view is that the fundamental entities of science are centers of force and not particles of moving matter.
2. The centers of force are real indivisible points-metaphysical points.
3. Unlike physical points they are not extended.
4. Unlike mathematical points they are not theoretical abstractions.
5. The metaphysical points are related to his infinitesimal calculus.
   a. His attempt to deal with motion as a continuum made up of an infinite number of infinitesimal points.
   b. As opposed to dealing with motion as a series of discrete leaps.
6. Reality is a mathematically ordered continuum of forces.

Monads

I Nature of Monads
A. Introduction
1. Monads are the basic elements of reality.
2. From the Greek “monas” meaning “unity” or “that which is one.”
3. They are immaterial substances.
4. There are an infinite number of them.

B. Minds
1. Minds are monads.
2. Minds cannot be extended-it makes no sense to claim that the mind is round or six feet wide.
3. The mind contains thoughts, feelings and desires-but none can exist on their own as distinct beings and they form one unified mental experience.
4. Monads have qualities but are metaphysical simples.

C. Perception
1. All monads perceive, hence perception occurs throughout all of reality.
2. Monads that are higher minds engage in apperception-conscious perception.
3. Thus, nature is a continuum.
4. He denies the existence of the lifeless matter posited by 17th century physics.
5. Thus, Leibniz accepts idealism-the view that the basic element of reality is mental in nature.
6. He also accepts panpsychism-the view that reality is composed of minds/souls.

D. Continuity
1. Based on the mathematical notion of continuum, he claims the world follows the law of continuity-nature does not make leaps.
2. Thus, nature is composed of monads exhibiting every level of awareness and every variety of perspective-from God to the most minimal level of awareness and perception.

E. The Identity of Indiscernibles
1. He argues that two identical monads could not be distinguished and hence cannot actually be two different things.
2. Hence, each monad in the universe is unique.

II Windowless Monads
A. Windowless
1. Monads do not interact—each is self-enclosed and self-sufficient.
2. “The monads have no windows through which anything can enter or depart” (Monadology).
3. Each monad mirrors or represents the entire world—though the clarity varies.
4. Thus, there is no dichotomy between the inner world of experience and the outer world.
   a. This avoids the problem of how something external can enter into one’s experience.
   b. It also avoids the problem of whether experience corresponds to the external world or not.
5. Minds also have an internally represented world.
6. Each being’s inner world of experience are separate in impenetrable.
7. The inner experience of different beings are different, their contents correspond with each other.

III Pre-Established Harmony
A. Inner World
1. There is no external world beyond the monads’ experiences.
2. These experiences are caused by God.
3. When God creates each monad all its experiences are placed within it.
4. The universe unfolds within each monad from its perspective.
5. “Each body feels all that happens in the universe, so he who sees all, might read in each what happens everywhere.”
6. Each monad contains its own internal principle of its activity.
7. Appetition: the inner drive towards self-development,
   a. Conscious appetition is purpose or will.
   b. Conscious or not, all things are driven by their internal desires.
B. One World
1. The problem: are all the monads experiencing the same world or are they all in their own worlds?
2. Answer: Pre-established harmony—when God created the monads He made each so that its experiences correspond with the experiences of all the others.
3. Each monad is like a musician in his/her own room, but all playing from the same score and following synchronized metronomes.
4. Leibniz also used the analogy of two synchronized clocks.

IV Space and Time
A. Extended things
1. Problem: Given that monads are unextended and indivisible, how do we have experience of extended things?
2. For Leibniz, extension is like a rainbow: a rainbow is not a unified entity but an appearance based in a number of water drops.
3. Extension is not a real property but is a way things appear to minds.
4. What seems to be extension is a repetition of similar monads-similar to how a painter can create the illusion of depth and extension.
B. Space and Time
1. Space and time do not exist apart from our spatially and temporally organized experiences.
2. For Newton, space is like a container—if everything were removed from it, space would still remain.
3. For Leibniz, space is not an entity—it is a system of relationships between the elements of experience.
4. Time does not exist by itself but is a measure of the successive relationships between experienced events.
5. Thus, space and time are relative.

V Mind-Body Problem
A. Bodies
1. Physical bodies are, in fact, collections of monads.
2. Some bodies, such as sand, are merely aggregates because they lack a unifying principle.
3. Organic bodies are communities of monads whose activities are in harmony with those of the dominant monad—the soul or mind of the being.
4. A creature experiences the monads of its body with the most clarity.
B. Interaction
1. There is no causal interaction between mind and body—monads are windowless.
2. Through pre-established harmony, God ensures that all mental events and “physical” events are in harmony.
3. Thus, the mind-body problem is solved.

VI Teleology & Mechanism
A. Reconciliation
1. Teleological explanations are given in terms of purposes and final ends.
2. Mechanical explanations are given in mechanistic terms without refering to ends or purposes.
3. Bodies follow fixed laws and it is harmless to speak of them acting on each other in accord with mechanical principles.
4. The highest level of explanation for the actions of bodies would refer solely to the unfolding of their inner natures in accord with ends ordained by God.
5. “Souls act according to the laws of final causes, by appetitions, ends and means.
6. “Bodies act in accordance with the laws of efficient causes or of motion.”
7. The two realms “are in harmony with each other.”

B. Two Realms
1. The notion of two realms gives science a realm.
2. However, the material realm is still part of a purposive system ordained by God.
3. Thus, physics must be supplemented by theology and metaphysics.

VII Freedom and Determinism
A. Freedom
1. His view seems to deny freedom—what you will do is pre-established in your inner nature.
2. He claims that people are free.
3. Freedom is unimpeded self-development and not arbitrary, unpredictable, spontaneous actions.
4. One would lack freedom if his actions were controlled from outside, but Leibniz denies that God is like a puppeteer who pulls the strings directly.
5. A person’s actions result from her values and character—they flow from her inner nature.

B. Compatibilism
1. All that a person does that is not the result of external coercion results from her own internal character.
2. If choices are determined by character, this is all that could be reasonably meant by human freedom.
3. We are both determined and free.

VIII The City of God
A. Souls
1. Each mind is like a little divinity and is capable of entering into a society with God.
2. He is to them what an inventor is to his machine, a prince is to his subjects, a father to his children.
3. The assembly of all spirits composes the City of God—the most perfect state most perfect state, under the perfect monarch.

B. Why did God create the world?
1. The city of God is the highest and most divine of his works.
2. In this the glory of God truly consists—He would not have it if this greatness and goodness were not known and admired.
3. It is in relation to this divine city that he properly has goodness.
4. His wisdom and his power are everywhere manifest.

C. Harmony, Reward & Punishment
1. A perfect harmony exists between the physical kingdom of nature and the moral kingdom of grace.
2. This harmony makes things progress toward grace by natural means.

D. Machinery of Justice
1. God as architect satisfies in every respect God as legislator.
2. Sins, by the order of nature and mechanical structure of things, must carry their punishment with them.
3. In the same way, good actions obtain their rewards mechanically through their relations to bodies.
   a. This cannot and ought not always happen immediately.
4. Under this perfect government, there will be no good action un.rewarded, no bad action unpunished.
5. Everything must result in the well being of the good.

6. Recognizing that if we could sufficiently understand the order of the universe, we should find it
   a. Surpasses all the wishes of the wisest.
   b. It is impossible to render it better than it is for all in general and ourselves in particular.
   c. God ought to be the whole aim of our will, and can alone make our happiness.

Problems & Impact

I Problems
A. The best of all possible worlds.
1. In 1755 Lisbon was devastated by an earthquake—this was a shock to the optimism of the 18th century.
2. In 1759 Voltaire wrote Candide, a bitter satire of Leibniz’s view, in response to the earthquake.
3. The work presents the brutality of human beings and nature.
4. The main character, the philosopher Pangloss, proclaims there is sufficient reason for all the suffering.
5. In the face of the suffering, Pangloss’s student Candide says “If this is the best of all possible worlds, what are the others like?”

B. Freedom
1. Reconciling the claim that humans are free with the claim that the nature of humans is determined is problematic.

2. Most criticisms are based on the view that there is more to freedom than simply acting from a pre-determined inner nature.

3. Defining the nature of freedom is highly problematic.

C. Collapse to Spinoza

1. Leibniz did his best to distinguish his position from that of Spinoza because he regarded it’s metaphysical and theological conclusions as intolerable.

2. Leibniz takes God to be the supreme monad whose experience contains the infinite experiences of all other less monads.

3. This seems similar to Spinoza’s view that all things are modes of the divine substance.

4. Leibniz’s claims that God’s nature required Him to create this specific world and claims that the world is a rational system such that its details can be derived from the concept of anything in it.

5. These claims seem to lead to the view held by Spinoza regarding necessity.

II Impact

A. Dominant

1. His views dominated German philosophy for over a century.

2. His views were important in bringing the enlightenment to the German states.

3. His view served as a paradigm of rationalistic metaphysics.

4. His view was targeted by Kant-he thought the rationalists had pushed reason beyond its intrinsic limits.

B. Lost potential

1. Most of his works remained “lost” in the Royal Library at Hanover until the 20th century.

2. Scholars had re-discovered ideas about symbolic logic he had worked out centuries earlier.

C. Universal, Logically Perfect Language

1. His dream of creating the logically perfect language inspired logicians such as Bertrand Russell.

2. His vision of reducing human thought to mathematical symbols is the basis of research in artificial intelligence.

Part III: Locke & Berkeley

**Historical Background: The Enlightenment**

Based on *The Voyage of Discovery*, by William F. Lawhead

**Enlightenment**

I Introduction

A. The Age of Enlightenment

1. 18th century

2. The writers of the time named it themselves.

3. Reason had shown the path of progress for philosophy, science, religion, politics and the arts.

4. Passion, prejudice, authority and dogma would be banished.

5. A time of great hope and optimism.

B. Philosophy and Science-Bookends of the Age

1. 1687: Sir Isaac Newton’s *Principia Mathematica*

2. 1690: John Locke’s *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*.

3. 1781: Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*.

4. Kant’s 1784 “What is Enlightenment”: “Enlightenment is man’s leaving his self-caused immaturity.”

II Four Pillars of the Enlightenment

A. Nature

1. Nature is orderly, benevolent and ruled by laws.

2. Human nature was seen as orderly, benevolent and ruled by laws-provided that passion and dogma are removed so that reason can prevail.

B. Reason

1. Philosophers disagreed about the nature of reason, roughly dividing into empiricists and rationalists.

2. All humans have a capacity for reason.

C. Education and Experience

1. Education and experience will develop a person’s reason.

D. Progress

1. All problems are solvable via science and reason.
Newton

I Background
A. Newton
1. Born in 1642.
2. “If I have seen farther, it is because I have stood on the shoulders of Giants.”
3. Discovered, as did Leibniz, the infinitesimal calculus.
4. Developed a single, comprehensive theory of physics that enabled the derivation of:
   a. Galileo’s law regarding falling bodies.
   b. Kepler’s laws of planetary motion.
5. His physics remained the framework for science until Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity.
B. Hero
1. Newton became a cultural hero.
2. He was regarded as an authority on par with the authority that had been previously awarded to Aristotle.
3. Alexander Pope: “Nature and Nature’s law lay hid in night: God said, Let Newton be! And all was Light.”
4. He was claimed by both rationalists and empiricists.

II Science
A. End of Aristotelian Science
1. Aristotle held the view that the terrestrial and celestial realms were governed by different laws.
2. This distinction was reinforced in the Middle Ages by the theological view of earth and heaven.
3. Newton held that the heavens and the earth are composed of the same materials and are under the same laws.
4. This made the universe less mysterious and more accessible to human comprehension and manipulation.
B. Empirical
1. He used the deductive, mathematical approach of the rationalists and scientists such as Galileo and Descartes
2. He also used the inductive, experimental approach of the empiricists and scientists like Bacon and Boyle.
3. This provided a foundation on which British empiricism was constructed.
C. Rejection of Speculative Theory
1. Newton argued that science needs to avoid metaphysical speculation and stick to empirical data.
2. He rejects hypotheses, taking them to be “whatever is not deduced from the phenomena.”
3. He claims hypotheses, “whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in empirical science.”
4. Science must no longer deal with essences or underlying realities-these are beyond scientific comprehension.
5. Science must stick to describing the patterns of phenomena.
6. This view lead to the view that what we can know about reality is the way it appears to us.

Newton’s Impact on Philosophy & Religion

I Newtonian Model for Philosophy
A. Philosophers Influenced by Newton
1. Believed the Newtonian model of experimental observation could be applied across the board.
2. Believed the mind, ethics, and politics are phenomena explainable by descriptive laws.
3. Many philosophers emulated Newton’s approach:
   a. Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
   b. Berkeley’s A Treatise Concerning Human Understanding.
B. Julien La Mettrie
1. 1709-1751
2. 1747: Man the Machine
3. He argues that philosophers should be engineers who analyze the mind.
4. His work anticipated the theory that the brain is like a computer.
5. Unlike most other philosophers, he seemed to understand the implications of mechanism-determinism and reductionism.
C. Influence on Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind
1. Newtonian physics focused on the motion of physical particles.
2. For Newton, physical objects were composed of fundamental physical particles.
3. Some modeled their epistemology on this and took complex ideas to be composed of simple ideas.
4. This also affected philosophy of mind-the mind was regarded as a container in which ideas operated in accord with psychological laws.
5. This generates the problem of the external world—how do the ideas correspond with the external objects?
6. Leibniz rejected the Newtonian model.
7. Berkeley also rejects the Newtonian model in favor of idealism.

II Newtonian Science & Religion
A. Reaction
1. Initially it was feared that Newtonian science would be harmful to faith.
2. He presented naturalistic explanations for celestial phenomena that had traditionally been credited to God.
3. A universe based on mechanical laws seems to leave no room for miracles.
4. It was feared that science would lead to materialism and atheism.
B. Newton & Religion
1. Newton was a devout believer.
2. He wrote theological works.
3. He regarded science as revealing a designed universe—he presented an argument from design for God’s existence.
C. God in the Gaps
1. Newton argued that God existed on the basis of problems in his physics.
2. One problem: he could not account for the fact that the gravitational attraction of the stars had failed to pull them together.
3. He observed irregularities in the universe which he regarded as leading to it coming to an end.
4. He drew the conclusion that God kept things going.
5. Later scientists developed his physics and solved this problem without God.
   a. When Laplace presented his theory of planetary motion to Napoleon in 1796, he asked about God’s role.
   b. Laplace replied “Sire, I have no need of that hypothesis.”

I
II The Rise of Disbelief
A. Theism
1. At the start of the enlightenment, most philosophers and scientists regarded religion and science as means to achieve truth.
2. Berkeley claimed that science and religion will converge.
B. Reduced Theism
1. Later, most philosophers still accepted revelation, but argued that alleged revelations would need to pass through the filter of reason.
C. Deism
1. The rise of science gave birth to deism,
2. God created the world.
3. The world is a perfect machine that does not require God to intervene.
4. The world and its truths can be known via human reason without revelation.
5. Noted deists include Paine, Jefferson and Franklin.
D. The Skeptics
1. An agnostic position arose in which it was claimed that we could not have knowledge of God.
2. Reason does not provide evidence for God, but cannot prove that God does not exist.
3. Hume took this position, although he was critical of religion.
4. Kant agreed with Hume that knowledge of God is not possible—only the sciences reveal what exists.
5. Kant claimed that we find it appealing to accept God’s existence.
E. Naturalistic Atheism
1. This became a dominant view in the 19th century.
2. The main tenet is that the evidence against God is sufficient to warrant rejecting the claim that God exists.

The French
I The Philosophes
A. Philosophes (French for Philosopher).
1. Mostly literary intellectuals and not true philosophers.
2. They popularized the enlightenment via their writings.
3. They were often guests at the salons, parties attended by fashionable intellectuals and aristocrats.
4. Included: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Diderot, Condilac, La Mettrie, Voltaire, Helvetius, d’A;embert, Holbach, and Condorcet.
B. Social Criticism
1. They often attacked bigotry, ignorance, hypocrisy in religion, and political oppression.
2. They endorsed the power of reason, progress and human perfection.
3. Some were deists and others were atheists.
C. Influences
1. Montesquieu (1689-1755) and Voltaire (1694-1778) were influenced by Locke and Newton and took the English political system as their model.

2. Montesquieu’s works:
   b. 1748 *Spirit of Laws*: A text in political science.

3. Voltaire’s Works
   b. 1759 *Candide*: A satirical novel that includes a sustained attack on Leibniz.

D. Encyclopedie
   1. Edited by Diderot and d’Alembert
   2. Covered science, math and technology.
   3. Included attacks on religion and the existing social institutions.
   4. The work reached 35 volumes after about 30 years.
   5. It was attacked for promoting deism and materialism.
   6. Diderot claimed the work was intended to inform and “to change the general way of thinking.”
   7. The work was extremely successful.

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**John Locke (1632-1704)**

**Background**

I Background

A. Early years & Education
   1. Born in 1632 into a Puritan family.
   2. Educated at Oxford in theology, natural science, philosophy and medicine.
   3. Described as “a man of turbulent spirit, clamorous and never contented.”
   4. He found Oxford’s Scholasticism to be “perplexed with obscure terms and useless questions.”
   5. He read the works of Descartes on his own.
   6. He was a lecturer at Oxford in Greek and rhetoric for a short while.

B. Public Life
   1. 1667-1683 he served as the doctor and adviser to Lord Ashley (who became the Earl of Shaftsbury).
   2. Held a variety of political offices.
   3. 1669 He helped draft a constitution for the Carolinas.

C. Revolution
   1. The Parliament of England and the throne had been struggling with each other for decades.
   2. Locke supported parliamentary rights.
   3. Locke fled England for Holland in 1683 when James II took the throne.
   4. In 1689, after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 which replaced James II with William of Orange, he returned to England.
   5. He held various political offices.

D. Works
   1. 1690: *Two Treatises on Government* and *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*.
   2. 1689-1692: *Letters Concerning Toleration*.
   3. 1693: *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*.
   4. 1695: *The Reasonableness of Christianity*.

E. The End
   1. In 1691 he entered into partial retirement and moved 20 miles outside of London.
   2. He spent his remaining years studying the scriptures and enjoying the company of friends.
   3. He died in 1704.

II Locke’s Project

A. Age of Enlightenment
   1. It is widely accepted that the publication of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* marked the start of the enlightenment.
   2. This book was extremely influential on the 18th century.

B. Motivation & Task
   1. Locke’s motivation arose from a conversation with friends around 1670.
   2. He realized that to avoid confusion in inquiries he needed to examine human abilities and determine what objects the understanding was fit or unfit to deal with.
3. He took his task to be “to inquire into the original sources, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent.”
4. Locke accepted that human faculties were limited and that there could be questions beyond our ability to answer.
5. He sets out to determine
   a. How far the understanding extends.
   b. How far it has faculties to attain certainty.
   c. In what cases we can only judge and guess.”
6. Like Descartes, Locke longed for certainty.
7. Unlike Descartes, Locke was willing to take a more practical approach to epistemology.
8. Locke uses an analogy to a candle:
   a. Though we want the light of the sun, we have to settle for a candle by which to work.
   b. The candle is like the intellect.
9. Locke claims that we should be satisfied with the discoveries we can make with this “candle.”

III Methodology
A. Ideas
   1. The focus is on ideas, which are the building blocks of knowledge.
   2. Ideas: anything that is “the immediate object of perception, thought or understanding.”
   3. Ideas include concepts, abstract notions as well as specific and concrete properties.
   4. Examples: “whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness…”
B. “Historical Plain” Method
   1. Historical: the genesis of ideas must be backtracked until the original sources are found.
   2. This is not a logical analysis but an examination of how the idea arose.
   3. Plain: This indicates the empirical method of Locke and his attempt to use a sensible approach.
   4. The basis for validating an idea is whether it can be derived from the senses or not.

Locke’s Empirical Epistemology

I Critique of Innate Ideas
A. Goals
   1. To clear away the “underbrush” of unintelligible terms and useless philosophical systems.
   2. Once the clearing is done, the “master builders” such as Newton could start on new construction.
   3. Innate ideas were the main debris.
B. Innate Ideas
   1. Theory of innate ideas: at least some ideas, principles or knowledge do not arise from sensory experience but are components of the mind.
   2. Plato, Descartes and Leibniz accepted innate ideas.
   3. Logic and mathematics were often claimed to be innate.
   4. Some argued that moral and theological ideas are innate.
C. Universal Agreement
   1. One standard argument for innate ideas is that there is universal agreement in regards to certain principles.
   2. Locke argues that even if this is true, it does not prove the ideas are innate.
   3. He offers an alternative explanation: ideas for which there is universal agreement arise because of the uniformity of human experience in those areas.
   4. For example, ideas of fire, sun, heat and numbers are universal because they are common elements in experience.
D. Universal Knowledge
   1. Locke notes that the knowledge of innate ideas is not universal.
   2. He points out that children, the mentally deficient and people in some cultures do not seem to know such truths.
   3. He argues that if there were innate ideas, everyone would know them.
   4. He claims that “no proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never conscious of.”
   5. Thus, he concludes that there are no innate ideas.
   6. Plato addressed this matter in the Meno in which he argues that the mind must be led to recollect the ideas.
   7. Leibniz responded to this argument with his argument that the mind is not “transparent.”
E. Moral Principles
   1. Locke uses an argument by example to show that moral ideas are not innate.
   2. He catalogs the morals of a variety of cultures and shows how different they are.
   3. Based on this moral diversity, he concludes that moral ideas are not innate.
   4. He does not reject objective, universal moral principles.
II Theory of Simple Ideas
A. Origin of Knowledge
1. Ideas are not innate.
2. Ideas arise from experience.
3. Metaphorically, the mind is a blank slate which is written on by experience.
4. He also compares the mind to a dark closet.

B. Newtonian Influence
1. The mind is an empty vessel that fills up with ideas.
2. He is emulating Newton’s view of particles and attempted to find the laws governing the mind.
3. The world is composed of moving particles, some of which strike the senses, thus giving rise to ideas.

C. Simple Ideas
1. A simple idea is an atom of thought.
2. A simple idea is unanalyzable and irreducible.
3. The mind cannot create a new simple idea—it can only acquire one via experience.

D. Types of Simple Ideas: Ideas of sensation
1. Ideas originating in sensation.
2. These are ideas of qualities such as heat, color, cold, flavor, etc.
3. Ideas of objects are not ideas of sensation.
4. The foundation of knowledge consists in sense data, not ideas of objects.
5. One has sensory experience of qualities and not of objects.

E. Types of Simple Ideas: Ideas of reflection.
1. These ideas arise from internal experience of one’s own mental operations.
2. Includes ideas of perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, emotions, and other psychological states.
3. One’s observation of one’s mental operations enables one to think about thinking.

F. Only Two Sources of Ideas
1. These are the only two sources of ideas.
2. “External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities.”
3. “The mind furnishes the understanding with the ideas of its own operation.”
4. Locke claims that if anyone examines his thoughts he will only find ideas that originated in the senses or in the reflection of the mind on its own operations.
5. In support of his view he notes that people do not know the taste of something until they taste it or the idea of a color before seeing it.

III Theory of Complex Ideas
A. Origin of Complex Ideas
1. The mind cannot create ideas from nothing.
2. The mind can combine simple ideas to create complex ideas.
3. Complex ideas can be treated as single entities and named.
4. Examples: “beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the universe.”

B. Classification of Complex Ideas
1. In the 4th edition of the Essay complex ideas are classified by the three operations of the mind producing them: compounding, relating and abstracting.

C. Compounding
1. Compounding: creating ideas by combining ideas.
2. Multiple ideas of the same type can be combined to create complex entities.
   a. Example: Ideas of space can be combined to create an idea of vast space.
   b. Example: Ideas of men can be combined to create an idea of a crowd or army.
3. Ideas of different types can be combined to create an idea of a complex entity.
   a. Example: Ideas of red, round, white, and sweet can be combined to form the idea of an apple.

D. Abstracting & Abstract Ideas
1. Relation: ideas produced by comparing one idea to another idea.
   a. Example: the idea of smaller is created by comparing ideas of two things.
2. Abstraction: ideas created by abstracting or generalizing.
3. Creating an idea of “type X”, such as “man”, involves abstracting all the common qualities of the Xs and ignoring the distinctions.
4. The notion of infinity can be created by abstraction.
   a. It comes from “the power we observe in ourselves of repeating without end, our own ideas.”
5. The notion of eternity can be created in a similar manner.
6. He notes that the abstract idea of infinity is vague—the human mind cannot have a definite idea of infinite space.
a. This would require being able to have the idea of the unending series of ideas as a completed series, which would require an infinite mind.

IV Primary and Secondary Qualities
A. Qualities
1. Locke never doubts the existence of an external world.
2. Given that all knowledge is based on ideas, Locke needs to show how this knowledge relates to the external world.
3. He begins his answer by introducing the notion of quality: a power to produce ideas in the mind.
B. Primary Qualities
1. Primary qualities: qualities that actually exist in the objects.
2. Examples: solidity, extension, shape, motion, and rest.
3. Ideas corresponding to these qualities accurately represent qualities in the external world.
4. These qualities can be quantified and are the subject of physics.
C. Secondary Qualities
1. Secondary qualities: Qualities which are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities.
2. Examples: colors, sounds, tastes, odors, warmth, cold, etc.
3. The secondary qualities are subjective and do not resemble their causes.
4. These qualities are not the subject of physics and are not quantitative.
D. Powers
1. Powers: The power in a body, by its primary qualities, to make a change in the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of another body, thus changing how it operates on our senses.
2. The sun has a power to make wax white, and fire to make lead fluid.
3. The powers result from the different modifications of primary qualities.
4. Locke takes powers to be a third category, but this distinction is commonly ignored.
E. Locke’s General Reasoning for the Distinction
1. Reflection reveals that different opinions about an object’s primary qualities can be tested against the objective properties of the object.
2. When different people taste the same thing they can experience different flavors.
3. The actual shape of an object does not vary from person to person.
4. The color of an object varies with viewing conditions and the viewer.
5. The same fire can produce warmth and pain, but since pain is not in the fire, neither is the heat.
6. One hand put in water can feel warmth while another hand in the same water can feel chilled—thus showing the cold and warmth are not in the water.
7. Figure never produces the idea of a square in one and that of a globe in another.

V Representative Realism & Judgment
A. Representative Realism
1. The mind is directly aware of only its ideas, but these ideas are caused by and represent external objects.
2. While real, the objects themselves cannot be examined—we have only our ideas of objects.
3. There is no perception without the mind.
B. Judgment
1. Ideas from sensation can be altered by the judgment without this being noticed
2. Example:
   a. Seeing a globe of a uniform color yields the idea of a shaded flat circle.
   b. Judgment yields the idea of a globe.
C. The Mohneaux Problem
1. A man born blind learns to distinguish between a cube and a sphere by touch.
2. Suppose he is then able to see the cube and sphere.
3. Mohneaux claims he could not distinguish them by sight before touching them.
4. He has the experience of touch, but lacks the experience connecting touch and sight.
5. Locke agrees.

VI Degrees of Knowledge
A. Knowledge
1. Knowledge: “the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas.”
2. Knowledge is obtained by observing how our ideas fit or do not fit.
3. A true claim/proposition is one in which the ideas are properly related.
4. There are three varieties of knowledge.
B. Intuitive Knowledge
1. The connection between ideas is seen immediately.
2. Examples: “white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three are more than two, and equal to one and two.”
3. This knowledge “leaves no room for hesitation, doubt, or examination, but the mind is presently filled with the clear light of it.”
4. This knowledge is certain and provides the foundation for all other knowledge.
5. Knowledge of one’s own existence is intuitive knowledge.
6. There is no intuitive knowledge of the existence of other objects.

C. Demonstrative Knowledge
1. The connection between the ideas is not immediate but is created by means of a series of logical steps.
2. Demonstrative knowledge provides certainty, provided each step is properly taken.
3. Due to the possibility of error it is not as “clear and bright, nor the assent so ready as in intuitive knowledge.”
4. Demonstrative knowledge includes geometry and God’s existence.

D. Sensitive Knowledge
1. Includes all knowledge of the existence of beings aside from oneself and God.
2. This knowledge cannot achieve the certainty of intuitive or demonstrative knowledge.
3. The evidence is so probable that it “puts us past doubting.”
4. While certainty in everyday life is not possible, he claims it is not needed for practical life.

E. Certainty
1. Locke takes a modest view on the possibility of certainty in experimental science.
2. Experience shows that gold, for example, always has had certain qualities but we can find no necessary connections among these qualities.
3. Locke sometimes seems to indicate that certainty in such matters is impossible, but at times he suggests that certainty in such matters might be possible if knowledge of the “minute constituent parts of any two bodies” is possible.
4. He indicates that such knowledge would enable one to determine the necessary connection between bodies “as we do now the properties of a square or triangle.”

VII Refutation of Skepticism
A. The Skeptic
1. Distrusts his senses.
2. Affirms all we sense, think and do is but an unreal dream.
3. Questions the existence of all things, or our knowledge of any thing.

B. Locke’s “Humorous” Reply to Skepticism
1. No one can be so skeptical as to be uncertain of the existence of things he sees and feels.
2. Such a skeptic cannot have a controversy with Locke.
3. He can never be sure Locke says anything contrary to his own opinion.

C. 4. First Confirmation-Production of Ideas
1. Perceptions are produced by exterior causes affecting our senses.
2. Those lacking the organs of a sense cannot have the ideas belonging to it produced in their minds.
3. We must be assured that they come in solely by the organs of that sense.
4. The organs do not produce them—if they did, people would see colors in the dark, smell roses in the winter, and know the taste of pineapple before tasting it.

D. Second Confirmation-Unavoidable
1. Sometimes he cannot avoid having ideas produced in his mind.
2. Example: If he looks at the sun, he cannot avoid the ideas produced by the sun.
3. The difference is manifest between ideas in the memory and those which unavoidably force themselves on him.
4. If ideas were only in memory, he would have the power to call and dispose of them at will.
5. There must be external objects he cannot resist producing ideas in his mind, whether he wills or not.
6. All see the difference between contemplating the idea of the sun in memory and looking at it.
7. His perception is so distinct that few ideas are more distinguishable.
8. So, he has certain knowledge that:
   a. Both are not memory or actions of his mind.
   b. The actual seeing has an external cause.

E. Third Confirmation-Pain & Measurement
1. Many ideas are produced in us with pain, but the memory of them does not produce pain.
2. The pain is caused by external objects.
3. We remember the pains of hunger, thirst, or head-ache, without pain.
4. These would never disturb us or do so when we thought of them if there were only ideas and no external things affecting us.
5. Examining mathematic proofs by diagrams supports the evidence of sight and gives it a certainty approaching demonstration.
6. It would be strange to be certain that one angles measured by a diagram of lines and angle is bigger than another and then doubt the existence of the lines and angles used to measure.
F. Fourth Confirmation
1. Our senses often support each other concerning the existence of external sensible things.
2. Seeing a fire a skeptic may feel it and be convinced by putting his hand in it.
3. Such certainly could never be put into pain by a bare idea, unless the pain is also a fancy.
4. One cannot burn oneself again by raising the idea again.
5. Argument: Writing
   a. The letters will not appear if his hands stay still.
   b. Once the paper is written on, he can only see them as they are.
   c. Hence they are not products of his imagination
   d. The characters made at his thought do not obey his thought or cease to be when he wills.
   e. They affect his senses constantly and regularly.
   f. When another sees the writing and speaks the words he knows that what he wrote exists without him.
   g. The sounds could not be the effect of his imagination, nor could his memory retain them in that order.
G. Adequate
1. The faculties cannot provide a perfect, clear, comprehensive knowledge free from all doubt.
2. They are suited to our preservation and accommodated to the use of life.
3. They serve our purpose by giving notice of things convenient or inconvenient.
4. This is assurance enough, when no one requires greater certainty to govern his actions, than what is as certain as the actions.
5. If the dreamer wishes to try if the heat of a furnace is a dream by putting his hand in it, he may be wakened to a certainty greater than he could wish.
6. This evidence is as great as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain.
7. We have no concern of knowing or being beyond our happiness or misery.
8. This assurance of the existence of external things is sufficient to direct us to attain good and avoid evil caused by them.
9. This is the important concern regarding external objects.
H. Practical Approach
1. It is vain to
   a. Expect demonstration and certainty in things incapable of it.
   b. To refuse assent to very rational propositions.
   c. To act contrary to plain and clear truths because they can be doubted.
2. In life one who required certainty would only be sure of perishing quickly.
   a. The wholesomeness of his meat or drink would not give him reason to try it.
   b. He could do nothing if he required grounds with no doubt, no objection.

Locke’s Metaphysics

Locke’s Theory of Substance and Personal Identity
From: Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690,1694)

I Substance
A. Idea of Substance
1. Qualities cannot subsist, sine re substante (without something to support them).
2. The supporter of the qualities is called “Substantia”: “standing under” or “upholding.”
B. Locke’s Elephant Story
1. If asked what supports the qualities, he would be like the Indian:
   a. Saying the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on.
   b. His answer: a great tortoise.
   c. Asked what supported the tortoise, he replied: something he knew not what.
2. We have no distinct idea of substance and are perfectly ignorant of it.
3. It is something we know not what.
C. Ideas of Material Substance and Spiritual Substance
1. The physical is supposed to be (without knowing what it is) substratum of simple ideas from outside.
2. The mental is supposed (with like ignorance) to be substratum to the operations experienced within.
3. Given that we lack clear and distinct ideas of either, it is as ration to claim there is no body as to claim there is no spirit.

II The Identity Of Living Things
A. Living Creatures
1. The identity of a living being does not depend on the sameness of matter.
2. Changes in matter or parts do not result in a change of identity.
3. An oak is not a mass of matter but a disposition of them as constitutes its parts.
   a. It remains one plant through changes of matter if it has an organization of parts in a coherent body with a common life.
4. Same animal: a continued life communicated to different particles of matter successively united to the organized living body.

III Man
A. Identity of Man
   1. The identity of man is in an organized continued body under one organization of life in the particles of matter united to it.
   2. If identity of soul makes the same man, and a soul could occupy different bodies, men in distant ages might be the same man.
   3. If the soul makes the man, “man” would apply to an idea excluding body and shape.
   4. The soul of a man could be in a hog, but we would not say the hog is a man.
   5. It is one thing to be the same substance, another to be the same man, and a third to be the same person.
B. What is a Man?
   1. Man: an animal of a certain form.
   2. A creature without reason but having the shape of a man would be called a man.
   3. A cat or parrot that reasoned would be called a cat or parrot.
   4. For most, a man is not just a thinking/rational being, but a particularly shaped body joined to thinking.
      a. The same body and the same spirit go into making the same man.

IV Consciousness and Personal Identity
A. Person
   1. A thinking intelligent being.
   2. That has reason and reflection.
   3. Can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places.
   4. Which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking.
B. Consciousness
   1. Consciousness always accompanies thinking.
   2. Consciousness: what makes each to be what he calls self, and distinguishes him from other thinking things.
   3. Consciousness is the sole basis of personal identity, the sameness of a rational being.
   4. The identity of a person reaches as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought.

V Consciousness Makes Personal Identity
A. Forgetting
   1. If people did not forget, few would doubt the same thinking thing was always present.
   2. We do forget and this raises doubts about whether we are the same thinking substance or not.
   3. This does not concern personal identity, which is about sameness of person, not sameness of substance.
B. Consciousness
   1. The same consciousness makes a man himself to himself.
   2. So personal identity depends on that alone, regardless of substance or substances.
C. Changes of Time & Substance: Clothing analogy and Hand argument
   1. The self extends as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come.
   2. Time or change of substance no more makes two persons, than changing clothes after a night’s sleep makes two men.
   3. The limbs of one’s body are a part of him- he sympathizes and is concerned for them.
   4. Cut off a hand and separate it from the consciousness, it is no more a part of him than the remotest part of matter.

VI Personal Identity & Immaterial Substance
A. First Question
   1. Is it the same person through change of substance?
   2. This can only be resolved by those who know:
      a. What kind of thinking substances they are.
      b. If consciousness of past actions can be transferred from one thinking substance to another.
   3. If the same consciousness is not the same individual, we must know
      a. Why one intellectual substance may think it did something it did not.
      b. Why such a thought may be without reality, like in a dream.
   4. That this never happens is best explained by God’s goodness.
      a. He will not, by their error, transfer the consciousness bringing reward or punishment with it.
      b. This must do until we have a clearer understanding.
   5. If the same consciousness is transferable from one thinking substance to another, two thinking substances might be one person.
B. Second Question
   1. Can there be two distinct persons though the immaterial substance is the same?
   2. Can the same immaterial being lose its consciousness of past actions and be unable to regain them?
3. Those accepting preexistence claim the soul has no consciousness of what it did while separate from body, or in another body.
4. If personal identity reaches no further than consciousness, a preexistent spirit must make different persons.

C. Example: Nestor
1. Suppose a person now has the soul that was in Nestor at Troy but not his consciousness.
2. Having no consciousness of actions of Nestor he cannot conceive himself as Nestor.
3. This would no more make him the same person as Nestor, than if some particles of Nestor's body were a part of him.
4. The same immaterial substance, without the same consciousness, no more makes the same person, than the same particle of matter, without consciousness, makes the same person.
5. If he is conscious of any actions of Nestor, he is the same person with Nestor.

VII MEMORY AND PERSONAL IDENTITY
A. Resurrection
1. The same person can be at the resurrection, though not in his original body.
2. If the same consciousness is present in the body along with the soul that inhabits it.
B. The Prince and the Cobbler
1. If the soul of a prince, carrying along his consciousness enters the soulless body of a cobbler:
   a. He would be the same person with the prince.
   b. Accountable only for the prince's actions.
2. The body goes to the making the man, and would to everyone determine the man.
3. The soul would not make another man; he would be the same cobbler to all but himself.
C. Language
1. In the ordinary way of speaking, “same person” and “same man”, stand for the same thing.
2. People can apply sounds to what ideas they thinks fit, and change them as they please.
3. When inquiring what makes the same spirit, man, or person, we must determine what we mean and thus determine when it is and is not the same.

VIII SELF DEPENDS ON CONSCIOUSNESS
A. Consciousness
1. Self: that conscious thinking thing, whatever the substance, which is:
   a. Sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain.
   b. Capable of happiness or misery.
   c. So is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends.
   d. It matters not whether it is spiritual or material, simple or compounded.
B. The Little Finger
1. Understood under that consciousness, a little finger is as much a part of him as what is most so.
2. If the little finger is removed and the consciousness went it, the finger would be the same person, and self would have nothing to do with the rest of the body.
3. It is the consciousness that goes along with the substance, when a part is separate from another, which makes the same person.
   a. This also applies to substances remote in time.
4. Whatever the consciousness of the present thinking thing can join itself, makes the same person.
   a. And so attributes to itself and owns the actions of that thing, as far as consciousness reaches, and no further.

IX. REWARD AND PUNISHMENT
A. PI and Justice
1. On personal identity is founded all the right and justice of reward and punishment.
2. Happiness and misery are what each is concerned for himself regardless of what happens to any substance not joined to that consciousness.
B. The Little Finger
1. If consciousness went with a severed little finger, it would be the same self which was concerned with the whole body before, whose actions must be its own now.
2. If the body had its own consciousness, unknown to the finger, it wouldn’t be concerned for it as a part of itself or own its actions.
C. Personal Identity
1. Personal identity consists not in the identity of substance, but in the identity of consciousness.
2. If Socrates and the mayor of Queenborough have the same consciousness they are the same person.
3. If the same Socrates waking and sleeping do not have the same consciousness, then Socrates waking and Socrates sleeping are not the same person.
4. To punish Socrates waking for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was not conscious of, would not be any more right, than to punish one twin for what the other did that he was unaware of, because they could not be distinguished.
D. Objection and Reply
1. Suppose I lose the memory of some parts of my life, beyond possible retrieval.
2. Aren’t I the same person that did the actions and had the thoughts I was once conscious of, though I forgot them?
3. Reply: we must notice what the word “I” is applied to—here to the man only.
4. Assuming the same man is the same person, “I” is easily supposed to stand for the same person.
5. If it is possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times, the same man would at different times make different persons.
6. This is the sense of mankind in the solemnest declaration of their opinions.
   a. Human laws do not punish the mad man for the sober man's actions,
   b. Nor the sober man for what the mad man did.
   c. Thus making them two persons.
7. We say such a one is not himself or beside himself as if it is thought the self was changed and the same person was no longer in that man.

X A PROBLEM ABOUT PUNISHMENT

A. Drunk, Asleep, & Judgment Day
1. Is not a man drunk and sober the same person?
2. Why else is he punished for the act committed when drunk, though he is never afterwards conscious of it?
3. Just as much the same person as a man who walks in his sleep is the same person, and is answerable for any mischief he does while asleep.
4. Human laws punish both with a justice suitable to their way of knowledge because, in these cases, they cannot distinguish with certainty what is real and what counterfeit.
5. So ignorance in drunkenness or sleep is not admitted as a plea.
6. Though punishment is annexed to personality, and personality to consciousness, and the drunkard was perhaps not conscious of what he did, human law justly punishes him.
   a. Because the fact is proved against him, but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him.
7. When all secrets of all hearts shall be laid open no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of; but shall receive his doom, his conscience accusing or excusing him.

XI Odd Cases

A. Two and One
1. Suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses act in the same body, one by day, the other by night.
2. Suppose the same consciousness, acting by intervals, has two distinct bodies.
3. Personal identity is determined by the consciousness.
4. Granting the thinking substance must be immaterial; it may part with its past consciousness and be restored, as when men forget their past actions.
5. Make remembering and forgetting take turns by day and night, and there are two persons with the same spirit and two persons with the same body.
6. Self is not determined by identity or diversity or substance, which it cannot be sure of, but only by identity of consciousness.

Locke’s Moral Theory

Moral Knowledge

I Morality

A. Moral Ideas
1. Locke rejects innate ideas, so moral knowledge cannot be innate.
2. We have no direct sensations of good and evil, so these ideas must be derived from other sensations.
B. Pleasure and Pain
1. Whatever tends to produce pleasure is called “good.”
2. Whatever tends to produce pain is called “evil.”
3. Morality seems to be based on empirical generalizations.
C. Law
1. Moral good is conformity of action with the moral law.
2. Moral evil is a disagreement of action with the moral laws.
D. Three Kinds of Law
1. Divine law: discovered via “the light of nature” or “the voice of revelation.”
2. Civil law
3. Law of opinion or reputation.
4. Civil law and law of opinion vary from society to society.
5. Following Divine law tends to advance the general good, so the other two tend to conform to it.
II Locke’s Rationalist Account of Ethics

A. Moral Demonstration
1. He claims “morality is capable of demonstration as well as mathematics.”
2. He presents examples of what he takes to be rationally demonstrated moral principles.
3. He takes these principles to be as certain as any geometric proof.
4. Example: “Where there is no property, there is no injustice.”
   a. He defines property as the right to anything.
   b. He defines injustice as the violation of rights.
   c. This makes the claim a tautology: “where there are no rights, there is no violation of rights.”
5. Example: “No government allows absolute liberty.”
   a. He takes the concept of government to include limits on liberty.
   b. Thus, this makes the claim a tautology: “no system that limits liberty allows liberty without limit.”
6. Berkeley wrote: “Locke’s instances of demonstration in morality are…trifling propositions.”

B. Locke’s Empirical Account of Ethics
1. Morality varies from society to society, but they are very similar.
2. Locke claims that experience teaches people which behavior is most pleasant and which is not.
3. The law of opinion or reputation based on social tradition, tends to reflect the collective experience of society.
4. Societies that are based on ‘evil’ principles will be unpleasant and short lived.
5. Societies that apply empirical reasoning to moral conduct will conform to Divine Law.

C. Locke’s Mixed Bag
1. Moral law is given in revelation.
2. Human reason and experience can yield moral knowledge.
3. In his rationalistic approach, he stresses rational moral principles that are God’s Law.
4. His empirical approach seems to indicate that morality could change if the consequences of behavior changes.
5. He seems to hold that conformity to the law is the main motive of ethics and that pleasure was a mere companion.
6. He also seems to hold that pleasure and rational self-interest are the basis of ethics and virtue is but a means to those ends.
7. His view seems to reflect a conflict between the nature of empiricism and his rationalist, theological tendencies.

Locke’s Philosophy of Religion

I Empirical Ideas of God

A. Introduction
1. Given his empiricism, he does not develop a full theology.
2. We can have an idea of God.
3. Demonstration of God’s existence is possible.

B. Source of the Idea of God
1. Given his rejection of innate ideas, it cannot be innate.
2. The idea of the infinite God must be constructed from the finite ideas of experience.
3. The idea begins in our ideas of our own minds and ideas of existence, duration, knowledge, power, wisdom and all other positive qualities.
4. Then “we enlarge every one of these with our idea of infinity; and so putting them together make our complex idea of God.”

C. Rejection of the Perfection Argument
1. He claims the idea of God is a complex idea extrapolated from other ideas and not an innate idea.
2. He claims Descartes’ argument from the idea of perfection is “an ill way of establishing the truth and silencing atheists.”
3. Some have no idea of God and those who have the idea have conflicting ideas.

II Proving God’s Existence

A. Proving
1. The complex idea of God is a construct.
2. He claims the existence of God can be proven as certainly as a geometrical theorem.
3. He begins with empirical data:
   a. The existence of the world.
   b. The existence of thinking beings.
   c. The existence of harmony, order and beauty in the natural world.
4. He then uses two Cartesian principles:
   a. No ex nihilo creation (something cannot come from nothing).
   b. The cause must contain at least as much reality/perfection as the effect.
5. He deduces the existence of an eternal, powerful and intelligent cause.
6. This is a blend of the standard causal and design arguments.
III Deism
A. Deism
1. An approach to religion that is grounded in reason.
2. God exists and created the world.
3. The world is a self-sufficient rational system constructed by God and does not require divine intervention, such as miracles.
4. Human reason is adequate to find the truths of science, morality and religion, hence there is no need for revelation.
B. Locke’s View
1. Truths given via divine revelation are certain.
2. An alleged revelation that conflicts with reason must be rejected.
3. He claims some revealed truths are “above reason” in that reason cannot determine them to be true or false.
4. These truths are to be believed on the basis of faith.
5. However, Locke did not set clear standards for discerning between alleged revelations that are contrary to reason and true revelations that are beyond reason.
C. Impact
1. He claimed that must be used to discern between true revelation and mere enthusiasm.
2. Religious though must be assessed by reason.
3. He helped fuel the view that rationality and tolerance are best served by minimizing theology.
4. He helped the rise of natural religion—religion based on natural, rational faculties.
5. While the deists accepted Locke’s view about the importance of reason, they rejected revelation and the view of religious truths beyond reason.

Locke’s Political Philosophy

I Background
A. Background
1. Those supporting a more democratic government and a Protestant monarchy struggled against those supporting a Catholic absolute monarchy.
2. Locke’s political theory was a brilliant summary and enhancement of existing ideas.
4. The preface states that it is intended to justify the 1688 revolution, but he had been writing the essays for several years.

II The State of Nature
A. The State
1. Prior to government.
2. People are free and independent.
3. People are equal in that no one has jurisdiction over anyone else.
4. His argument does not require that such a state ever existed, though he claims there are examples:
   a. The American wilderness of his time.
   b. Relations between states.
   c. Individuals outside of nations, such as people shipwrecked.
5. A key claim is that the status of the individual is more fundamental than the state.
B. Locke’s Assumptions
1. People are independent individuals.
2. Society is a complex entity composed of individuals.
3. This mirrors Locke’s view of simple and complex ideas.
C. Differences from Hobbes’ State of Nature
1. Hobbes’ state of nature is a war of all against all.
2. Locke’s state of nature is one of peace, goodwill and mutual assistance.
3. Locke’s state of nature includes property rights.
D. The Qualities of the State of Nature
1. People are governed only by the law of nature and reason which is “intelligible and plain” to all.
2. Individuals are free and independent.
3. There are natural and informal social relations.

III Natural Law and Rights
A. Natural Law Theory
1. Natural Law Theorist: the moral laws are part of nature.
2. Everyone has natural, God-given rights.
3. These rights do not come from government and cannot be taken away by a government.
4. These rights include life, liberty and property—hence people should not harm others in these areas.

B. Common Property
1. The earth, fruits and animals belong to mankind in common.
2. These things must be appropriated before they can benefit a person.

C. The Basis of Property & Locke’s Proviso
1. Each man has an exclusive property in his own person.
2. His labor and work are his.
3. What he removes from nature and mixes with his labor becomes his property.
4. The labor being the property of the laborer, only he has a right to what it is joined to.
5. The Proviso: The limit is that a person must leave enough and as good for others.

D. Limits of Property
1. A person is not permitted to take as much as he wants.
2. The law of nature that gives property also bounds property.
3. One may make his as much as he can use to any advantage before it spoils.
4. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy.

E. Right of Punishment & Reparation
1. To protect rights the execution of the law of nature is in everyone’s hands.
2. All have the right to punish transgressors to the degree that hinders its violation.
3. The law of nature would be in vain if none had a power to execute it.
4. Where there is no government, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must have a right to do.
5. All have the right to punish crime to deter other crimes.
6. The injured party has the right to take reparation.
7. Everyone has, in the state of nature, a right to kill a murderer.
   a. This is the basis of the great law of nature: Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed.

F. Right of Self Defense
1. Force, or declaration of force, where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to, is the state of war.
2. The lack of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even in society.
3. If the law cannot secure my life this permits my defense.
4. The right of war permits a liberty to kill the aggressor because he does permit appeal to a common judge or law.
5. Lack of a judge with authority puts all in a state of nature.
6. Force without right makes a state of war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge.

G. Slavery
1. In the state of nature, each is free from any superior power on earth with only the law of nature for his rule.
2. In society liberty is to be under only the legislative power established by consent.
3. Since a person does not have the “power of his own life” he cannot consent to slavery.
   a. This would be granting another a power he does not possess himself.
4. A person who has forfeited his life can be enslaved, but can resist his master and bring about the deserved death.

IV Social Contract
A. First Motivation for Leaving the State of Nature
1. The state of nature lacks established, settled, known law.
2. The law of nature is intelligible to all rational beings, but bias and ignorance makes it unlikely that people will accept it as binding in own particular cases.
3. Society provides for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and property.

B. Second Motivation
1. The state of nature lacks a known and indifferent judge, with authority according to established law.
2. In the state of nature everyone is judge and executioner of the law of nature.
3. But, people are partial to themselves so:
   a. Passion and revenge will tend to take them too far in their own cases.
   b. Negligence and lack of concern will make them too remiss in others’ cases.
4. Society provides impartial judges with authority according to established law.

C. Third Motivation
1. In the state of nature there is a lack of power to enforce sentences.
2. The unjust will use force, thus making attempts at punishment dangerous.
3. Society provides the power to back up its sentences.

D. The Contract & Consent
1. Because of these reasons people agree to enter into society.
2. Each willingly gives up his power of punishing.
3. The right to punish is to be exercised by those appointed and by rules agreed on by the community.
4. Since men are naturally free, equal, and independent, one comes under political power only by consent.
5. This is the basis of the right and rise of legislative and executive power, as well as governments and societies.

E. Majority Rule
1. Consent makes a community with a power to act as one by the will of the majority.
2. It is necessary for a body to move one way- the way the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority.
3. Otherwise it is impossible for it to act or remain one body.
4. Otherwise the original agreement would be no agreement-it would be as if the state of nature still existed.
5. So everyone is bound by that consent to accept the decision of the majority.
6. Unanimous consent is not necessary because it is next to impossible.
   a. This requirement would make the state extremely short lived.
   b. Rational creatures do not create societies only to have them dissolved:
   c. If the majority does not decide, they cannot act as one body, and the community will dissolve.

F. Express and Tacit Consent.
1. The express consent, of any man entering into any society, makes him a member of that society.
2. Each person having possessions or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of a government thereby gives his tacit consent.
3. Tacit consent obligates him to obey the government during the time in question.
   a. Whether his possession is land belonging to him or a week’s lodging, or if he is simply traveling the highway.

V Limits of Government
A. Powers Given Up in Society
1. People give up two powers they possessed in the state of nature.
   a. He gives up as much of his natural liberty as the good, prosperity, and safety of society requires.
2. Second: Each wholly gives up the power to punish crimes committed against that law.
3. This is necessary and just since the other members of the society do the same.
4. This is done only with the intent of each to better preserve himself, his liberty and property.

B. Limits of Power
1. The power of the society never extends beyond the common good.
2. The government is bound to govern by:
   a. Established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees.
   b. Indifferent and upright judges, who decide controversies by the laws.
3. The government is obligated to employ force:
   a. Domestically only in the execution of such laws.
   b. Abroad only to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion.
4. All this is directed solely to the peace, safety, and public good of the people.

C. Extent of the Legislative Power
1. The legislative does not have absolute, arbitrary power over the people.
   a. It gains its power from the people.
   b. No one can give another more power than he himself has.
   c. No one has absolute arbitrary power in the state of nature.
   d. Hence, it does not have absolute, arbitrary power.
2. Its power is limited to the public good of the society.
3. It has no end but preservation and can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or impoverish the subjects.
4. They must not raise taxes on the property of the people, without the consent of the people.

D. Natural Law Remains
1. The obligations of the law of nature do not cease in society, thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men.
2. The laws of man must be conformable to the law of nature-to the will of God.
3. The fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be valid against it.

E. Branches of Government
1. To limit the power of government, Locke recommended dividing it into three branches.
   a. Legislative.
   b. Executive.
   c. Federative: This branch would supervise foreign relations.
2. Locked mentions a judiciary, but Montesquieu (1689-1755) was the first to explicitly make it the third branch.
3. The United States is based on the Locke-Montesquieu model.

VI Tyranny & Resistance
A. Tyranny
1. Tyranny is the exercise of power not for the good of those who are under it, but for one’s own private advantage.
   a. The governor makes his will, not the law, the rule.
b. The ruler aims at the satisfaction of his own ambition, revenge, covetousness, or any other irregular passion.

B. Resistance
1. An authority that exceeds his legal authority and uses force in ways the law does not allow ceases to be a magistrate.
2. Acting without authority, he may be opposed, as any who by force invades the right of another.
3. He that has authority to seize me in public, may be opposed as a criminal if he tries to break into my house to execute a writ,
4. This holds for the highest and the most inferior magistrate.
5. Government loses its legitimacy if it breaks the social contract-this is judged by the people.
6. He cautions that people should not call for revolution “upon every little mismanagement in public affairs.”

Locke: Problems & Impact

I Innate Ideas
A. Straw Man?
1. Some philosophers claim Locke attacked a version of innate ideas that no other philosopher held.
2. Locke assumed that the mind is transparent in the sense that the consciousness is explicitly aware of its ideas.
3. Leibniz argued that there is a distinction between having an idea and being aware of the idea.
4. Others have argued that people can use an idea, such as an idea of the principle of non-contradiction, without actually being aware they are using said idea.
5. However, his empiricism does serve to explain why he would take this view.
B. Intellect
1. Locke claimed that there was nothing in the mind/intellect that was not first in the senses.
2. Leibniz pointed “except for the intellect itself.”
3. If the mind lacked any content, how could it process the sense data it received?
4. While most current philosophers reject innate ideas, some still accept innate capacities.

II Representative Realism
A. Problem of the External World
1. Locke was aware of this problem and presented it as follows.
2. The mind does not know things immediately, but only by the ideas it has of them.
3. We have knowledge only insofar as our ideas conform to the external things.
4. What criterion can be used to establish that the ideas correspond to an external world?
B. Locke’s Proposed Solution
1. Locke argues that we do not create our own simple ideas, so they must be the effects of external objects.
2. He also asserts that ideas will correspond to the objects to the degree “intended by the wisdom and will of our Maker.”
C. Problem
1. Given that he accepts secondary qualities, the door to skepticism is open.
2. How does one distinguish between ideas which represent their objects and those which are secondary qualities?
3. Berkeley argues that Locke’s view invites skepticism

III Tyranny of the Majority
A. Majority Rule
1. Mill argues that Locke fails to properly take into account the possibility of the tyranny of the majority.

IV Impact and Significance
A. Politics
1. Locke helped make the concepts of the state of nature, natural law, natural rights, the social contract and the right of revolution art of the political thought.
2. Locke’s ideas influenced the American Revolution and the development of American law & political theory.
   a. No taxation without representation.
3. Locke’s influence in Montesquieu influenced the French revolution.
4. Endorsed religious tolerance in his Letter Concerning Toleration.
   a. But, he argued this should not be extended to Roman Catholics because their allegiance is to the Pope.
   b. He also did not extend this tolerance to atheists.
B. Philosophy
1. Locke is considered the father of modern empiricism.
2. He created a philosophical model that steered the middle course between dogmatism and skepticism.
3. He created a model for the practical approach to philosophy:
   a. “Our business here is not to know all things but those which concern our conduct.”
   b. “If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things we shall act as wisely as he who
would not use his legs, but sit still and perish because he had no wings to fly.”
4. George Santayana remarked “Had Locke’s mind been more profound, it might have been less influential.”

**GEORGE BERKELEY**

There was a young man who said, "God Must think it exceedingly odd
If he finds that this tree Continues to be,
When there's no one about in the quad."
Dear Sir, your astonishment's odd
I'm always about in the quad,
And that's why the tree Continues to be,
Since observed by,

Yours faithfully,
God

**Background**

**I Background**

**A. Life**
1. Born on March 12, 1685 near Kilkenny in Ireland.
2. At 15 he attended trinity College in Dublin.
   a. Studied Descartes, Malebranche, Locke and Newton.
3. 1710-Ordained as an Anglican priest.
4. Married in 1728 and went to Newport, RI to found a college.
   a. Funding did not appear and he returned to London in 1731.
5. 1734-Appointed Bishop of Cloyne.
6. Promoted the medical benefits of tar water, which he learned from the Indians.
7. Died: January 14, 1753.

**B. Impact on American Education**
1. California established a university in a city named after him.
2. Berkeley Divinity was established school in New Haven, Connecticut.
3. The first president of King’s College (Columbia) took Berkeley’s advice to found the school.
4. He provided Yale with a library and an endowment.
5. Donated books to Harvard.

**Opposing Skepticism & Atheism**

**I Berkeley’s Project**

**A. Treatise**
1. 1710: *A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge wherein the chief causes of error and difficulty in the Sciences, with the grounds of Skepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion are inquired into.*
   2. The errors in the sciences are caused by the metaphysical assumptions of the scientists.
   3. Skepticism arises from Locke’s epistemology.
   4. This work was not well received.

**B. Three Dialogues**
1. 1713: *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*
   2. A better written and more popular work created in response to the poor reception given the Treatise.
   3. A debate between two British college students.
      a. Hylas: a materialist whose name is similar to the Greek term for matter.
      b. Philonous: an immaterialist whose name means “mind lover.”
   4. Hylas begins with naïve realism: the properties objects are perceived to have are the properties they possess in the external world.

**C. Newtonian Science**
1. Berkeley knew that many scientists were also theists.
2. He was concerned that science would undermine religion by explaining events in mechanistic and materialistic terms.
3. He held that science should be limited to describing the regularities in experience and should stay out of metaphysics.
4. He wanted to reconcile science and religion.

D. Matter
1. The main problem is the belief in matter.
2. Matter was taken to be an intelligible, independent substance.
3. If an account of an ordered, self-sufficient material world is possible, then there is no need for God.
4. He reasoned that if he could show that matter is not intelligible, then a spiritual explanation would be needed.
5. This would undermine materialistic atheism.

E. Idealism
1. He called his position “immaterialism.”
2. All that exists is minds and ideas perceived by minds.
3. His principle is “esse est percipi”—“to be is to be perceived.”
4. Nothing exists that is not perceived by a mind.

F. Against Skepticism
1. He was motivated by religion, but scrupulously employed philosophical methods.
2. His goal was to “convince skeptics and infidels by reason…”
3. He held that Locke’s view leads to skepticism.
   a. All that is known is the ideas in the mind.
   b. Knowledge is never of the external world, since there is no way to get beyond the ideas.
   c. Locke claims that ideas of primary qualities are representations of the external world.
   d. Even these ideas cannot be compared to the alleged external world.
   e. Thus, we cannot know if our alleged knowledge has any correspondence to the external world.

G. The Philosopher of Common Sense
1. He saw his goals as “eternally banishing metaphysics” and “recalling men to common sense.”
2. He claims his view match common sense—it tells us what we experience is real and reality is what we experience.
3. He claims that his view simply expresses the view people have before they are corrupted by materialistic philosophy.

Empirical Reformation

I Locke to the Logical Conclusion
A. Locke
1. He praises Locke for his clarity.
2. He claims that using Locke’s method consistently takes one to conclusions other than those of Locke.
3. He claims that empiricism properly leads to a rejection of matter.
4. Matter is not experienced; hence the belief in matter is not justified.

II Theory of Ideas
A. Ideas
1. Ideas are images or sense data that are directly experienced by the mind in vivid sense experience or less vivid memory or imagination.
2. An idea is more of an experience or sensation than a concept or description.

III Criticism of Abstract Ideas (Treatise)
A. Locke’s Theory of Abstract Ideas
1. We take our experiences of many Xs and abstract the common properties of the Xs.
2. Thus, the abstract idea of X is created.
B. Berkeley’s Criticism
1. He contends that an idea is always of a specific/particular image.
2. Hence, the mind cannot have an idea of an X that is neither p nor not p, etc.
3. We can speak of, think of, or imagine only particular things.
C. General Ideas
1. He claims we can have general ideas.
2. A general idea is when a particular idea of an X is used as a “stand in” for all other Xs.
3. General terms, like “apple”, are a way of referring to all the particulars.
4. General terms do not refer to abstract ideas or metaphysical universals.
5. Thus, Berkeley is a nominalist.
D. Language Problem
1. He warns against being trapped by general terms and assuming that there is a metaphysical reality behind general terms.
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2. He claims that abstract ideas and essences must be excluded from empirical philosophy.

E. Rejection of Abstract Ideas-Rejection of Matter
1. The concept of matter depends on abstract ideas.
2. It is an abstraction to distinguish the existence of objects from their being perceived.
3. Things seen and felt are sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on the senses.
   4. It is not possible to separate, even in thought, these from perception.
4. He can abstract only to have ideas of objects that can exist or be perceived apart from one another.
5. His imagination doesn’t extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception.
6. It is impossible to sense anything without a sensation of the thing.
7. So it impossible to conceive any sensible thing or object distinct from the perception of it.

IV Arguments from Mental Dependency (Treatise)
A. Argument
1. Ideas and sensations exist only in the mind.
2. Intuitive knowledge of this comes from the meaning of “exist” applied to sensible things.
   a. The table exists=He sees and feels it.
   b. If he left, the table exists=if he was there he or another might perceive it.
3. All that can be understood by expressions
   a. “There was an odor” is that “it was smelled.”
   b. “There was a sound” is “it was heard.”
   c. “A color or figure” = “it was perceived by sight or touch.”
4. Thus ,the existence of unthinking things without their being perceived is unintelligible.
5. Their esse is percipi, so they cannot exist outside of the mind.
B. Argument
1. The only substance is spirit- that which perceives.
2. The sensible qualities are ideas perceived by sense.
3. For an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction.
4. It is clear there can be no unthinking substance or substratum of sensible ideas.
C. Objection & Reply
1. Objection: Though ideas do not exist without the mind, they may resemble things existing in matter.
2. Reply: an idea can be like nothing but an idea.
   a. A color or figure can only be like another color or figure.
   b. If the external things are perceivable they are ideas.
   c. If they are not perceivable, it isn’t sensible to claim a color is like something invisible or that soft is like something intangible.

V Argument from Pain & Pleasure (Dialogues)
A. The Argument
1. A quality X is experienced as either a pain or pleasure.
2. Pain and pleasure do not exist in the objects-they exist only when perceived by the mind.
3. Therefore, quality X is not a quality of an external object but exists only when perceived by the mind.
B. Heat
1. Philonous uses heat as an example.
2. Most believe that heat is in fire but that pain is not.
3. An experience of great heat is actually an experience of pain.
4. Thus, if the pain is not in the fire, neither is the heat.
5. This sort of argument was used by Locke.
C. Hylas
1. Argues that the heat is in the fire and it causes the sensation of pain.
2. Philonous argues that the experience of heat and pain cannot be separated, so they are one sensation.
3. This sensation must exist in the mind.

VI Arguments from Perceptual Relativity (Dialogues)
A. Hot & Cold Argument
1. Philonous presents an experiment involving water.
2. A hand taken from warm water and placed in lukewarm water will feel the water as cold.
3. A cold hand placed in the same lukewarm water will feel it as warm.
4. It would be a contradiction for the water to be warm and cold at the same time.
5. Philonous concludes that warmth and cold exist only in the mind.
6. This sort of argument was also presented by Locke.
B. Taste and Odor Argument
1. The sweetness of sugar is experienced as a kind of pleasure.
2. The bitterness of herbs is experienced as a kind of pain.
3. Neither pleasure nor pain are in the objects, but only in the mind.
4. So, the qualities experienced by taste are in the mind.
5. The same reasoning applies to odors.

C. Sound
1. Sound is taken as what we experience.
2. So, sound cannot exist when not perceived.
3. Motion cannot be sound because sound can have qualities that motion does not.
4. This is the origin of “If a tree falls in the forest and no one hears it, does it make a sound?”

D. Color
1. Colors of objects vary with conditions.
2. Hence, it makes no sense to speak of the real color of things.
3. The variation of colors proves that color is a matter of perception.

E. Results
1. At this point Berkeley has merely argued for the position that secondary qualities are not in external objects.
2. This position is accepted by philosophers who accept material substance and the reality of primary qualities.
3. Berkeley needs to argue that primary qualities do not exist outside of the mind.

VII Primary & Secondary Quality Arguments
A. Primary & Secondary Qualities
1. Primary Qualities are claimed to be qualities that exist in material objects apart from the mind.
2. Primary Qualities: extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number.
3. Secondary Qualities: qualities that exist in the mind and are supposedly created by qualities in objects that they do not resemble.
4. Matter: an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure and motion subsist.

B. Contradiction Argument (Treatise)
1. Extension, figure, and motion are only ideas existing in the mind.
2. An idea can only be like another idea.
3. Neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance.
4. So, the notion of matter involves a contradiction.

C. Inseparability Argument (Treatise, Dialogue).
1. Those claiming primary qualities exist in matter claim secondary qualities are mental sensations dependent on texture and motion of particles of matter.
2. If primary qualities are inseparably united with secondary qualities and cannot be abstracted from them, they exist only in the mind.
3. One cannot, by abstraction, conceive the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities.
   a. A body cannot be conceived without a color or other sensible quality which is supposed to exist only in the mind.
4. Extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities are inconceivable.
5. These qualities must exist with all other sensible qualities-only in the mind.

D. Extension Argument (Treatise, Dialogue)
1. Size and speed don’t exist without the mind-they are entirely relative.
2. Extension existing without the mind is neither great nor small, motion neither swift nor slow- so they are nothing.
3. Without extension solidity cannot be conceived.
4. Since extension doesn’t exist in an unthinking substance, the same must be true of solidity.
5. Thus, extension, motion and solidity exist in the mind.

E. Objection (Dialogue)
1. Some claim the existence of extension in general and motion in general.
2. So, the tenet of extended, moveable substance depends on abstract ideas.
3. Berkeley has argued against abstract ideas.
4. This view also resembles that of materia prima of Aristotle and his followers.
5. Berkeley seems to be relying on the fact that Modern philosophy was a reaction against Aristotle.

F. Number Argument (Treatise)
1. Number is obviously relative and dependent on understanding.
2. One book, one page, one line; all are equally units, though some contain several of the others.
3. The unit relates to a particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put together by the mind.
4. Thus number exists in the mind.

G. Dream Argument (Treatise)
1. Even those who claim matter exists admit that people could have all the ideas they do without the existence of matter.
2. Dreams and “frenzies” proves this.
H. Distance (Dialogue)
1. Perception of distance is a means of identifying extension.
2. Philonous argues that because we perceive distance in dreams there is no need to accept the existence of real extension.
3. He also argues that when an object appears distant, we do not experience distance.
4. We experience an object that appears small.
5. As argued previously, size is relative to the perceiver.
6. Hence, distance is relative to the perceiver as well.
7. Philonous also argues that person who was born blind and gained sight would not interpret the visual images as presenting the quality of distance.
8. Philonous argues that the person would have to learn to associate the visual images with the concept of distance.

VIII Imagination Argument (Treatise & Dialogues)
A. Imagination Argument
1. Philonous: if Hylas can conceive of any sensible object existing apart from the mind, then he will concede.
2. Hylas: nothing is easier than “to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of and unperceived by, any mind.”
3. This is just having ideas while omitting the idea of any one to perceive them.
4. You perceive or think of them all the while.
5. Hylas cannot claim, without contradiction, that the conception of the tree or house is present in his mind at the same time it is not present in a mind.

IX Criticism of Representational Realism (Dialogues)
A. Locke
1. Locke held to representational realism.
2. Ideas are in the mind.
3. Some ideas resemble external objects.
B. Objection
1. All that is seen in a portrait is colors and shapes.
2. For the portrait to suggest the idea of an actual person, we must have an experience that associates the two.
3. One can be said to hear a coach, but one just hears its sounds and associates them with the coach based on experiences of hearing and seeing.
4. We only have a correlation between ideas/experiences and never get beyond the ideas.
5. Hence, we cannot tell if an idea resembles and external object—we can never make the comparison.
C. Primary & Secondary Qualities
1. What would real objects, devoid of all sensible qualities, be?
2. “Can a real thing, in itself invisible, be like a color, or a real thing which is not audible, be like a sound?”
3. “In a word, can anything be like a sensation or idea, but another sensation or idea?”

Berkeley’s Metaphysics

I The World
A. Objection: Banishing of the Real (Treatise)
1. Objection: all that is real and substantial in nature is banished and replaced with a chimerical scheme of ideas.
2. Objection: All things that exist, exist only in the mind, so is everything an illusion?
B. Reply (Treatise)
1. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or otherwise conceive or understand, remains as secure and real as ever.
2. There is a rerum natura, and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains full force.
3. He doesn’t argue against the existence of anything that we can apprehend by sense or reflection.
4. He does not question the existence of what he sees and touches.
5. He only denies the existence of the philosophers’ material substance.
6. Doing this doesn’t damage the rest of mankind, who will never miss it.
   a. The atheist lacks an empty name to support his impiety.
   b. Philosophers have lost a great handle for trifling and disputation.
C. Dreams vs. Reality (Dialogue)
1. Hylas: “What difference is there between real things and chimeras formed by the imagination or the visions of a dream since they are all equally in the mind?”
2. Philonous:
   a. The ideas of a dream are “dim irregular and confused.”
   b. Ideas of real things are “more vivid and clear.”
3. Dreams are distinguished from reality by comparing one experience to another.
4. We obviously cannot make a comparison between experience and an independent reality.

D. Existence (Treatise)
1. The meaning of “exist” applied to sensible things.
2. The table exists=He sees and feels it.
3. If he left, the table exists=if he was there he might perceive it, or another spirit perceives it.

E. Samuel Johnson
1. Johnson attacked Berkeley’s theory.
2. He kicked a stone saying “I refute him thus.”
3. Johnson missed Berkeley’s point.
4. When he kicks the stone he has experiences of solidity, motion, colors and so on—a series of ideas.
5. The sensations can exist without the existence of a physical body.

F. Seeming Absurdity
1. Berkeley is aware of the apparent absurdity of his view.
2. For example, an apple is a collection of ideas—so are we just eating ideas when we eat apples?
3. He says this way of saying it seems “very harsh.”
4. But, this is because of language—we use “things” instead of “ideas.”
5. He has no argument with the terms, as long as it is accepted that objects are collections of ideas.
6. He says to “think with the learned and speak with the vulgar.”

II The Cause of Ideas
A. Goal
1. He set out to restore faith and refute the skeptics and atheists.
2. He argues that the rejection of matter helps establish the existence of God.
3. His reasoning is that if matter does not exist, then we will be led to accept the existence of God.
4. He sets out to examine the causes of ideas.

B. Ideas cannot Cause Ideas
1. All ideas are obviously inactive—there is no power or agency in them.
2. One idea cannot produce or alter another.
3. The only proof needed is the observation of our ideas.
4. Ideas exist only in the mind, so there is nothing in them but what is perceived.
5. The being of idea implies passiveness and inertness—it is impossible for an idea to do or cause of anything.

C. Material Substance
1. Material substance cannot be the cause of ideas.

D. Substance
1. The cause of ideas must be a substance.
2. It has been shown there is no material substance.
3. Therefore, the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or spirit.

II Spirit & Ideas
A. Spirit
1. A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being:
2. As it perceives ideas, it is the understanding.
3. As it produces or operates on them it is the will.

B. There can be no idea of a soul or spirit
1. As all ideas are passive and inert they cannot represent what acts.
2. Spirit can only be perceived by its effect.
3. “Will”, “soul”, “spirit” do not stand for ideas but for something different.
4. We have some notion of spirit and operations of the mind as far as we understand those words.

C. The Active Mind
1. He can excite ideas in his mind and change them as he sees fit.
2. This shows the mind is active.
3. Thus he causes some of his ideas.

D. Ideas of Sense
1. Ideas perceived by sense lack a dependence on his will.
2. When he opens his eyes he cannot choose to see or determine what objects will be present.
   a. Similarly for the other senses.
3. So, there is another will or spirit that produces them.

III Proof of God’s Existence
A. Knowledge of Other Spirits
1. We only know other spirits exist by their operations or ideas of them excited in us.
2. Perception of motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, inform him that other spirits exist.
3. The knowledge of other spirits is not immediate.
4. This knowledge depends on the intervention of ideas, agents or spirits distinct from him, as effects or concomitant signs.

B. Argument from Design
1. Some things are produced by humans.
2. It is evident the works of nature are not produced by, or dependent on, the wills of men.
3. There is another spirit that causes them, since he has argued they cannot exist on their own.
4. If we consider:
   a. The constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the magnificence, beauty, and perfection of the larger and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of the creation.
   b. The exact harmony and correspondence of the whole.
   c. The laws of pain and pleasure, the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals.
5. And attend to the meaning and import of the attributes: one, eternal, infinitely wise, good, and perfect.
6. Then we shall clearly perceive they belong to the spirit, who works all in all, and by whom all things consist.

C. God: Another Proof and Cause
1. God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit distinct from ourselves.
2. The existence of God is far more evident than the existence of men:
3. The effects of nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable than those of humans.
4. Any mark denoting a man, or effect produced by him, more strongly evinces God.
5. In affecting other persons, the will of man has no object other than the motion his limbs.
6. That such a motion should excite any idea in the mind of another depends wholly on God’s will.
7. He alone is “upholding all things by the word of his power,” and maintains interaction between spirits, by which they can perceive the existence of each other.
8. This pure and clear light, which enlightens every one, is invisible.

IV God the Perceiver
A. Perceiver
1. One problem Berkeley considers is the problem of persistence.
2. According to commonsense, objects do not disappear when people do not perceive them.
3. He claims that God creates ideas in our minds and also perceives these ideas.
4. Thus, when humans do not perceive something, God still perceives it.
5. Thus God literally keeps the world in existence by perceiving it.

V Refutation of Deism in Alciphron
A. Deism
1. He held that the mechanistic view of deism lead to a God who is unable to inspire piety and morality.
2. The deists held that God created a well ordered, mechanistic world, set it in motion and then left it alone.
B. Refutation
1. He claims that his proof refutes deism.
2. God is proven to be not just a creator but a provident governor who:
   a. Is actually and intimately present.
   b. Is attentive to all our interests and motions.
   c. Watches over our conduct and takes care of our minutest actions and designs.
   d. Informs, admonishes, and directs incessantly in a most evident and sensible manner.

VI Problem with God (Dialogues)
A. The Problem
1. God is not a sensory quality.
2. Berkeley claims we can only have ideas of sensory qualities and we cannot have ideas of spirits.
B. Hylas’ Dilemma
1. God is a spirit and we cannot have ideas of spirits.
2. If we cannot have an idea of God, we cannot conceive “it possible that things should exist in His mind.”
3. If we can conceive the mind of God without having an idea of it, then it would seem that matter is conceivable even without the existence of an idea of matter.
B. Berkeley’s Reply
1. Philonous make a distinction between ideas and notions.
2. He cannot have idea of his mind.
3. But, being a directly aware of his own mental operations he can create a notion of his mind via reflection.
4. Thus, he can know his mind even though he has no idea of it.
5. From this he can make an analogical argument and infer that other minds exist.
6. He can then come up with the notion of a perfect mind—the mind of God.

C. Hylas’ Reply
1. Given Berkeley’s own principles, “it should follow that you are only a system of floating ideas without any substance to support them.”
2. The experience of the operations is not experiences of a substance.
3. Berkeley did not seem to regard this as a problem, but David Hume latter used this reasoning to attack immaterial substance.

Science and Laws of Nature

I Science in an Immaterial World

A. Berkeley’s View
1. He did not want to reject science.
2. He intended to rid it of an unnecessary metaphysical assumption: material substance.
3. There is no phenomenon that is explained with the assumption that matter exists that cannot be explained as well without it.
4. Thus, his reasoning is in accord with Ockham’s razor.
5. He argues for an empirical science.
6. He claims that scientists will avoid error if the record the uniform order of experienced ideas and avoid the supposition of matter.

B. The Laws of Nature (Treatise)
1. The laws of nature are the set rules by which God causes sensory ideas in us.
2. There laws are learned by experience.
   a. By experience we learn that certain ideas are attended with certain other ideas, in the ordinary course of things.
   b. This gives us a foresight enabling us to regulate our actions for the benefit of life.
3. We know certain means are effective for certain ends, not by discovering a necessary connection between our ideas, but by observing the laws of nature.

C. Causation (Treatise)
1. This consistent, uniform working, which displays the goodness and wisdom of God, leads us to seek another cause.
2. Perceiving certain sensory ideas constantly followed by others, and knowing it is not our doing, we take one as causing the other.
   a. Example: When we see a certain round luminous figure, we perceive the idea of heat and conclude the sun causes the heat.
3. This is absurd and unintelligible.

D. Science and Religion
1. Science does not eliminate religion.
2. God is needed to explain the uniformity of events.
3. Miracles are easily explained: all natural events are directly caused by God so He can deviate from the usual order as He wills.

E. Scriptural Argument
1. Hylas argues that scripture states that God created the heavens and the earth, etc. but it does not say He created ideas.
2. Philonous argues that scripture does not state that God created matter.
3. God created all that is experienced, but did not create matter.

F. Time & Space
1. He rejects absolute time and space.
2. He regards them as abstractions that do not refer to anything that exists.
3. He regards space and time as relations between experiences.
4. “Space” refers to experiences of motion and relations between ideas of bodies.
5. “Time” refers to the experience of the succession of ideas in the mind.
6. He claims that there cannot be “any motion other than relative; so that to conceive motion there must be at least conceived two bodies, whereof the distance or position in regard to each other is varied.”
7. He claims that gravity and force are not metaphysical entities, but mathematical expressions of predictable relations between events.

Problems & Impact

I Trilemma
A. Trilemma
1. Critics claim that Berkeley’s view leads to one of three problematic views.
2. Solipsism, representative realism, or pantheism.

B. Solipsism
1. Solipsism: the view that all that exists is my mind.
2. If all one can perceive are one’s own ideas, then one only has evidence of his own existence.
3. While Berkeley claims that God also perceives these objects, critics have argued that his view collapses into solipsism.
4. Solipsism is generally regarded as an absurd position.

C. Representative Realism
1. Berkeley sometimes seems to indicate that ideas are specific representations of the ideas in God’s mind and His ideas are archetypes.
2. This seems to entail that reality, as it exists for God, is not the same as what humans perceive.
3. This would lead to a form of representative realism.
4. In any case, we would not have direct experience of reality.

D. Pantheism
1. If our ideas are not distinct from God’s, then human minds somehow participate in the mind of God.
2. Berkeley would probably not accept Pantheism.

II Other Problems
A. Perceiving & Conceiving
1. Berkeley claims that we cannot conceive of an object that exists unperceived.
2. His argument does not prove that objects cannot exist unperceived.
3. Berkeley takes perceiving and conceiving to be the same—he thinks we think in images.
4. However, it seems (as per Descartes) we can conceive of something without perceiving or imaging it.

B. Notion
1. Berkeley added notions to his philosophy after writing the *Dialogues* and rewriting the *Treatise*.
2. The addition of notions creates a serious weakness in his philosophy in that it opens the door for material substance.
3. But without notions he would not seem to have a concept of God.

C. Common Sense
1. Most find it hard to agree that Berkeley is presenting a common sense view.
2. If his arguments are not as solid as he thinks, then the existence of external objects would seem to be the simpler and more sensible view.
3. His view also makes God the cause of all pains, suffering and terrible experiences.

D. Hume
1. He says of Berkeley’s argument that “They admit of no answer and produce no conviction.”
2. “Their only effect is to cause…momentary amazement, irresolution and confusion.”

E. Theists
1. Even theists did not embrace his arguments.

III Impact
A. Impact
1. He raised useful questions about the metaphysical assumptions of philosophers and scientists.
2. His view showed where logic would take empiricism—some took his view as a refutation of empiricism.
3. Some accept the consequences of his position and accept phenomenalism, but reject metaphysics—include ideas of self and God.
4. His approach to philosophical method, language and perception had a significant impact.
5. A form of his anti-Newtonian philosophy of science arose in the 20th century.

Part IV David Hume & Immanuel Kant

**David Hume**

**Background for Hume**

I General Background
A. Life & Philosopher Writings
1. Born in 1711 in Edinburgh, Scotland to a Calvinist family.
2. Attended Edinburgh University.
   a. Studied literature and philosophy.
3. Went to France and wrote *A Treatise of Human Nature*.
   a. His hope of achieving literary fame as his “ruling passion.”
   b. The book was met with indifference from his contemporaries.
   c. The work “fell dead-born from the press.”
4. 1745—Because of his skeptical and religious views he was denied a position in ethics and Edinburgh University.
5. 1748—He revised the first two parts of the *Treatise* in a more popular style and released it as *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*.
6. 1751—He revised the third part of the *Treatise* as *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*.
7. 1752—He was denied a position at the University of Glasgow.
8. 1757—Published his *Natural History of Religion*.
   a. An account of the genesis of the religious impulse.

B. Other Publications & Career
   a. An extremely successful work.
2. 1763 Went to Paris as the assistant to the English ambassador.
   a. Was a celebrity.
3. 1776 Died in Edinburgh of cancer or ulcerative colitis.
4. He was well-liked and seen as kind and gentle.
   a. Nicknamed ‘St. David’ and his street bears this name.

II Goals
A. Motivation
1. He believed the foundations of science and philosophy were far from solid.
2. “There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions.”
3. “Disputes are multiplied as if everything was uncertain.”
4. He held that human nature was not adequately understood.

B. Goal
1. Using a military metaphor, he said his goal was to take the “capital or center of these sciences, to human nature itself…”
2. He held that once this was done, victory over all else would be easy.
3. His goal was to provide the foundation for all the sciences.

**Hume’s Epistemology & Metaphysics**

**Theory of Ideas**

I Ideas
A. Perceptions
1. Perceptions: contents of the consciousness.
2. There are two types of perceptions: impressions and ideas.
B. Impressions
1. Original experiences.
2. Sensations or the contents of one’s psychological states.
3. “Our more lively impressions when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will.”
C. Ideas
1. Less lively copies of impressions.
2. Each idea is a copy of an impression.
3. Hume claims the only way to refute this view is to produce an idea that is not derived from an impression.
4. Hume thinks this is impossible.
D. Creative Power of the Mind
1. The mind cannot create ideas from nothing.
2. The “creative powers of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience.”
3. The mind’s contents are derived from experiences.
4. A blind person can have no idea of colors.
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5. A deaf person can have no ideas of sounds.

II Association of Ideas
A. Atomism
1. Experience is composed of atoms analogous to the particles of physics.
2. As Newton developed the physical laws governing particles, Hume set out to find the psychological laws.
3. He intended to find “some bond of union” or “gentle force” that link ideas together.
B. Association
1. Hume notes that one idea tends to be associated with another.
   a. Example: The idea of an injury is associated with the idea of pain and not an idea of sweetness.
2. “There is a principle of connection between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that, in their appearance to the
   memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity.”
3. There are three relations between ideas: resemblance, contiguity, cause and effect.
4. Resemblance: Similar ideas tend to be associated.
5. Contiguity: Ideas that are proximal in space and time tend to be associated.
6. Cause and effect: When one event regularly follows another, their ideas tend to become associated.

III Relations of Ideas & Matters of Fact
A. Division
1. All objects of human reason pr inquiry are divided into Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact.
B. Relations of Ideas
1. Include geometry, algebra and arithmetic.
2. Include claims that are “intuitively or demonstratively certain.”
3. These are necessary truths whose denial states a contradiction.
4. They do not depend on knowledge of the external world.
5. “Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would forever retain their certainty
   and evidence.”
C. Matters of Facts
1. The denial of a Matter of Fact does not state a contradiction.
2. Reason alone cannot discover the truth or falsity of a Matter of Fact.
3. Matters of Fact are discovered by experience.
4. He imagines the situation of Adam.
   a. He “could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water that it would suffocate him.”
   b. He could not infer from the “light and warmth of fire that it would consume him.”
5. “No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it or the effects which
   will arise from it.”
6. “Nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact.”
D. The Gap
1. The two are divided.
2. Relations of Ideas are certain, but reveal nothing about the world.
3. Matters of Fact are uncertain, but provide information about the world.

Theory of Causation
Revised 3/28/2005
I Goal
A. Goal
1. To clarify the meaning of “power”, “force”, “energy” or “necessary connection.”
2. To search for the impressions yielding these ideas.

II External Objects
A. No Idea of Necessary Connection from Impressions of External Objects
1. No necessary connection is observed between external objects-one merely follows the other.
   a. One has the impression of the motion of one billiard ball followed by the motion of another.
2. If we could discover the cause the effect could be predicted with reason alone.
3. The observation of particular instances yields no idea of necessary connection.

III Internal Impressions
A. Introduction
1. An idea of necessary connection cannot be derived from reflection on the mind’s operation nor copied from an internal impression.
2. It might be claimed we are conscious of internal power enabling us to move or imagine new ideas.
3. We are conscious that bodily motion follows the command of the will.
4. There are three reasons why a necessary connection cannot be found.

B. First: Mind-Body Problem
1. The means by which a spiritual substance influences a material one is extremely mysterious.
   a. A power to move mountains, or control planets’ orbits would be no more extraordinary or incomprehensible.
2. If we perceived any power in the will, we must know
   a. This power and its connection with the effect.
   b. The union of soul and body.
   c. The nature of both substances and how they can operate on each other.

C. Second: Voluntary Control
1. We cannot move all organs voluntarily and only experience reveals the difference.
2. Why can the will influence tongue and fingers and not heart or liver?
3. We are not conscious of a power present in the first cases and absent in the second.

D. Third: The Process is Unknown
1. The immediate object of power in voluntary motion is not the moved member but muscles, nerves, etc.
2. Thus, the power performing the operation is mysterious.
3. Detailed Argument
   a. The mind wills event X and a series of unknown and totally different events from X occur, and then X occurs.
   b. If the original power is felt, it and its effect must be known since power is relative to its effect.
   c. If the effect is unknown, the power cannot be known nor felt.
   d. We cannot be conscious of a power to move our limbs—we only have a power to move animal spirits whose operations are incomprehensible.

E. The Power is Unknown
1. Our idea of power is not copied from a consciousness of power in us when we give rise to motion.
2. That motion follows the will is a matter of experience, like other natural events.
3. The power, as in all natural events, is unknown and inconceivable.

IV Unintelligibility
A. Causes
1. Most find it easy to account for common operations of nature: falling objects, plant growth, animal birth and nourishing food.
2. Most suppose they perceive the force of the cause infallibly connecting it to effect.
3. They acquire a habit: when the cause appears, they expect its usual effect.
B. Extraordinary phenomena
1. Only in extraordinary phenomena (earthquakes, pestilence, and prodigies) can they not assign a cause and explain the effect.
2. In such cases it is common to present an invisible intelligent principle (God) as the cause.
3. They think the phenomena cannot be accounted for by the common powers of nature.
C. Philosophers
1. Philosophers realize that even in familiar events the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as the most unusual.
2. We learn by experience the frequent conjunction of objects.
3. We do not comprehend any connection between them.

V No Necessary Connection
A. Position
1. No idea of power or necessary connection has been found in the sources from which it could be derived.
B. Single Instances
1. In single instances of the operation of bodies we:
   a. Can only discover one event following another.
   b. Cannot comprehend a power by which the cause operates or a connection between it and its supposed effect.
C. Mind and Body
1. The same difficulty occurs with operations of mind on body.
2. The motion of body is observed to follow the volition of the mind.
3. We cannot observe or conceive the tie or energy that is supposed to produce this effect.
4. So, the authority of the will over the body is no more comprehensible than the operation of bodies.
D. No Connection
1. There is no conceivable instance of connection and all events seem separate.
2. One event follows another—but no tie can be observed.
3. They seem conjoined but never connected.
E. Conclusion
1. We cannot have an idea of anything never appearing to outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion is:
   a. We have no idea of connection or power.
   b. “Connection” and “power” have no meaning in philosophy or common life.

VI Experience and the Origin of the Idea
A. Experience & Foretelling
1. We cannot discover without experience what will result or predict beyond an object immediately present to memory & senses.
2. Even if an event is seen to follow another we are not entitled to form a general rule or predict what will happen in similar cases.
3. If a type of event has always been conjoined with another, we predict without reservation one when the other appears.
4. We call one object the Cause and other the Effect.
5. We suppose a connection: a power in one producing the other with certainty and necessity.

B. Origin of Idea
1. The impression yielding the idea of necessary connection is the habitual transition of the imagination from an object to its usual attendant.
2. This is the sole origin of the idea and sole difference between one instance, from which we can never receive the idea of connection, and a number of similar instances which suggests it.

C. Billiard Ball Example
1. First seeing the communication of motion by impulse one can only say one event is conjoined but not connected with the other.
2. After observing several instances, he says they are connected.
3. The only change: he now imagines the events are connected and can foretell one from the other.
4. Saying one is connected with another: they have acquired a connection in thought yielding an inference by which they become proofs of each other's existence.
5. Though extraordinary, it seems founded on sufficient evidence.

D. Cause & Effect
1. Cause and effect is the foundation of all reasoning concerning matter of fact or existence.
2. Only it provides assurance concerning objects outside the present testimony of memory and senses.
3. The only immediate utility of science is to teach us to control and regulate future events by their causes.
4. Our thoughts and enquiries are every moment employed about this relation.

E. First definition of “cause.”
1. We experience that similar objects are always conjoined with similar.
2. Definition 1: an object, followed by another, and all objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second.
3. If the first object had not been, the second would have never existed.

F. Second definition of “cause.”
1. The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind, by customary transition, to the idea of the effect.
2. Definition 2: an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other.

G. Problems with the Definitions
1. Both definitions are drawn from circumstances foreign to the cause.
2. We lack a definition that indicates the circumstance in the cause connecting it with effect.
3. We have no idea of this connection, nor a distinct notion of what we desire to know.

H. Example of the Problems: Vibration
1. We say the vibration of a string causes a sound.
2. We mean that this vibration is followed by this sound and:
   a. All similar vibrations were followed by similar sounds.
   b. Or on the appearance of one the mind anticipates the senses, and forms an idea of the other.
3. The relation of cause and effect can be considered in either way—but we have no idea of it beyond these.

VII Custom & Conclusion
A. Custom
1. It is the great guide of human life.
2. It is the sole principle that makes experience useful.
3. It makes us expect for the future events similar to those of the past.
4. Without it we would be ignorant of every matter of fact beyond that immediately present to memory and senses.
5. Without it we would not know how to adjust means to ends or produce any effect.

B. Distant Times & Places
1. Conclusions from experience about matters of fact in distant places and ages must come from a fact present to the senses or memory.
2. We learn the events of former ages from history texts and carry inferences from one testimony to another until reaching the eyewitnesses.
3. Without a fact present to the memory or senses our reasoning would be hypothetical and we could not have knowledge of any real existence.

C. Infinite Regress
1. If asked why you believe a particular matter of fact you must provide another fact connected with it.
2. Since this cannot go on infinitely, it must end in a fact present to memory or senses; or accepting the belief lacks a foundation.

D. Conclusion
1. All belief of matter of fact comes from an object present to memory or senses and a customary conjunction between X and Y.
2. If X appears to the senses, custom leads the mind to expect Y, and to believe that Y exists, and will be discovered.
3. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances.
4. It is an operation of the soul as unavoidable as feeling love when benefited; or hatred when injured.
5. All these operations are natural instinct which no reasoning can produce or prevent.

Skepticism Regarding the Senses
David Hume

I The Senses & Objects
A. Question & Assumption
1. Question: what causes us to believe in the existence of body (objects)?
2. Assumption: It is vain to ask whether bodies exist or not.

B. Questions
1. Two distinct questions are commonly combined:
2. First Question: Why we attribute continued existence to objects even when they are not present to the senses.
3. Second Question: Why we suppose objects exist distinct from the mind and perception.
   a. Having external position.
   b. The independence of their existence and operation.
4. Settling one question decides the other
   a. If objects of the senses exist unperceived their existence is independent of and distinct from the perception.
   b. If their existence is independent of and distinct from the perception they must exist when not perceived.
5. He will consider whether Senses, reason, or imagination produces the opinion of a continued or distinct existence.
6. The notion of external existence different from perceptions is absurd, so these are the only intelligible questions.

C. Senses & Continued Existence
1. The senses cannot give the notion of the continued existence of their objects when they are no longer sensed.
2. This is a contradiction and supposes the senses operate after they cease operation.

D. Senses & Distinct Existence
1. If the senses yield an idea of distinct existence they must present impressions as images of distinct external existences.
2. They do not: they convey only a perception and nothing beyond.
3. The mind infers a double existence from a perception and supposes resemblance and causation between them.
4. So, if the senses suggest an idea of distinct existences it arises from a fallacy and illusion.

II Self and Objects
A. Intent
1. To determine if the senses deceive and represent perceptions as distinct (external and independent).
2. To determine if the error is from an immediate sensation or other causes.

B. External Existence
1. Because some impressions appear exterior to the body, we infer they are exterior to the self.
2. There are three reasons why this inference is flawed.

C. First Reason
1. We do not perceive our body-only sensory impressions.
2. Ascribing corporeal existence to impressions or their objects is a difficult to explain mental action.

D. Second Reason
1. Sounds, tastes, and smells are commonly taken as continued independent qualities.
2. But, they appear to lack any existence in extension.
3. So, they cannot appear to the senses as external to the body.

E. Third Reason
1. Sight does not inform us of distance immediately and without reasoning and experience.
2. Conclusions from experience are unfavorable to the view that objects exist externally.

III Philosophers & the Vulgar
A. Three Types of Impressions are conveyed by the senses.
1. First: figure, bulk, motion and solidity of bodies.
2. Second: colors, tastes, smells, sounds, heat and cold.
3. Third: pains and pleasures arising from objects applied to our bodies.
4. Philosophers and the vulgar suppose the first has a distinct and continued existence.
5. The vulgar think the second have a distinct and continued existence.
6. Philosophers and the vulgar think the third are perceptions-interrupted and dependent beings.

B. Reason
1. For sounds and colors we attribute a distinct continued existence to objects without consulting reason or philosophy.
2. The arguments philosophers present for independent objects are known to but a few and don’t induce children, peasants, or most to attribute objects to some impressions and not others.

C. Contrary Conclusions
1. The conclusions of the vulgar are contrary to those of philosophy.
2. Philosophy: everything appearing to the mind is an interrupted mind dependent perception.
3. Vulgar: they attribute a distinct continued existence to perceptions.

D. Imagination Assures Us of Continued & Distinct Existence
1. Taking perceptions and objects as the same, we cannot
   a. Infer the existence one from the other.
   b. Form an argument from cause and effect- the only relation assuring us of matter of fact.
2. Taking perceptions and objects as different we can’t reason from the existence of one to the other.
3. Imagination, not reason, assures us of the continued and distinct existence of body.

E. Vividness and Involuntariness.
1. We don’t attribute a continued existence to all involuntary or more forceful impressions.
2. Pains, pleasures, passions and affections, existing only in perception, are stronger than and as involuntary as impressions of figure, extension, color and sound, which are taken as permanent.

IV Constancy, Coherence, Cause and Effect
A. Motivation
1. The vulgar is rejected, so a new hypothesis is needed about qualities in impressions that make us accept their distinct and continued existence.
2. He considers: constancy, coherence and cause & effect.

B. Constancy
1. All objects attributed a continued existence have a constancy distinguishing them from dependent impressions.
2. Things he sees have always appeared in the same order.
3. This constancy is imperfect and allows considerable exceptions.

C. Coherence & Constancy
1. Even in change objects preserve coherence and have a regular dependence on each other.
2. This is the foundation of causal reasoning and yields an opinion of continued existence.
3. Constancy and coherence in changes are characteristics of external objects.

D. Difference between External & Internal Impressions
1. The passions are connected with and dependent on each other.
2. But, it isn’t necessary to suppose they exist unperceived to explain this dependence and connection.
3. External objects require a continued existence or greatly lose the regularity of their operation.

E. The Room, Porter and Letter Example
1. He is in his chamber and memory informs him of the existence of many objects.
2. He hears a noise as of a door opening and sees a porter and so reasons the noise is from a door.
3. He has found the human body cannot float in air and the porter would need to float if the stairs vanished in Hume’s absence.
4. He receives a letter and cannot account for it without accepting the existence of a sea, continent, posts and ferries.
5. The phenomena are contradictions to experience and are objections to maxims about connections of causes and effects.
   a. He is accustomed to hear a sound and see an object in motion at the same time-but has not.
6. He supposes the continued existence of objects connects their past and present appearances.
   a. It is the only way to reconcile the contradictions.
7. He is naturally led to regard the world as real and existing unperceived.

F. Reasoning from Coherence vs. Reasoning from Cause & Effect
1. The conclusion from coherence of appearances is not the same as reasoning about causes and effects.
2. Cause and effect: the inference is from habit and regulated by past experience.
3. Coherence: the inference is from understanding and custom indirectly.

G. Regularity in Perceptions
1. Only perceptions are present to the mind, so a habit can only be acquired by a regular succession of perceptions.
2. Regularity in perceptions cannot be used to infer greater regularity in unperceived objects.
3. This supposes a contradiction-a habit acquired by something never present to the mind.
H. Imagination & Coherence

1. All reasoning of matters of fact is from custom and custom is only an effect of repeated perceptions.
2. Extending custom and reason beyond perceptions must be from other principles and not the direct effect of repetition.
3. The imagination, when on a train of thinking, tends to continue even when its object fails it.
4. Objects have certain coherence even as they appear to our senses.
5. The coherence is greater and more uniform if we suppose the objects have a continued existence.
6. Once the mind is in the train of observing uniformity among objects it continues until the uniformity is as complete as possible.
7. The supposition of continued existence is sufficient for this and gives a notion of more regularity in objects than the senses do.

I. Constancy

1. Coherence is too weak to support the continued existence of all external bodies.
2. The constancy of their appearance must be joined to coherence for a satisfactory account.
3. The inference from constancy yields the opinion of continued existence.

J. Continued Existence

1. When accustomed to constancy in impressions, we regard interrupted perceptions as the same due to their resemblance.
2. The interruption is contrary to their identity: the first impression is seen as annihilated and the second newly created.
3. To avoid this contradiction it is supposed the perceptions are connected by an insensible real existence.
4. The idea of continued existence acquires force and vivacity from memory of broken impressions and a tendency to suppose their identity.
   a. The essence of belief is in the force and vivacity of the conception.

K. Distinct Existence

1. An intimate connection lies between the principles of a continued and of a distinct existence.
2. When the opinion of a continued existence is established, so is that of distinct existence.

V Neither and Independent nor Continued Existence

A. Experience

1. The independent existence of sensible perceptions is contrary to plainest experience.

B. Experiments

1. Experiments show our perceptions lack independent existence.
2. Pressing the eye with a finger doubles the objects and moves half of them.
3. We don’t attribute continued existence to both perceptions.
4. Both are of the same nature: all perceptions are dependent on our organs.

C. Additional Confirmation of Dependence

1. The seeming increase and diminution of objects based on distance.
2. Apparent alterations in their figure.
3. Changes in color and other qualities from illness.
4. Similar experiments showing our sensible perceptions lack distinct or independent existence.

VI Philosophic & Vulgar Systems

A. The Philosophic System

1. Philosophers distinguish between perceptions and objects.
3. Objects: uninterrupted and preserve a continued existence and identity.

B. Hume’s Criticism

1. The philosophical is only a palliative remedy and has the difficulties of the vulgar system plus its own.
2. The philosophical has no recommendation to reason or imagination-it gets its influence on the imagination from the vulgar.

C. First Part of the Proposition

1. Only cause and effect permits and inference from the existence of one thing to that of another.
   a. This shows the existence of one depends on the other.
2. The idea is derived from experience by finding two beings constantly conjoined are always present at once to the mind.
3. But, only perceptions are present to the mind.
4. So, a relation of cause and effect is observable between perceptions.
5. But, cause and effect cannot be observed between perceptions and objects.
6. So, it is impossible to infer, via reason, the existence of objects from that of perceptions.
7. Thus, the philosophical system has no primary recommendation to the imagination since it alone would not find the principle.

D. Second part of the proposition,

1. The philosophical system acquires all its influence on the imagination from the vulgar.
2. Since most and all who reflect on the subject accept it, its influence is from the vulgar system since it has none of its own.

E. His explanation on how the two contrary systems are connected.

1. Imagination naturally follows this way thinking:
a. Our perceptions are our only objects.
b. Resembling perceptions are the same however interrupted they appear.
c. This appearing interruption is contrary to the identity.
d. The interruption doesn’t extend beyond the appearance-the perception/object continues to exist.
e. So, our sensible perceptions have a continued and uninterrupted existence.

2. Reflection destroys this conclusion:
   a. Perceptions have a dependent existence.
   b. There is not a continued existence in nature, preserved even when unperceived.
3. While philosophers reject the independence and continuance of perceptions, only the skeptics reject continued existence.
   a. The skeptics do not really believe in their view.

VII Double Existence
A. Reason & Natural Impulses
1. Opinions of reflection differ from those of natural impulse.
2. The philosophical principle may prevail while attentive, but nature draws us back to the vulgar.

B. Psychology of Double Existence
1. The natural principles prevail over studied reflections, but not without a struggle.
2. To be at ease we make a philosophical hypothesis of the double existence of perceptions and objects.
3. It is the monstrous offspring of two contrary principles:
   a. Imagination: our resembling perceptions have a continued and uninterrupted existence.
   b. Reason: our resembling perceptions are interrupted in existence and different from each other.
4. The contradiction is evaded by a new fiction: the perceptions are interrupted and the objects are continued.

C. Opinions
1. If we believed perceptions are continued, identical, and independent, we would not create the opinion of a double existence.
   a. We would be satisfied and have no reason to look beyond.
2. If we believed perceptions are dependent, interrupted and different we would not accept a double existence.
   a. We would see the error of the supposition of a continued existence.
3. Our adherence to contrary principles makes us justify them by double existence.

D. Another Advantage
1. The philosophical system is similar to the vulgar so we can humor reason, then easily return to our natural notions.
2. Philosophers, outside their closets, agree with mankind: perceptions are our only objects and continue identically and uninterrupted in all interrupted appearances.

VIII Results
A. First Particular
1. We suppose external objects resemble internal perceptions.
2. The relation of cause and effect can’t justify the inference of external, continued objects from qualities of perceptions.
3. We have no reason to infer that objects resemble perceptions.
4. This is derived only from the imagination borrowing ideas from a precedent perception.
5. We never can conceive anything but perceptions, and hence must make everything resemble them.

B. Second Particular
1. We assume an object resembles the perception it causes.
2. To the idea of their being united in the imagination by cause and effect, we naturally add resemblance to complete the union.
3. We tend to complete every union by joining new relations to those observed between any ideas.

C. Hume's Results
1. He began by assuming we ought to have implicit faith in our senses and this would be supported by reason.
2. He is now inclined to put no faith in the senses or imagination.
3. Such trivial qualities of the fancy conducted by false suppositions cannot lead to a solid and rational system.

D. Illusions and Problems
1. The constancy of perceptions has considerable effect, but has the greatest difficulties.
2. It is an illusion to suppose resembling perceptions are numerically the same.
3. This illusion leads us into the popular opinion that perceptions are uninterrupted and exist unperceived.
4. The philosophical has the same difficulties and also absurdly denies and establishes the vulgar.
5. Philosophers deny resembling perceptions are identical and uninterrupted.
6. Philosophers so strongly believe the opposite they invent a new set of perceptions and attribute to them identity and continuity.
7. These groundless, unjustified and extraordinary opinions can only yield error and falsehood.

H. Skeptical Doubt
1. Skeptical doubt is a malady and can never be radically cured.
2. It is impossible to defend our understanding or senses.
3. Skeptical doubt arises from profound and intense reflection so always increases as we reason for or against it.
Personal Identity

I Preliminaries

A. Other Philosophers imagine
   1. We are always conscious of what we call our Self.
   2. We feel its existence and its continuance.
   3. We are certain, beyond evidence of a demonstration, of its perfect identity and simplicity.

B. Hume
   1. When he enters into what he calls himself he encounters a particular perception or other.
      a. Perceptions of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure.
   2. He is never without a perception and never observes anything but the perception.
   3. If his perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, as long as he is insensible of himself he does not exist.
   4. If all his perceptions were removed by death and he could not think, feel, see, love, nor hate after the dissolution of his body he
      would be annihilated.

C. Disagreement
   1. If after serious and unprejudiced reflection another has a different notion of himself, Hume cannot reason with him.
   2. He may perceive something simple and continued he calls himself, though Hume is certain there is no such thing in his case.

II Bundles & Persons

A. Bundles & Change
   1. A person is only a bundle or collection of different perceptions.
   2. These perceptions succeed each other and are in perpetual flux and movement.
   3. There is no power of the soul remaining unalterably the same even for a moment.

B. The mind is a kind of theatre.
   1. Numerous perceptions successively make their appearance.
   2. There is no simplicity at one time, nor identity in different times, despite our natural propensity to imagine otherwise.
   3. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us:
      a. Only the successive perceptions constitute the mind.
      b. We have no notion of the place where these scenes are represented or the materials composing it.

III Identity & Relations

A. Identity
   1. What leads us to ascribe identity to successive perceptions and suppose we have an invariable and uninterrupted existence?
   2. Every distinct perception adding to the mind is a distinct existence.
   3. We suppose the train of perceptions is united by identity.
   4. The understanding never observes any real connection among objects.
      a. Even cause and effect is a customary association of ideas.
   5. Thus, identity is nothing belonging to nor uniting different perceptions.
   6. Identity is a quality attributed to them because of the union of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon them.

B. Relations
   1. The only qualities that can yield ideas of a union in the imagination are: Resemblance, contiguity, and causation.
   2. These three are the uniting principles in the ideal world.
   3. Without them every distinct object is separable by the mind and appears to have no connection with any other object.
   4. Identity depends on resemblance and causation, and not contiguity, this has little or no influence here.
   5. They produce an easy transition of ideas, so notions of personal identity come from the smooth, uninterrupted progress of
      thoughts along a train of connected ideas.

C. Resemblance & Memory
   1. Memory is a faculty by which we raise up images of past perceptions.
   2. An image necessarily resembles its object.
   3. Frequent placing of resembling perceptions in a chain of thought conveys the imagination more easily from one link to
      another.
   4. This makes the whole seem like one continuing object.
   5. So, memory both discovers the identity and contributes to its production-it produces the resemblance among perceptions.

D. Causation & Analogy to a Commonwealth
   1. The mind is a system of different perceptions linked by cause and effect that mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify
      each other.
      a. Impressions give rise to correspondent ideas and these ideas produce other impressions.
   2. The soul is like a republic or commonwealth.
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3. The members are united by ties of government and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts.
4. As the same republic may change members, laws and constitutions the same person may vary character, disposition, impressions and ideas, without losing identity.
   a. Whatever changes he endures his parts are still connected by the relation of causation.

IV Concern, Memory and Conclusion
A. Concern
1. Our identity, in regard to passions, corroborates that of the imagination.
2. This is by making our distant perceptions influence each other.
3. And by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures.

B. Memory
1. Memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of the succession of perceptions, so it is the source of personal identity.
2. If we had no memory, we would lack a notion of causation and hence of the chain of causes & effects constituting our self.
3. Once we have a notion of causation from memory, we can extend the chain of causes and our identity beyond our memory.
4. Thus comprehending times, circumstances, and actions we forgot but suppose existed.

C. Criticism of Memory as the basis of Identity
1. We remember few of our past actions.
2. To claim that if one forgets, then the present self is not the same as the past self overturns the established notions of personal identity.
3. Memory discovers, more than it produces personal identity, by showing cause and effect among different perceptions.
4. Those who claim memory entirely produces our identity must give a reason why we can extend it beyond our memory.

E. Conclusion
1. All questions concerning personal identity can never possibly be decided and are to be regarded as grammatical rather than philosophical difficulties.
2. Identity depends on the relations of ideas that produce identity via the easy transition they occasion.
3. Since the relations and easiness of the transition may insensibly diminish, we have no just standard to settle disputes concerning when they acquire or lose title to identity.
4. All disputes concerning identity of connected objects are merely verbal, except as far as the relation of parts yields a fiction or imaginary principle of union.

Hume's Ethical Theory

I Introduction
A. Work
1. His work on ethics is the *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.*
   a. Subtitled: *An Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects.*
2. He considered it his best work.
B. Science
1. “Moral philosophy seems hitherto to have received less improvement than either geometry or physics.”
2. Like other Enlightenment thinkers, he held that the scientific method could be applied across the board.
3. His project is more descriptive than prescriptive.
   a. He theorizes about how moral principles arise and function.
   b. He tends not to say what people should do.
4. He takes an empirical approach—he derives his theory of ethics from observations of human psychology.
5. He regards morality as natural to humans and assumes that this entails that people share the same moral tendencies.
6. Because of this assumption, he often argues by asking the reader to refer to his/her own moral feelings.

II Moral Judgments
A. Knowledge
1. As reason alone cannot provide knowledge of the world, it cannot provide knowledge about morality.
2. He contends that reason has a very limited role in ethics.
3. Given his view, moral judgments would either fall under Relations of Ideas or Matters of Fact.
4. He considers both options, but argues against moral judgments falling under Relations of Ideas.
B. Ethics & Relations of Ideas
1. He examines the possibility that moral judgments fall under the Relations of Ideas.
2. If so, ethical truths would be as certain as those of mathematics and geometry.
3. “There are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to very rational being that considers them.”
4. “The immediate measures of right and wrong impose an obligation, not only on human creatures, but also on the Deity himself.”

5. “Morality, like truth, is discern’d merely by ideas, and by their juxta-position and comparison.”

C. Hume’s Criticism
1. Morality is supposed to influence and guide human actions.
2. Reason can discover truth or falsehood.
3. Morality is not concerned with what is true, but with what one ought to do.
4. “Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals.”

D. Ethics & Matters of Fact
1. He considers whether reason can derive morality from matters of fact.
2. He asks the reader to consider any action that is considered morally wrong.
3. “Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice.”
4. He concludes that neither evil nor goodness are matters of fact.

E. Passions & Morality
1. Morality arises from the passions.
2. Moral evil cannot be found “till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action.”
3. Passions cannot be correct or incorrect—they do not represent things.
4. Passions can neither conform to nor be contrary to reason.
5. “’Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.”
6. “When you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it.”

F. Moral Sentiment
1. Moral sentiment is natural and psychological.
2. Most humans share the same moral sentiments and these tend to cause people to cooperate.
3. “Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”
4. “Morality, therefore, is more properly felt that judg’d of.”
5. Experience only yields impressions, impressions are not moral values and cannot produce “oughtness.”

III Moral Rules
A. Sources of Moral Rules
1. Social utility and sympathy.

B. Social Utility
1. Some moral rules do not appear to fit our natural tendencies.
2. Examples: justice, obligations to keep promises, obedience to the state and chastity.
3. He argues that social utility motivates people to follow these rules.
4. He calls these the artificial virtues.
   a. Our unregulated natural impulses could cause people to be unjust, break promises, etc. when it was convenient to do so.
   b. Hence, the principles that restrain such actions are artificial.
5. People obey such rules because they tend to serve each person’s interests in the long run.
6. Thus, people follow these rules out of self-interest.

C. Sympathy
1. Even when “injustice is so distant from us, as no way to affect our interests, it still displeases us.”
2. Sympathy accounts for this.
3. “Thus self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice: but a sympathy with interest is the source of the moral approbation which attends that virtue.”
4. We feel greater sympathy to those closer to use.
5. We generalize from such feelings and approve or disapprove of remote actions even though the passions are not as strong.

D. Benevolence
1. People can feel a general benevolence and “this sentiment can be no other than a feeling for the happiness of mankind, and a resentment of their misery; since these are the different ends which virtue and vice have a tendency to produce.”
2. He rejects the views of Epicurus, Hobbes and Locke because they imply that benevolence is simply a form of self love.
3. He argues that experience refutes psychological egoism.
4. “To the most careless observer there appear to be such dispositions as benevolence and generosity; such affections as love, friendship, compassion, gratitude.”
5. He claims this sympathy is natural and is the foundation of morality.
   a. “It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask why we have humanity or fellow feeling with others.”
   b. “It is sufficient, that this is experienced to be a principle in human nature.”
   c. “We must stop somewhere in our examination of causes.”
Hume's Philosophy of Religion

The Existence of God

I Skepticism

A. Introduction
1. He takes a skeptical view of religion.
2. All a priori and a posteriori arguments for religious belief fail.
3. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion focuses on the theistic proofs and involves three characters.
4. Cleanthes is a theist who presents a posteriori arguments for God’s existence.
5. Demea is pious and orthodox; he relies on faith and a priori arguments.
6. Philo is a skeptic and is Hume’s mouthpiece.
7. Hume argues that all standard arguments for God’s existence fail.
8. He argues that even if the arguments support the existence of a first cause, this first cause will be extremely different from the orthodox view of God.

B. Reason
1. In part IX Philo argues that reason is not sufficient to establish a matter of fact.
2. All claims about existence are claims about matters of fact.
3. Hence, a priori reasoning cannot establish the existence of anything.
4. Anything that can be conceived of as existing can also be conceived of as not existing.
5. “Consequently there is no being whose existence is demonstrable.”
6. Necessity only applies to relations of ideas and not matters of fact, so there is no necessary being.

C. Causation
1. He attacks arguments based on the assumption that all events have a cause.
2. He makes use of his earlier arguments regarding causation.
   a. Causality is a habit based on the observation of constant conjunction.
3. Philo notes that it is rational to conclude a specific house had a builder because we have observed a constant conjunction between houses and builder.
4. In the case of the universe, we have only one instance to observe.
5. Hence, there is no constant conjunction between universes and their causes in human experience.
6. Thus, no empirical argument based on causation can succeed.

D. Rejection of Design
1. He questions the mechanistic assumption/metaphor.
2. “The world plainly resembles more an animal or a vegetable, than it does a watch or a knitting loom.”
3. He argues that if an animal did not match its environment then it not survive.
4. Thus, animals that survive would be ideally suited to their environment.

II Five Problems

A. Introduction
1. Philo (Hume) accepts that like effects proof the existence of like causes and the conclusion that this proves there is a cause of the universe.
   a. He is attacking arguments that include premises such as “there much be as much reality in the cause as the effect.”
2. He argues that this proof creates five problems for traditional theism.

B. First Problem
1. A finite effect does not justify concluding an infinite cause.
2. Even granting the assumptions, the cause need only be as great as the effect and hence need not be infinite.

C. Second Problem
1. It cannot be assumed that the creator is perfect.
2. There is no reason to believe that the universe is perfect.
3. The universe falls short in many ways-improvements can easily be imagined.
4. We have no other universe to compare our universe to, so we lack a standard by which to evaluate its goodness.

D. Third
1. Even if it is assumed that the world is as good as it could possibly be, this does not prove that the creator is perfect.
2. “Many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout eternity, ere this system was struck out.”
3. “Much labour lost: many fruitless trials made:”
4. “And a slow, but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in the art of world making.”

E. Fourth
1. There does not seem to be adequate evidence that there is one God.

2. Using the human analogy, since many humans are involved in creating large and complex things, it seems reasonable to conclude that there are many gods who contributed to the creation of the universe.

F. Fifth

1. Arguments that draw an analogy between humans and God would seem to lead to the conclusion that the creator of the physical universe is a physical being.

Hume’s Agnosticism

I Religion

A. Personal Views

1. He was raised in a Calvinist family.
2. He gave up religion early in life.

B. Boswell

1. Hume was visited by James Boswell (the biographer of Samuel Johnson).
2. Boswell asked the dying Hume whether he believed in an afterlife or not.
3. Hume replied “It was possible that a piece of coal put upon the fire would not burn.”
4. His view was that “it was a most unreasonable fancy that we should exist forever.”

C. Causation

1. He asserted that “all events seem entirely loose and separate.”
2. This seems to entail that anything is possible.
3. Thus, neither reason nor experience proves nor disproves atheism or theism.
4. He does not consider himself an atheist-he does not conclude that God certainly does not exist.
5. His position seems to be one of agnosticism.

D. Miracles

1. “A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence.”
2. The burden of proof rests on those who claim there are miracles because their claims go beyond what is normally experienced.
3. He takes the general view that one should believe what is most likely.
4. When it comes to miracles, what is most likely is based on the known fact that people lie.

E. Intelligence

1. He accepts that we can establish one claim.
2. “That the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence.”
3. He notes that our best reasoning can only give a vague answer to such critical questions.

F. The mystery passage.

1. Hume states the following:
   a. “A person, seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of natural reason, will fly to revealed truth with the greatest of avidity:
   b. “While the haughty dogmatist, persuaded that he can erect a complete system of theology by the mere help of philosophy, disdains any further aid and rejects this adventitious instructor.”
   c. “To be a philosophical Skeptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian.”
2. Interpretation: though he was not a theist, his skepticism created room for faith by showing the limits of reason.
3. Another interpretation: being a Christian requires being a skeptic because knowledge makes it impossible to accept what faith requires.

Results

I Skepticism and Practicality

A. Skeptical Results

1. “The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another.”
2. “Where am I or what?” From what causes do I turn?”
3. “I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron’d with the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv’d of the use of every member and faculty.”

B. Hume’s Conclusion

1. Reason is incapable of proving even the most fundamental beliefs.
2. Reason provides nothing but abstractions and gives no basis for our beliefs.
3. There is no need to rationally prove the fundamental beliefs in order for them to be useful.
5. “Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever.”
6. Thus, total skepticism is not possible.

C. Mitigated Skepticism
1. Hume recommends a form of mitigated skepticism.
2. This skepticism does not affect “normal” life.
3. He claims that in the case of dogmatists such skepticism “would naturally inspire them with more modesty and reserve, and diminish their fond opinion of themselves and their prejudice against antagonists.”
4. “A true sceptic will be diffident of his philosophical doubts, as well as of his philosophical conviction.”

D. Skepticism
1. Descartes believed that knowledge required certainty and he held that he had achieved this goal.
2. Locke had a more modest agenda—he believed that practical certainty is possible.
3. Both Locke and Descartes held that reason and experience could be used to build a firm foundation for knowledge.
4. Hume began with Descartes’ assumption about the need for certainty, but ended up concluding that it was not possible.
5. Hence, Hume concluded that we do not have knowledge.

Immanuel Kant

Background

I Background
A. Personal information
1. Born in Konigsberg, East Prussia on April 22, 1724.
2. Born into a Pietist family.
   a. Severe, puritanical lifestyle.
   b. Faith and religious feelings were emphasized over reason and theological doctrines.
4. Attended the University of Konigsberg as a student and latter became a professor.
5. About five feet tall, frail and thin.
6. Knew much about geography and the events of his time, but never traveled more than sixty miles from home.
7. Helped his brother and sisters financially, but was not close to them.
8. He was known for being extremely orderly—so much so that the locals set their watches by his daily walk.
   a. The place he walked is still known as the Philosopher’s Walk.
9. He had friends, but latter became a recluse.
10. He retired from public lecturing in 1797.
11. He died on February 12, 1804.
B. Contributions
1. Metaphysics, logic, aesthetics, and theology.
3. He revolutionized philosophy.
4. His impact was so important that that some divide philosophy into pre-Kantian and post-Kantian phases.

II Philosophic Motivation and Goals
A. Leibnizian Rationalism
1. Kant was trained in Leibnizian rationalism.
2. Christian Wolff (1679-1754), an average thinker, was the chief spokesman of this view.
3. One of Wolff’s works was Reasonable Thoughts on God, the World, the Soul of Man, and All Things In General.
4. He claimed that reading Hume’s works awakened him from his “dogmatic slumbers” and led him to criticize dogmatic rationalism.
5. He was critical of the rationalists, because they failed to critically assess human reason before engaging in their speculations.
B. Assumptions
1. He assumes that we do have knowledge.
2. He assumes that the fundamental principles of mathematics and Newtonian physics are universal, necessary and that no future discovery would undermine them.
C. First Goal
1. The foundations of science need to be clarified.
2. He accepts the rationalist view that knowledge must be universal, necessary and certain.
3. He disagreed with the rationalists about perception and saw it as essential to science.
4. He agreed with Hume that logical propositions alone do not provide knowledge about the world, but merely provide knowledge about the relations between our ideas.
5. He agreed with the empiricists that knowledge begins with experience.

D. Experience
1. He agreed with Hume that experience alone cannot provide universal, necessary and certain knowledge.
2. Hume concluded that the connections in experience, such as causation, are based on psychological habit.
3. For Hume, we are limited to our subjective experiences, so he saw no grounds for the belief that our mental content corresponds to the external world.
4. Kant regarded Hume’s empiricism as flawed because it undermined scientific knowledge.
5. To rectify this, he set out to create a new theory of knowledge that would serve as the foundation for science while avoiding rationalist dogmatism and empiricist skepticism.

E. Second Task
1. Kant set out to resolve the conflict between mechanistic science and religion, morality and freedom.
2. Mechanistic science seems to leave little room for religion and freedom.
3. Since science seems to deal only with physical facts, grounding morality seems problematic.
4. Kant claims he had to “deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith.”
5. Scientific knowledge is limited and these other concerns must be founded in something other than empirical science.

F. Third task
1. He set out to deal with the crisis in metaphysics.
2. Traditional metaphysics and theology was based on the assumption that reason could inform us of transcendent reality.
3. Kant noted that there was no agreement or progress in metaphysics comparable to what existed in the sciences.
4. He said metaphysics was “a dark ocean without coasts and without lighthouses.”
5. Because of Hume’s influence, Kant would not return to the dogmatism of previous rationalism.
6. While Hume wanted to burn works on metaphysics, Kant held that metaphysics is unavoidable and that it deals with important matters.
7. Kant claims that it would be as unreasonable to abandon metaphysics because of some nonsense as it would be to cease breathing because some air is tainted.
8. His goal was to explain the failure of traditional metaphysics and to develop a more limited version.
9. “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe…the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.”
10. The stars belong to physics and mathematics-Kant assumed they were subject to physical law.
11. Kant also assumed that we also feel the force of the moral law.
12. Thus, Kant sent out to reconcile physics, math and morality.

### Theory of Knowledge

I Critical Philosophy

A. Critiques
1. Kant’s work was a reaction to the dogmatic philosophy of his predecessors.
2. He follows the Greek roots of the word “critique”: “to sort” or “to sift out.”
3. His main work in epistemology is the Critique of Pure Reason.

B. Kant’s “Copernican” Revolution
1. “There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience.”
2. “But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience.”
3. Copernicus proposed a revolution in astronomy: the earth was replaced by the sun as the center.
4. Past empiricists assumed that knowledge conforms to its objects.
5. All attempts to extend knowledge of objects by a priori means failed.
6. Hume argued that we have no way of establishing this conformity.
7. Kant revolts this: he claims that objects correspond to our knowledge.
8. For sense data to be experience as objects, the mind must impose a structure or ordering upon them.
9. This would yield knowledge of objects a priori.
10. If our intuition must conform to the object, we could not know anything of the object a priori.
11. If the object of sense must conform to our faculty of intuition, then a priori knowledge is possible.

C. Reality
1. Kant does not claim that the mind creates reality.
2. The way reality appears depends on both the senses and the mind.
3. The mind imposes its structure on experience and this yields the objects of knowledge.
4. This is not a discernible process—when one becomes aware of an object, the mind has already imposed its structure.
   a. The mind performs this activity throughout all perception.
5. Thus, experience is a product of what is sensed in the external world and the structure the mind imposes on it.
6. We cannot compare reality as it appears to reality as it is before the mind structures it.
7. However, if human minds have the same structure, then within human experience it is possible to have objective and universal knowledge.

II Varieties of Judgment
A. Analytic Judgments
   1. Analytical Judgments: judgments that are based on the principle of contradiction.
   2. A true analytical judgment is such that its contradiction is necessarily false.
   3. The predicate in such a judgment is contained in the subject.
   4. The truth of the judgment is independent of facts and does not yield any new knowledge about the world.
B. Synthetic Judgments
   1. These judgments yield knowledge about the world.
   2. Synthetic judgments synthesize the subject with the predicate.
   3. The denial of a true synthetic judgment does not yield a contradiction.
C. A priori Knowledge
   1. Knowledge that can be acquired without experience.
   2. Analytic judgments are a priori.
D. A Posteriori Knowledge
   1. Knowledge that is acquired via experience.
E. Analytic A priori
   1. These are based on the principle of non-contradiction.
   2. Example: “All bodies are extended.”
   3. Example: “All bachelors are unmarried.”
F. Analytic A Posteriori
   1. There are no such judgments—analytic judgments are not based in experience.
G. Synthetic A Posteriori
   1. These are judgments based in experience.
   2. Includes scientific judgments.
H. Synthetic A Priori
   1. These are judgments that are a priori that yield knowledge about the world.
   2. Example: “All events have a cause.”
   a. As Hume argued, no amount of experience can yield such knowledge.
   3. We bring this information to our experience of the world and do not derive it from our experience.
   4. Thus, it is a priori knowledge.
   5. Unlike analytical judgments, synthetic a priori judgments yield knowledge of the world.
I. Mathematics
   1. Kant takes mathematics to fall within the synthetic a priori.
   2. One can know, a priori, that “7+5=12” is a universal and necessary truth.
   3. But, one cannot analyze the concepts of “5”, “7” and their union and find that they explicitly contain the concept of “12.”
J. Geometry
   1. Geometric judgments are synthetic a priori.
   2. Example: “A straight line is the shortest distance between two points.”
   3. The concept “straight” refers only to the quality of the line and does not contain quantitative concepts such as “shortest.”
   4. Its truth is known without experience.”
K. Kant’s Goal
   1. Kant sets out to determine how synthetic a priori judgments are possible in mathematics, physics, metaphysics and morality.

III The Transcendent Method
A. Rejection of Empiricism
   1. The empiricists attempted to go from specific facts to generalizations.
   2. As Hume argued, the limits of experience entail that the generalizations will be inconclusive.
   3. Thus, Kant concludes that the method of the empiricists will be useless in trying to establish universal and necessary knowledge of the world.
B. The Transcendent Method
   1. This method begins with the nature of experience in general to the necessary conditions of its possibility.
2. The transcendental structures of experience are those formal features that are not limited to any particular experience but are the universal and necessary features of all experiences.

3. Kant’s test is that if one cannot imagine an experience without a certain structural feature, then that yields a reason to accept that it is necessary for that experience.

4. If we make spatial judgments about experience, then we must have minds that structure experience spatially.

5. If we can make causal judgments, then we must have minds that structure experience in causal terms.

C. Space & Time
1. Scientific knowledge deals with objects in space and time.
2. To understand how we know the world requires understanding how we can experience objects spatially and temporally.
3. Kant claims that space and time are not objects of experience but are basic frames of reference in terms of which objects appear to us.
4. He calls them “forms of intuition.”

D. Space
1. We can imagine empty space without objects but we cannot imagine objects without space.
2. Spatial qualities differ from qualities and objects of sensation.
3. Space is a form the mind that arranges sensations but is not a sensation.
4. We do not experience space—we experience objects that are spatially structured.
5. Space is the form of outer sense because it structures our experiences of external objects.

E. Time
1. Time is not a thing that exists in the world.
2. It is a form in which objects appear to humans.
3. Time is the “form of inner sense” because mental states necessarily occur to us in temporal sequences.
4. He notes that traditional accounts of God (such as Augustine’s) place God beyond time.
   a. Past, present, and future are experienced simultaneously by God but are experienced sequentially by us.
   b. Thus, time is not a feature of reality but a way humans experience reality.

F. Mathematics
1. He develops his account of space and time in order to explain how mathematical judgments are synthetic a priori.
2. Geometry is the science of spatial properties.
3. He claims math is a method of processing numbers and hence involves time.
4. By linking math and geometry to space and time and by showing that space and time are universal and necessary structures of how humans experience the world, he is able to retain the a priori character of math while proving that it provides information about the world studied by science.

IV Categories of the Understanding
A. Knowledge
1. Knowledge comes from sensibility and understanding.
2. Kant considers that they might come from “a common, but unknown root.”
3. Objects are given to us by sensibility.
4. Objects are thought via the understanding.
5. Kant explains sensibility in terms of how sense experience is structured by the forms of intuition of space and time.
6. If humans only had a mechanism of perception, then we would only possess spatially and temporally located sensations and not knowledge.
7. Knowledge requires additional principles of organization and these are contained within the understanding.

B. Knowledge
1. Knowledge is the result of the sensibility and understanding working in tandem.
2. Without sensibility we would have no objects.
3. “Without understanding no object would be thought.”
4. “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”
5. “The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing.”
6. “Only through their union can knowledge arise.”
7. Knowledge consists of judgments expressible as propositions.

C. Concepts
1. The understanding organizes experience using pure concepts or categories of the understanding.
2. The concepts are “pure” because they are a priori.
3. To find the mind’s categories he begins by cataloguing our judgments.
4. He uses Aristotelian logic, which he considers the final development of logic.
5. He discovers twelve types of judgments.
6. He thinks that we can deduce the concepts necessary for these judgments.

D. The Twelve A Priori Concepts
1. He takes these twelve to make up the nature of any possible object.
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2. They are a priori—not derived from experience.
3. They are the way the mind represents experience.
4. Quantity: unity, plurality, totality.

V Response to Humean Skepticism
A. Hume’s Skepticism
1. We cannot have a priori knowledge of the world.
2. We only have access to unconnected impressions and there is no evidence for necessary connections.
3. Hume’s skepticism is based in his view of causality and his epistemology.
4. He does, of course, take a pragmatic view of his skepticism.
B. Kant & Substance
1. He claims that sensations that appear in consistent and enduring groups and that are experienced in a similar manner by others are experienced as objects in the objective world.
2. He claims we can form empirical concepts of objects via the category of substance.
3. This category permits one to order qualities (such as red, round and tasty) into an object, such as an apple.
4. As per Hume, the notion of substance is not from sensation.
5. Against Descartes and Locke, he rejects the view that substance is an underlying metaphysical entity.
6. Substance is a logical category the mind employs to select groups of impressions from experience and combine them to what we regard as objects.
7. This organization can be mistaken, but experience is always ordered in terms of substance.
C. Kant & Causation
1. Hume presented an analysis of causation in terms of habituation.
2. On Hume’s view, experience consists of impressions without necessary connections.
   a. This undermines the distinction between accidental conjunctions and causation.
3. Kant distinguishes between contingent a posteriori truths and synthetic a priori truths.
4. Kant: experience reveals the particular cause and effect relationships.
   a. We can mistake accidental conjunctions for causal connections.
5. Kant: the mind always organizes experience in terms of causation.
6. Kant: Causation is not a metaphysical category that exists in the world, but is a genuine distinction in experience.
D. Kant’s Subjective-Objective Distinction
1. Kant argues against Hume’s rejection of substance and his analysis of causation.
2. He distinguishes between objective and subjective:
   a. Subjective: experiences that lack consistency and are not interpersonal.
   b. Objective: experiences that are consistent, ordered by rules and interpersonal.
3. The world must have a fundamental structure or it could not be experience, thought about, spoken about or shared with other humans.
4. Other beings might experience the world in very different ways.
5. The categories of the understanding necessarily determine how humans experience the world.

VI Theory of Experience
A. Unity & Experience
1. The manifold of experience: the variety of sensory impressions.
2. He accepts Hume’s view that by themselves these experiences are distinct and lack necessary connections.
3. Experience is unified, yet the sense data do not (as Hume argued) contain this unity nor is the unity an experienced thing.
4. The unity of experience arises from the activity of the mind.
B. Synthesis
1. Synthesis of apprehension in intuition: To distinguish elements of experience from other elements and take them as one experience.
   a. For example: picking out a series of notes from a variety of noises and experiencing it as a song.
2. Synthesis of reproduction in imagination: To remember elements in experience by use of the imagination and thus order experience.
   a. Example: To identify a note as second one must remember that there was a first note.
   a. Example: Regarding a series of notes as forming a song.
C. Concepts
1. The empirical concepts are acquired from experience.
2. The empirical concepts require a priori concepts such as plurality, totality, substance and causality.
3. The mind actively synthesizes the elements of experience, thus unifying them.
4. Objects conform to the mind: without the mind synthesizing via its categories, there would be no distinct objects in human experience but only sensations without unity.
5. He held that the fact that experience always has a universal and necessary structure provides a sufficient foundation for science.

Kantian Metaphysics

I Phenomena & Noumena
A. Introduction
1. Kant argues that synthetic a priori judgments are possible in math and physics.
2. He wonders whether they are possible in metaphysics.
3. He does not think it is likely that people have the ability to gain knowledge about reality beyond human experience.
4. Knowledge of the world is limited is perceivable in space and time and known via the categories of the understanding.
5. He calls traditional metaphysics “transcendent illusions.”
B. Phenomena
1. Traditional modern metaphysics typically assumed a dichotomy between ideas and reality, thus giving rise to the problem of the external world.
2. Kant: The only world that can make sense is the world of objects appearing in experience.
3. Phenomena: things as they appear to us.
4. In practical terms, the phenomenal world is the “real” world and the idea that it corresponds to an external reality is unintelligible.
C. Noumena
1. Humans apparently cannot avoid trying to talk about what is beyond experience.
2. Noumena: things in themselves that are not structured by the mind’s categories.
3. No positive content can be given to the concept of noumena—it is a limiting concept that refers to what is beyond experience.
D. Difficulties
1. Kant, like the traditional metaphysicians, retained the notion of a world beyond experience.
2. Humans do not create their experiences—they give them specific forms.
3. Thus, the contents of sensation must be the result of external causes.
4. His reference to phenomena as appearances seems to imply they are somehow related to the noumena.
5. But, this seems to require the application of the concept of cause—one of the twelve categories that the mind uses to structure experience.
6. He also denies that we can use the concept of causality to make judgments about noumena.
7. Since causal judgments only apply to the contents of experience and we do not experience the noumena.
8. Dilemma:
   a. If phenomena are appearances caused by external reality, then he has gone against his epistemology.
   b. If he denies that the noumena causes the phenomena, then how are they related?

II Transcendent Illusions of Metaphysics
A. The third Faculty
1. Reason is the third faculty of the mind.
2. Logic: the use of reason to order and unify the products of the understanding.
3. Pure reason generates its own concepts which reference what transcends all experience.
B. Transcendental Ideas
1. Self.
2. Cosmos.
3. God.
C. Problem
1. Reason mistakenly applies the categories of the understanding beyond their legitimate borders (the realm of phenomena).
2. Theoretical knowledge is limited to the realm of experience.
3. If pure reason goes beyond experience and draws conclusions about the noumena, then paradoxes and illusions arise.
4. Kant discusses three areas of metaphysics that have generated “transcendent illusions.”

III The Self
A. The Self
1. People have the notion that there is a self or soul—an enduring, non-physical substance.
2. Thoughts and experiences exist within the substance and do not “float around.”
3. Without the synthesizing activity of the self, unified experiences could not exist.
B. No Impression of the Self
1. Kant agrees with Hume—we never have an impression of the self.
2. We have experiences, but never experience the self having the experiences.
3. The self is a necessary condition for the existence of experience.

C. Empirical Self
1. Kant takes Descartes to be mistaken—Descartes thought he could know the self as a substance.
2. Kant: Substance can only be used as a category for unifying elements within experience—hence it is not applicable to what is behind experience.
3. Descartes discovered the empirical self.
4. The empirical self can be known via introspection.

D. Transcendental Self
1. Transcendental ego/transcendental unity of apperception.
2. We must think of our experiences as if they are related to a unifying principle.
3. The source of this principle cannot appear in space or time and cannot be conceptualized via the categories of the understanding.
4. The self is the subject underlying all experience, but cannot be known via introspection or via science.
5. Thus, the self is part of the unknowable noumena.

E. The Self of Psychology
1. Introspection reveals psychological states.
2. The self that is studied by science is not the transcendental self.
3. Psychologists can study people and determine lawlike regularities regulating behavior.
4. Science studies the phenomena and not the noumena.
5. Thus, while science has subject to study, the self is not a determined object.

IV The Cosmos
A. The cosmos
1. He claims that it is a mistake to assume that we can reason about the cosmos.
2. We have fragments of experience of the world, but never experience it in its entirety.
3. He disagrees with Locke’s view that we can compound our finite experiences and create a complex idea of the whole.
4. To reason about the entire world we would need a perspective like God-perceiving outside of space and time.
5. This would require going beyond the human methods of conceptualizing experience.

B. The failure of Reason
1. Reason leads to inconsistency when it attempts to go beyond its proper limits.
2. His argument is based in the presentation of “antimonies of reason.”
3. An antimony is a pair of apparently plausible claims that are contraries and hence cannot both be true.

C. The Antimonies
1. First:
   a. The world has beginning in time and occupies finite space.
   b. The world has no temporal beginning and is spatially and temporally infinite.
2. Second
   a. All things can be analyzed into basic components.
   b. Nothing can be analyzed into basic components.
3. Third
   a. Some events are free and not determined.
   b. No events are free and all events are determined.
4. Fourth
   a. A necessary being exists.
   b. There is no necessary being.

D. The Argument
1. Like the early skeptics, Kant argues for each claim, thus showing that reasoning on these topics leads to inconsistency.
2. He claims the first of each pair is a rationalist position and the second is an empiricist position; both are dogmatic.
3. Kant is sympathetic to the rationalists and claims that if there is no God, no free will, nor an immortal soul, then “moral ideas and principles lose all validity.”
4. He accepts that metaphysical claims are unprovable dogma.
5. He claims the rationalist and empiricist presuppose that we know what we cannot know.
6. The rationalist makes claims about the noumena.
7. The empiricist limits the world to phenomena and mistakenly assumes that appearances are the same as the noumena.

E. Kant’s Resolution
1. He resolves the first two antimonies by asserting both are false because the mistakenly assume that humans can reason about the world as a totality.
2. He resolves the first two by asserting that the second of each pair is true in terms of phenomena, while the first could be true of the noumena.
3. Statements about the noumena cannot be part of theoretical knowledge, but could be the result of “intellectual presuppositions and faith.”
4. Viewed as scientific phenomena, human behavior is determined.
5. Kant claims there is more to humans than this-morality requires that we regard ourselves as noumenal selves who are free.

V God
A. Introduction
1. Reason cannot be used to prove the existence of God.
2. Kant claims there are three ways a person might try to prove the existence of God.
   a. An a priori ontological argument, as per Anselm, Descartes and Leibniz that is based on the idea of a perfect being.
   b. Cosmological argument.
   c. Teleological argument.
3. He argues that each proof fails.
B. The Ontological Argument
1. I can conceive of a perfect being.
2. What is conceivable is possible.
3. It is possible for a perfect being to exist.
4. If a perfect being exists, then it must have all perfections.
5. Existence is a perfection.
6. If there is a perfect being, then it must have existence as a property/perfection.
7. It is possible that a perfect being necessarily exists-its non existence is not possible.
8. It is absurd to claim that there could be something whose nonexistence is impossible at the same time its nonexistence is possible.
9. Thus, a perfect being must exist of necessity.
C. Kant’s First Refutation of the Ontological Argument
1. He agrees that the concept of God includes the concept of an absolutely necessary being.
2. He then compares this with the nature of a triangle: if X is a triangle, then X must have three angles.
3. This does not inform us whether triangles exist or not: if one denies there are triangles, then one does not need to affirm that there are three-angled figures.
4. If there is a God, then there is a entity that exists by necessity-but if one denies that there is a God, then one may also deny that there is a necessary being.
5. Thus, Kant attempts to deny that one can go from concepts to existence.
D. Kant’s Second refutation of the Ontological Argument
1. He claims that existence is not a predicate.
2. Existence is not a property that adds to the concept of X.
   a. Example: Thinking of “a coin in piggy bank” is indistinguishable from thinking of “an existing coin in a piggy bank.”
3. If existence is not a property, then it cannot be an essential part of the concept of God.
4. Kant claims that arguing from our concept of God to His existence is like a merchant adding zeroes to his cash balance and supposing his wealth is thus increasing.
E. The Cosmological Argument
1. The argument proceeds from the existence of things that need a cause to the existence of an ultimate or final cause which must, of necessity, exist.
2. The argument rests on the principle that every event has a cause.
3. Kant argues that this principle only applies within the realm of experience-it cannot be applied to what lies beyond experience.
4. He also argues that by referring to a necessary being, the argument suffers from the same defect as the ontological argument.
F. The Teleological Argument
1. This argument proceeds from the evidence of an ordered universe to the claim that the world was created by an intelligent designer.
2. He claims that “it is the oldest, the clearest, and the most accordant with the common sense of mankind.”
3. He also suggests that it motivates scientists to look for connections within nature and that each discovery strengthens the proof.
4. He claims that the argument can, at most, establish that a designer imposed order on pre-existing matter.
   a. This view was accepted by many ancient Greek philosophers.
5. To establish a creator of everything would require the cosmological argument, but that argument fails.
G. Conclusion
1. All attempts to prove the existence of God are “altogether fruitless and by their nature null and void.”
2. He contends that his arguments also show that it is impossible to prove that God does not exist.
3. Thus, the theist and atheist cannot claim to have knowledge.
4. He claims that this leaves open the possibility for basing religion on practical or moral faith.
5. He claims that his goal in the Critique is to “deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.”
VI Pure Reason
A. Theology & Metaphysics
1. Kant disagrees with Hume’s view that books on metaphysics and theology should be “consigned to the flames.”
2. He claims that metaphysics is a transcendental illusion, but are irresistible.
3. The human mind is faced “by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer.”
B. Legitimate Use
1. The ideas of self, cosmos and God are useful for regulating thought.
2. They provide a meaningful frame of reference.
3. Even though we cannot have knowledge of self, cosmos or God, it is useful to act as if we do.
4. They are the goals of reason.
   a. For example, psychology acts as if there were a self.
5. All we know of the world are the finite objects of experience.
6. It is useful to regard the world as if it were made up of the totality of beings including those that have not been experience.
7. The idea of the world as totality stands for what we would know if science could answer all questions, thus it drives scientists to ask questions so they might move closer to this impossible goal.
8. The idea of God permits use to think of the world as if it possessed a unity with one intelligent cause, thus motivating us to create a coherent world view.
C. What does it mean?
1. Some interpret Kant as holding that the self, world and God do really exist beyond reason because they are necessary for thought.
2. Others interpret Kant as presenting these as useful fictions.

Kantian Ethics: Introduction
I Introduction
A. Theoretical Reason
1. Theoretical reason is reason that yields knowledge of the world of experience.
2. This deals with “the starry heavens” and the physical nature.
3. Physical bodies are governed by scientific laws.
4. Kant claims that we encounter both physical objects and persons.
5. We experience bodies from the outside, but experience personhood from outside and inside (our own personhood).
B. Practical Reason
1. Kant claims that people feel the draw of “the moral law within.”
2. This law is a governing principle but differs from the laws governing natural objects.
3. While he divides reason, he claims that “in the final analysis there can be but one and the same reason which must be different only in application.”
C. Ethical Works
1. 1785: The Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals.
2. 1787: The Critique of Practical Reason.
D. Emphasis
1. He places an emphasis on duties, motives, the dignity and moral worth of persons, plus an unchanging and absolute moral law.
2. He does not use God as the basis for his ethics.
3. He claims that our ability to identify God with the greatest good and to regard historical religious figures as good requires a pre-existing a priori concept of moral perfection.
E. Rationalism
1. Morality cannot be derived from empirical facts about humans.
2. Like Hume, he agrees that we cannot go from an “is” to an “ought.”
3. He solves this problem by his “Copernican revolution.”
4. If moral principles cannot be derived from what is experienced, then the mind must apply its own rational principles of morality to said experience.
5. So, for Kant acting morally is acting rationally and immorality is a form of irrationality.

Kantian Ethics: Good Will, Duty and the Categorical Imperative
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals
I The Good Will
A. The Good Will and Qualities
   1. Only the good will is good without qualification.
   2. Intelligence, wit, judgment, courage, resolution, and perseverance are good but may become bad without a good will.
   3. Power, riches, honor, health, and happiness, inspire pride and presumption without a good will to correct their influence.
B. Worthiness of Happiness
   1. Seeing one without a good will enjoying prosperity cannot please an impartial rational spectator.
   2. So, a good will is necessary to being worthy of happiness.
C. Virtues
   1. Some qualities serve the good will but lack intrinsic unconditional value-they presuppose a good will.
   2. Moderation, self-control, and calm deliberation are good and seem to be part of the intrinsic worth of a person.
   3. They are not good without qualification, though the ancients thought so.
   4. Without the principles of a good will, they may become bad.
      a. The coolness of a villain makes him more dangerous and abominable.
D. The Goodness of the Good Will
   1. A good will is good in itself-not because of what it does or its ability to obtain an end.
   2. It is to be esteemed much higher than all it can be bring about.
   3. If it couldn’t achieve its purpose and only it remained—not a wish, but a summoning of all one’s power, like a jewel, it would shine by its own light, having its whole value in itself.
   4. Its usefulness or fruitlessness cannot add nor take away from this value.

III Moral Worth, Maxim & Universal Law
A. Moral Worth
   1. The moral worth of an action is not in its expected effect nor a principle of action motivated by its expected effect.
   2. All positive effects and promotion of the happiness of others could have been caused other ways.
   3. So there would have been no need of the will of a rational being.
B. The Good
   1. The supreme and unconditional good is only in the good will.
   2. The pre-eminent good consists only in the conception of law—as far as it, and not the expected effect, determines the will.
   3. This is possible only in a rational being.
   4. This good is already present in the person and there is no need to wait for it to appear in the result.
C. Law
   1. The universal conformity of the will’s actions to law in general alone serves the will as a principle.
   2. I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.
   3. Proof: The common reason of men perfectly coincides with this.
D. Example
   1. May I when in distress make a promise with the intention not to keep it?
   2. Two questions:
      a. Is it prudent?
      b. Is it right?
   3. It is different to be truthful from duty and to be truthful from fear of injurious consequences.
      a. To deviate from the principle of duty is wicked.
      b. Ignoring my maxim of prudence may be advantageous, although abiding by it is safer.
   4. The shortest and unerring way to determine if a lying promise is consistent with duty is to ask:
      a. Should I accept that my maxim be a universal law for myself and others?
      b. Should I be able to say: “Everyone may make a deceitful promise when he finds himself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate himself”?
   5. I cannot will that lying be a universal law—there would be no promises since none would believe promises.
   6. Hence my maxim as a universal law would necessarily destroy itself.
E. Determining the Good
   1. To determine what must be done to have a good will ask “Canst thou also will that thy maxim should be a universal law?”
   3. If not, it must be rejected, not because of a disadvantage, but because it cannot be a principle of possible universal legislation.
F. Duty
   1. Duty is the necessity of acting from pure respect for the practical law.
   2. Every other motive must yield to this because it is the condition of a good will and its worth is above everything.

IV The Categorical Imperative
A. Law & Will
   1. Everything in nature works according to laws.
   2. Only rational beings have a will—the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws or principles.
B. Imperatives
1. All imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically.
2. Hypothetical: If the action is good only as a means to something else.
3. Categorical: It is conceived as good in itself and is necessarily the principle of a will which conforms to reason.
4. The categorical imperative: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
5. The imperative of duty: Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature.

IV Examples
A. Case #1: Suicide
1. The situation: A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes is weary of life.
   a. He asks if it would against his duty to himself to commit suicide.
2. Maxim: From self-love, I will end my life when its continuation is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction.
3. Test: Can this principle become a universal law of nature?
   a. A system of nature including a law to destroy life by means of what is to impel its improvement contradicts itself.
   b. Thus, it could not exist as a system of nature.
   c. Hence, the maxim cannot exist as a universal law of nature and is inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty.

B. Case #2: Lying Promises
1. The situation: A person is forced to borrow money.
   a. He knows he cannot repay it, but knows he will not get it unless he promises to repay it.
   b. He wants to promise, but asks: Is it not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way?
2. Maxim: When I need money, I will borrow it and promise to repay it, though I know I cannot.
3. Test: The maxim may be consistent with one's future welfare, but is it right?
   a. It could never be a universal law of nature, but would necessarily contradict itself.
   b. If it were a universal law that everyone could lie to get out of difficulty:
      1. The promise and intended end would be impossible.
      2. Promises would not be believed and ridiculed as vain pretences.

C. Case #3
1. Situation: A person has a talent that, if developed, might make him useful in many respects.
   a. Being in comfortable circumstances, he prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than take pains to improve his natural capacities.
2. Test: Can his maxim of neglect, agreeing with his inclination to indulgence, agree with duty?
   a. Such a system of nature could subsist though men allow their talents to rest, and devote themselves to enjoyment.
   b. He cannot will this to be a universal law of nature.
   c. As a rational being, he necessarily wills his faculties be developed, since they serve him, and were given for many purposes.

D. Case #4
1. The situation: One in prosperity sees others in wretchedness and though he could help, he sees it as no concern of his.
   a. Everyone can be as happy as Heaven pleases, or as he can make himself.
   b. He will take nothing from or envy him, but does not wish to assist him.
2. Test:
   a. If this were a universal law, the human race might be better than when
      1. Everyone talks of sympathy and goodwill, or occasionally practices it.
      2. But cheats and betrays or violates the rights of men.
   b. But, it is impossible to will that such a principle have the universal validity of a law of nature.
   c. Such a will would contradict itself:
      1. He might need the love and sympathy of others.
      2. But by such a law of nature he would deprive himself of all hope of aid.

V Ends
A. Rational Beings
1. Man and all rational being exist as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used.
2. In all his actions, whether concerning himself or other rational beings, they must be regarded as an end.
B. Objects of the inclination
1. Objects of the inclinations have only a conditional worth.
2. If the inclinations founded on them did not exist, they would be without value.
3. The worth of any object to be acquired by our action is always conditional.
4. Beings whose existence depends on nature's will have only a relative value as means, and are hence things.
C. Rational Beings
1. Rational beings are persons, because their nature shows them as ends in themselves, which must not be used only as means.
2. These are not merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us as an effect of our action.
3. They are objective ends, whose existence is an end in itself.
4. If all worth were contingent, there would be no supreme practical principle of reason whatever.

D. Supreme practical principle (Second Formulation of the CI)
1. If there is a Supreme practical principle it must be drawn from what is necessarily an end for everyone.
2. The foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself
3. A man necessarily conceives his own existence as such, making it a subjective principle of human action.
4. Every other rational being sees its existence similarly, on the same rational principle
5. So it is an objective principle, from which as a supreme practical law and all laws can be deduced.
6. The practical imperative: So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only.

E. Kingdom of Ends
1. Kingdom: the union of different rational beings in a system by common laws.
2. It is by laws that the universal validity of ends is determined.
3. If we abstract from the personal differences of rational beings and from their private ends, we can conceive all ends combined in a systematic whole.
4. This includes rational beings as ends in themselves, and the special ends each may propose to himself.
5. Thus, we can conceive a kingdom of ends.

F. Rational Beings as Legislators (Third formulation of the Categorical Imperative).
1. Kant focuses on “the idea of the will of every rational being as making universal law.”
2. Known as the principle of autonomy.
3. For Kant, the autonomy of the will is based on freedom.
4. When one’s moral principles are based on external authority or one’s own inclinations, the will is not free.
5. The moral law is not something that is imposed from outside—it is an expression of one’s own rational nature.
6. As moral agents, rational beings are bound by moral law.
7. Rational beings are autonomous legislators of moral law.
8. In the kingdom of Ends everyone is autonomous, yet follows the same moral laws.

Kantian Ethics: Three Postulates of Morality

I Three Postulates
A. Introduction
1. There are three ideas that are unprovable and cannot be the objects of knowledge, but are irresistible because they are the foundation of all morality.
2. They are: freedom, immortality and God.

B. Freedom
1. Human freedom must be accepted for morality to make sense.
2. Freedom cannot be observed scientifically—for Kant, the scientific view is that all events are determined by natural causes and human behavior is analyzable in psychological and physiological terms.
3. In inner moral experience it is found that the moral law command unconditional obedience.
4. If X is what I ought to do, this implies that X is something that I can do.
5. Hence, only free agents can meet the requirements of morality.
6. Thus, there is a noumenal self beyond the empirical self which is the basis of moral actions.
7. This freedom is unprovable, but is a practical necessity for morality.
8. Human life would be meaningless without morality, hence humans must regard themselves as free.

C. Immortality
1. For Kant, the moral law is strict—we are obligated to make our will conform perfectly with duty.
2. No one can meet this requirement during life.
3. Thus, immortality is a practical necessity—endless time is required to achieve the perfect conformity.
4. “This infinite progress is possible, however only the presupposition of an infinitely enduring existence and personality of the same rational being; this is called the immortality of the soul.”

D. God
1. The hope for eternal life cannot be the motive for doing right.
2. If one is motivated by this, then one is not doing good out of duty but based on a calculation of interest.
3. According to Kant, we intuitively want moral goodness to be linked with happiness.
4. In experience, no necessary connection is found between virtue and happiness.
5. For this intuition to make sense there must be a transcendent cause bringing about a just future distribution of happiness.
6. Thus, “it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God.”
7. Morality is rational and independent of God’s will, yet morality naturally leads to religion.
I. Impact

A. Significance
1. A significant portion of the 19th and 20th century philosophic effort was devoted to understanding Kant’s work.
2. Some philosophers hold that Kant’s revolution is correct and set out to apply his method across the board.
3. Others took his ideas to more extreme regions.
4. Still others attempted to restore traditional metaphysics and epistemology.

B. Impact
1. Kant’s philosophy shaped much of the philosophy that followed in terms of:
2. The objectivity of knowledge.
3. The relationship between the knower and what is known.
4. The nature and limits of science and reason.
5. The nature of self.
6. The nature of moral judgments and religious knowledge.